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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Firm Learning, Unemployment, and Self-Employment in Growth and Development
by
Ying Feng
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor James Rauch, Chair
Professor David Lagakos, Co-Chair
Differences in average income levels across countries are vast. This dissertation investi-
gates the interaction between heterogeneous firms or workers’ decisions and economic growth.
xv
Chapter 1 of this dissertation studies firm life-cycle learning and misallocation. Misalloca-
tion is one of the most prominent theories of Total Factor Productivity in recent years. Specifically,
this study focuses on misallocation of resources across producers. Dispersion in marginal revenue
products of capital (MRPK) across firms may lower aggregate productivity through misallocation.
Using firm-level panel data from China, I document that MRPK dispersion decreases substantially
with firm age, particularly before age five. Building on this fact, I provide a new interpretation
of MRPK dispersion as firm life-cycle learning. I formalize this idea in a dynamic model, in
which firms learn about their fundamental productivity as they age and choose capital inputs in a
frictional market based on their priors. Within each cohort of firms, imprecise priors lead firms to
differ in their ex-post MRPK even in the absence of firm-level distortions. As firms learn over
time and adjust their capital stocks, possibly through exiting the market, dispersion in MRPK
decreases. Quantitative analysis of the model shows that omitting firm life-cycle learning leads to
sizable overestimation of the aggregate productivity losses from misallocation.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation asks: How does the average unemployment rate change
with GDP per capita? This chapter draws on household survey data from countries of all income
levels to measure how unemployment varies with income. We document that unemployment is
increasing with GDP per capita. Furthermore, we show that this fact is accounted for almost
entirely by low-educated workers, whose unemployment rates are strongly increasing in GDP per
capita, rather than by high-educated workers, whose unemployment rates are not correlated with
income. To interpret these facts, we build a model with workers of heterogeneous ability and two
sectors: a traditional sector, in which self-employed workers produce output without reward for
ability; and a modern sector, in which firms hire in frictional labor markets, and output increases
with ability. Countries differ exogenously in the productivity level of the modern sector. The
model predicts that as productivity rises, the traditional sector shrinks, as progressively less-able
workers enter the modern sector, leading to a rise in overall unemployment and in the ratio of
xvi
low-educated to high-educated unemployment rates. A calibrated version of the model accounts
for some, but not all, of the cross-country patterns we document.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation proposes a universal division of different types of self-
employment. It is well-known that self-employment rate declines with GDP per capita (Gollin,
2008). However, when dividing self-employment into employers and own-account workers
(self-employed without employees), this paper documents that the labor share of employers
increases with income levels, and the share of own-account workers decreases. Using household
surveys from countries of all income levels, we show these facts are robust across main industries
and educational categories. We also show nearly universal negative selection on ability into
own-account status, and positive selection into employer and wage earning statuses in our data.
We develop a simple two-sector model to explain these facts. In general equilibrium, agents with
ability below a threshold become own-account workers in the traditional sector, and agents with
ability higher than the threshold enter the modern sector, becoming wage workers or employers.
Higher aggregate productivity is driven by higher returns to ability in the modern sector due to
skill biased technological change, which reduces the threshold ability level. By distinguishing
between own-account workers and employers consistently across 56 countries, our database and
model help reconcile diverse findings about development and entrepreneurship.
xvii
Chapter 1
Firm Life-Cycle Learning and
Misallocation
I am grateful to my advisors David Lagakos and James Rauch for their guidance and support. For helpful comments,
I thank Jim Hamilton, Pete Klenow, Richard Rogerson, Tommaso Porzio, and seminar/conference audiences at Cal
State Fullerton, CityUHK, HKU, ITAM, New Structural Economics Conference, NUS, SAIF, Tsinghua, and UCSD.
I also benefit from numerous discussions with Emilien Gouin-Bonenfant and Xiao Ma. All potential errors are my
own.
1
1.1 Introduction
Differences in average income levels across countries are vast. Development accounting
points to differences in total factor productivity (TFP) as an important proximate cause of cross-
country income differences ([36]). Yet the determinants of TFP are still not well understood. A
prominent theory of TFP emphasized in the recent literature is misallocation. Two influential
papers, [73] and [118], interpret dispersion in marginal revenue products of capital (MRPK)
across firms as the result of firm-level ‘distortions’ that cause misallocation. They argue that
misallocation leads to large TFP losses in developing countries. [13] provide evidence that
size-dependent tax, a form of distortions, are more prevalent in low-income countries.
However, the literature is still very much undecided about how to interpret dispersion
in MRPK across firms ([119]). A large body of work has provided alternative interpretations.
For example, [10] emphasize the role of capital adjustment costs under volatility of productivity,
and [45] emphasize the role of uncertainty in contemporaneous productivity. Both channels lead
to MRPK dispersion but do not imply misallocation from distortions. [44] further develop a
quantitative framework to decompose sources of MRPK dispersion and conclude that, while these
channels are present, a large share of dispersion still results from firm-level distortions. An open
question in the literature remains: What are the sources of MRPK dispersion?
This paper provides a new source of MRPK dispersion, building on a new pattern I
document in the data. Following firm cohorts using firm-level panel data from China for the
period 1998 - 2007, I document that MRPK dispersion across firms decreases substantially with
firm age, particularly before age 5. The magnitude of this life-cycle decrease is similar to the
difference in MRPK dispersion between China and the US as reported in [73]. Furthermore, for
young firms, MRPK dispersion decreases at a decreasing rate with firm age.
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Yet the challenge is that identifying the age effects separately without any additional
assumptions is impossible, because the age, year, and cohort indicators are collinear. In particular,
during my sample period, China experienced massive privatization reforms so that revenue share
of the state-owned firms in the industrial sector declined by 20 percent ([77]). One can expect
large year effects as China underwent such reforms and opened up to international trade. Hence,
the decrease in MRPK dispersion over a firm cohort’s life cycle could be the result of year effects,
rather than age effects. Similarly, one can expect that each successive cohort may be founded
with less MRPK dispersion across firms, as they entered the market more for economic reasons
rather than political reasons. Thus, including controls for year effects and cohort effects is crucial
in any reasonable attempt to identify the age effects on MRPK dispersion.
My preferred identification approach imposes the testable assumption of a linear trend in
the age effects at older ages. For example, consider a special case of linear effects as no trend
in the age effects on MRPK dispersion after firm age 10. Then year effects can be identified by
following the same firm cohorts aging from age 10 because all the changes over time are only
due to year effects in the absence of cohort and age effects. I can subsequently identify the age
effects and cohort effects after knowing the year effects. Specifically, in the preferred approach, I
imposed three plausible trends of age effects at older ages for identification. I also provide two
alternative identification approaches in the paper. All three estimation results show negative age
effects on dispersion in MRPK across firms. In particular, the estimated profile of the standard
deviation of log MRPK within a firm cohort always decreases by more than 0.2 before age five,
which accounts for 13% of the initial dispersion at firm entry.
Building on the facts I document, I provide a new interpretation of MRPK dispersion as
resulting from firm life-cycle learning. It reflects informational frictions over the firm cohort’s
life cycle when firms learn about their own fundamental productivity, as in [79]. Within each
cohort of firms, differences in the precision of priors lead firms to differ in their ex-post MRPK
3
even in the absence of firm-level distortions. I formalize this idea in a dynamic model in which
firms learn over time and choose capital inputs based on their priors in a frictional market with
firm-specific distortions. Qualitatively, as priors of the firm cohort improve through learning over
time, firms with too much or too little capital stock adjust, and the less productive firms within a
cohort exit. Hence, the model predicts that MRPK dispersion within the firm cohort decreases as
firms age.
The main quantitative experiment is to compute the model’s predictions about MRPK
dispersion within a firm cohort as the firms age. To do so, I take the joint distribution of
productivity and capital stocks among firm entrants as given in the data. I calibrate the model
to match three key moments in the data, namely, the exit rate of firm entrants, the correlation
between productivity and capital investment, and the autocorrelation of capital investments. As
a result, for the first ten years of the firm cohort’s life cycle, the calibrated model accounts for
around two thirds of the decrease in MRPK dispersion in the data.
To understand the quantitative role of learning, I decompose changes in MRPK disper-
sion over the firm cohort’s life cycle by sequentially adding mechanisms in the model. If the
firms adjust capital stocks without updating their priors and without exiting the market, MRPK
dispersion barely decreases with firm age. If firms Bayesian update their priors while adjusting
capital stocks, but still do not have the exit option, the dispersion in MRPK decreases around
half as much as the benchmark model prediction. Further adding endogenous firm exit under the
life-cycle learning accounts for the other half of the benchmark model prediction.
What, then, are the consequences of firm life-cycle learning for aggregate TFP, rather than
for a firm cohort? Taking into account the firms’ age distribution in the stationary equilibrium, I
compare the benchmark model predictions to a hypothetical baseline where young firm cohorts
had already completed their learning process as older firms. This comparison suggests that
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informational frictions from firm life-cycle learning lead to a 10 percent loss in aggregate TFP.
I conduct the same analysis in the model after removing firm-level distortions, which suggests
that distortions and firm life-cycle learning together result in a 19 percent loss in aggregate TFP.
Therefore, omitting the contribution of firm life-cycle learning to MRPK dispersion causes more
than half of TFP losses to be incorrectly attributed to distortions. I regard these estimates as lower
bounds of TFP losses because the quantitative analysis assumes MRPK dispersion across firms
remains constant after age 10.
Before concluding, I present plant-level panel data from Colombia and Chile for an
earlier period (around the 1980s). I ask whether MRPK dispersion (measured by standard
deviations of log MRPK) decreases with firm-cohort age. I find that, in both countries, MRPK
dispersion decreases by around 0.4 through the first five years of the firm cohort’s life cycle,
which accounts for 29% and 24% of the initial dispersion across age-zero firms in Colombia and
Chile, respectively. I conclude that data from other developing countries broadly show decreasing
life-cycle MRPK dispersion, similar to the data from China.
Related Literature. Most existing work focuses on the aggregate level of MRPK disper-
sion across firms and does not consider its dynamics over the firm cohort’s life cycle. For example,
[98] and [90] study financial frictions, [81] combine financial frictions and adjustment costs
to investigate MRPK dispersion across plants within the same firms, [72] explore the variation
in markups and returns to scale, and [130] consider markup dispersion, adjustment costs, and
measurement errors. In addition, all the models above are silent on endogenous firm entry and
exit. [140] studies the effects of distortions on firm entry but assumes exogenous exit. [51]
emphasizes that, in theory, endogenous exit may offset the effects of distortions on long-run TFP,
but does not consider informational frictions. This paper is the first to look at life-cycle MRPK
dispersion and the first to interpret MRPK dispersion as resulting from firm learning.1
1See [119] for an in-depth literature review on the causes and costs of misallocation. Other studies focus
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This paper also relates to the literature in macroeconomics that makes cross-country
comparisons of average firm sizes over firms’ life cycles. [75] show that plants stay much smaller
in Mexico and India than in the US over the plants’ life cycles. [21] use data from more countries
to argue that severe distortions in developing countries discourage investments, leading to smaller
average firm sizes. [4] and [40] emphasize the importance of delegation frictions and lack of
selection in explaining smaller average plant sizes over the plants’ life cycles in developing
countries. My results pertain to MRPK dispersion across firms rather than average firm size.
The fact that the dispersion decreases with firm age implies considerable improvement in how
efficiently resources are allocated across firms over their life cycles.
The idea of firm life-cycle learning is built on the classic model of [79]. By adding capital
to his original model, I bring in frictional capital markets, including adjustment costs and fire-sale
discounts upon exit. These frictions are important to match the key pattern of life-cycle MRPK
dispersion within a firm cohort. In addition, other studies, for example, [11], emphasize that exits
of low-productivity firms contribute to aggregate productivity growth. By focusing on MRPK
dispersion across firms, this paper can draw further implications of the consequences of firm
life-cycle learning and exit for aggregate productivity through reallocating resources across firms.
Finally, this paper adds to the vast literature on the theories of TFP, aiming at advancing
our understanding of income differences across countries and across time. For example, [63]
consider the macroeconomic implication on reductions in output of size-dependent policies. [33]
quantify the role of financial frictions in economic development. [44] emphasize distortions
accounts for a larger share of misallocation among Chinese manufacturing firms and adjustment
costs are more salient for large US firms. [35] argue that resource misallocation has played a
sizable role in slowing down Italian productivity growth. This paper points to the potentially
on misallocation over the business cycle: [8] consider the reallocation of products, and [128] emphasizes the
rising uncertainty at the start of the Great Recession. [14] consider misallocation in an open economy with trade
liberalization.
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important role of firm life-cycle informational frictions and learning.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data from China
and presents the features of life-cycle MRPK dispersion across firms without any additional
assumptions. Section 1.3 reports the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion with firm age while
controlling for cohort effects and year effects. Section 1.4 presents the model with learning and
its qualitative predictions. Section 1.5 discusses the quantitative analysis. Section 1.6 provides
evidence from Colombia and Chile. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 MRPK Dispersion across Firms over Their Life Cycles
In this section, I describe the data and present cross-sectional evidence on the pattern of
MRPK dispersion over the firm cohort’s life cycle. When tracking each firm cohort over time,
I find that the dispersion in MRPK across firms always decreases with firm age. The younger
cohorts tend to have smaller MRPK dispersion than older cohorts, and the aggregate MRPK
dispersion in a year also decreases during my sample period (1998 to 2007). I also find that, for
firm cohorts before age five, MRPK dispersion decreases at a decreasing rate.
1.2.1 Data and Measurement
I use the Annual Industry Surveys for 1998 - 2007 conducted by the National Bureau
of Statistics of China. The survey covers all the state-owned firms in the manufacturing sector,
as well as non-state-owned manufacturers with sales revenue above 5 million RMB (around 0.7
million USD). I follow the procedure used by [28] to construct the panel data. I start by matching
the firms over time by registration ID. When firms changed their registration ID due to restructure
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or acquisition, I use company name, phone number, and address to identify the same firms. Note
that ownership change will not cause false exits in the data, because those firms will still be
identified over time through address and name. Throughout the paper, I focus on the firm cohorts
founded after 1978, when the “opening-up reform” started. I drop firms founded in a planned
economy before the economic reform because they may operate under very different systems. In
addition, those firms cannot be observed at ages younger than 20, and are thus less relevant for
studying the life cycles of firms. The remaining panel data have an average of around 180,000
firms per year, growing from 106,000 firms in 1998 to over 298,000 firms in 2007. In addition, I
use the 4-digit Chinese Industry Code (CIC), birth year, wage, employee benefits, value-added,
and capital stock. 2
Let i denote an individual firm. The firm age j is calculated as the survey year minus
the reported birth year. Therefore, the age-one firms are operating for a full year. Let yit denote
the revenue output, kit the capital input, and nit the labor input. Then yit is measured as value
added, kit is measured as the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation of the year, and
nit is measured as the total of wage payments and employee benefits. The employee benefits
include unemployment insurance, old care insurance, medical insurance, housing compensation,
travailing compensation, and union expenses, but availability of the specific variable varies across
years. Hence, I inflate the labor share to match those reported in the annual national accounts as
[73] did. This procedure assumes the imputed values of missing benefits are a constant fraction of
labor income.To summarize dispersion of the key variables over the firms’ life cycles, Appendix
Figure 1.14 plots the standard deviation of log value-added (yit), log capital input (kit), log labor
input (nit), and log employment by firm age. I find the dispersion of value added and labor
input across firms increases with firm age until age 15, while dispersion of capital input and
employment across firms increases very marginally with firm age.
2The share of firms younger than age 10 is around 72% in every year of my sample.
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Let the production function be Cobb-Douglas yit = ezit k
α1
it n
α2
it . I assume decreasing returns
to scale, that is, α1+α2 < 1. I also allow the capital and labor input share to vary across industries
but not over time as in [73]. Following their work, I use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database to calculate α1 as the average values of capital share at 4-digit SIC level during the
period 1987-2011, and then match them to CIC at the 2-digit level. In the empirical analysis, I set
α1+α2 to be the standard 0.85.3 By definition, the MRPK of firm i at time t is ∂yit∂kit = α1
yit
kit
. I
measure total factor revenue productivity (TFPR), marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL),
and MRPK in log terms throughout the paper:
t f prit = log(yit)−α1log(kit)−α2log(nit) (1.1)
mrpkit = log(α1)+ log(yit)− log(kit). (1.2)
mrplit = log(α2)+ log(yit)− log(nit). (1.3)
I drop the observations with missing values and trim the 1% tails of measured MRPK or
TFPR in each industry-year-age group. The remaining data have an average of around 169,000
firms per year, consisting of more than 480,000 unique firms recorded during the sample period.
Around 48% of the unique firms survived for at least four years.
1.2.2 Dispersion of Marginal Products by Firm Age
Consider an industry-year-age bin, denoted as st j, consisting of firms observed in calendar
year t at firm age j in the 4-digit industry s. To measure MRPK dispersion within a st j bin, I
use the standard deviation of mrpkit , denoted as σmrpk,st j, and the 90th minus the 10th percentile
3I conduct the same analysis assuming constant returns to scale as in [73], letting α2 = 1−α1, and get similar
results.
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mrpkit , denoted as D90−10mrpk,st j. Note that, by construction, MRPK dispersion across firms within
an industry-year-age bin is always measured within the same firm cohort c of firms, which are
founded in year t− j. When summarizing MRPK dispersion at a give age or in a given year, I
will always weight σmrpk,st j by Nst j, the number of firms in an industry-year-age bin.
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standard deviation
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average standard deviation of MRPK (σ¯ j) and the weighted
average value of the 90th minus the 10th percentile (D¯90−10j ) by firm-cohort age.
Figure 1.1: Dispersion of MRPK by Firm Age
Define the weighted average dispersion in MRPK at a given firm-cohort age j in both
measures
σ¯ j ≡∑
s
∑
t
σmrpk,st j ·ωst
D¯90−10j ≡∑
s
∑
t
D90−10mrpk,st j ·ωst ,
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where the weight ωst =
Nst j
∑s∑t Nst j
. Figure 1.1 then plots σ¯ j (black solid line with round markers)
and D¯90−10j (blue dashed line with triangle markers) by firm-cohort age. The weighted average
standard deviation of MRPK, σ¯ j, deceases substantially from 1.5 by almost 0.4 points by age 28.
Note that this change is huge, and has the same magnitude as the difference between China and
the US reported in [73].4 The plotted average log differences, D¯90−10j , show the average ratio of
the 90th to the 10th percentile MRPK decreases from more than 33 (e3.5) to only 12 (e2.5) as the
firm cohort ages from zero to around 25. Similar to the patterns of MRPK standard deviations,
the 90-10 percentile difference in MRPK decreases substantially with firm age. I will focus on
the standard deviation of MRPK (σmrpk,st j) as the dispersion measure for the rest of the paper
because it has been used more broadly in the literature. More importantly, I will show later that
σmrpk,st j translates directly to TFP losses.5
Meanwhile, how does the dispersion of MRPL across firms change as firms age? Appendix
Figure 1.15 plots the weighted average standard deviation of MRPL and the weighted average
value of the 90th minus the 10th percentile MRPL by firm age. Both measures of dispersion in
MRPL decrease very marginally before age 5, and they increase slightly afterward. Therefore,
this paper focuses on MRPK dispersion and abstracts from the discussion of MRPL dispersion.
A natural explanation is that, MRPK dispersion decreases with firm age because the less
productive firms within a cohort learn about their type and exit gradually over their life cycles.
This implies that TFPR dispersion also decreases at a decreasing rate with firm age. As learning
and the selection in firm exits becomes less pronounced, the dispersion in both MRPK and TFPR
does not decrease further. Denote the weighted average standard deviation of TFPR at age j as
σ¯t f pr, j. Appendix Figure 1.16 shows that σ¯t f pr, j decreases at a decreasing rate from around 0.99
4Table 2 in their paper reports the difference of 0.14 in the standard deviation of t f pq between China and the US
in 2005. It implies a MRPK dispersion difference of 0.4 points in their model under the standard capital share of 0.3.
5As an alternative measure of dispersion in MRPK, the average ratio of the 75th to the 25th percentile MRPK
decreases monotonically from 6 to 4 as the firm cohort ages from zero to around 25.
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at entry to around 0.9 at age five, and fluctuates between 0.85 and 0.95 afterward. Alternatively,
if one thinks of the production process as the less productive firms catching up with the most
productive firms due to stable innovation investments or spillover effects, one should expect TFPR
dispersion to continuously decrease at older ages, which is not observed in the data.6 Furthermore,
Appendix Figure 1.17 plots MRPK dispersion for the balance panel, which consists of firms that I
can observe every year during the sample period of 1998-2007. It shows that, when firm exits are
shut down, MRPK dispersion decreases with firm age with a smaller magnitude.
However, the summary statistics by firm-cohort age presented above is the result of
a combination of age, cohort, and year effects. In a fast-changing economy like China, one
may expect large variations across firm cohorts born in different years. For example, as China
moves from an economy of state-owned enterprises to one with mostly private enterprises, each
successive cohort of firms may be founded with a smaller dispersion in MRPK. To investigate the
life-cycle pattern within each firm cohort c = t− j, define the weighted average dispersion across
firms at age j as
σ¯ jct− j ≡∑
s
σmrpk,st j ·ωsc,
where the weight ωsc =
Nst j
∑s Nst j
.
Figure 1.2 then plots σ¯ j,ct− j against firm-cohort age by following each cohort born in
1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999, respectively. For all the cohorts, we see a general decrease in
MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age. The older firm cohorts tend to have a larger dispersion in
MRPK than the younger cohorts at the same ages. In particular, for the firm cohort founded in
1999, MRPK dispersion declines by almost 0.4 from age zero to age eight. Furthermore, Figure
1.3 plots MRPK dispersion for the nine firm cohorts founded between 1998 and 2006, which
can be tracked from age 0 at the entry year. Similar to the 1999 firm cohort in Figure 1.2, the
6Note that σ¯t f pr, j is at a lower scale than σ¯mrpk, j, due to a large dispersion in kit , which is not offset by the
empirical correlation between yit and kit , thus being reflected in σ¯mrpk, j.
12
Cohort Born in 1979
Cohort Born in 1984
Cohort Born in 1989
Cohort Born in 1994
Cohort Born in 1999
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1.
6
D
is
pe
rs
io
n 
of
 M
RP
K
1 6 11 16 21 26
age
Note: This figure plots the weighted average dispersion, σ¯ j,ct− j , by firm age within each cohort born
in year 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999, respectively.
Figure 1.2: Dispersion of MRPK by Firm Age and Cohort
decline in MRPK dispersion across firms is substantial through the first five years of the firms’
life cycles for all nine cohorts. In addition, the older cohorts among the nine again tend to have a
larger MRPK dispersion, as we see the black lines are above the blue and the blue are above the
orange.7
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine the Chinese economy with little year effects as the
privatization reforms deepen over time. Define the weighted average dispersion in a given year
7Appendix Figure 1.21 plots the exit rates by firm-cohort age of the same firm cohorts in Figure 1.2 after removing
zero-sum year effects using the identification approach in Section 1.3.1. Patterns of the exit rates resemble those of
the MRPK dispersion.
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average dispersion, σ¯ j,ct− j , by firm age within each of the nine
cohorts born during 1998 to 2006.
Figure 1.3: Dispersion of MRPK by Firm Age, Young Cohorts
t as σ¯t ≡ ∑s∑ jσmrpk,st j ·ωs j , where the weight ωs j = Nst j∑s∑ j Nst j . Appendix Figure 1.18 plots σ¯t
during my sample period. The average aggregate dispersion in MRPK decreases from 1.4 in 1998
to less than 1.3 in 2007.
In summary, by following each firm cohort over time, I find that MRPK dispersion
decreases substantially with firm-cohort age. However, the decrease is not necessarily the result of
age effects, because it reflects both age effects and year effects. Instead, the substantial decrease
could be the result of potentially sizable year effects, because China underwent its reforms and
opened up over time. Therefore, in any reasonable attempt to identify age effects, controlling for
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cohort effects and year effects is crucial.
1.2.3 Industry Variations
In different industries, MRPK dispersion decreases at different rates with respect to firm-
cohort age. I use this variation to shed light on the mechanisms of decline in MRPK dispersion
over the firm cohort’s life cycle. Define the weighted average dispersion in MRPK across firms at
age j in industry s as σ¯s j ≡ ∑t σmrpk,st j ·ωt , where the weight ωt = Nst j∑t Nst j . I investigate how the
correlation between σ¯s j and firm age j varies across industries, and discuss how it relates to the
industry characteristics.
Within each industry, I use κs in the linear model below to summarize MRPK dispersion
over the firm cohort’s life cycle:
σmrpk,st j = κ0s+κsagest j + εst j. (1.4)
Estimate κ̂s describes how σ¯s j changes with firm-cohort age under the linear specification. The
average value of κ̂s across industries is -.014, with a standard deviation of 0.026. Therefore, in the
majority of industries, MRPK dispersion decreases with firm age, and on average, σ¯s j decreases
more than 1% per age.
To utilize the standard industry-level characteristics commonly used in the trade literature,
I mapped the 4-digit 2003 CIC to the 6-digit US Input-Output classification, and used the industry
indexes from [7]. Table 1.1 reports the results of regressing estimated κ̂s on various industry
characteristics with bootstrap standard errors. It shows that when the capital-labor ratio increases
by 1 log point, the decrease of σmrpk,st j per age is 0.005 points larger, which is more than one
third of the average value 0.014 across all industries. The significant positive coefficient on log
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Table 1.1: Industry Characteristics and Life-Cycle σmrpk,st j
κ̂s (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Capital Per Worker) -.005∗∗∗ -.005∗ -.006∗∗ -.006∗∗
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
Log(R&D/Sales) -.002∗∗ -.002∗∗ -.002∗
(.001) (.0008) (.0009)
Contractibility -.006 -.006∗∗
(.005) (.003)
Financial Dependence -.004 .003
(.003) (.016)
Input Substitutability -.00004 -.00004
(.0002) (.0003)
Log(Capital per worker)*Financial Dependence -.002
(.004)
Obs. 423 408 408 408
R2 .015 .034 .044 .044
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent
levels, respectively. Independent variable Log(Capital per worker) is the industry average calculated
during sample period 1998 - 2007 in China. The source of the industry indexes is [7]: industry-level
Log(R&D/Sales) is from Nunn-Trefler (US, 2000-2005); upstream Contractibility from Nunn (2007)
based on liberal classification; Financial Dependence is measured as the External Capital Dependence
from Rajan-Zingales (1997) calculated using 1980s Compustat data. Input Substitutability is measured
as the Import Demand Elasticity (based on SITC33).
capital per worker suggests that industries with higher capital shares are better at decreasing
MRPK dispersion over the firm cohort’s life cycle. One possible explanation could be that the
costs related to capital, such as storage and maintenance costs or adjustment costs, push firms to
adjust capital more responsively, reallocating resources to the more productive incumbent firms.
Meanwhile, industries that larger innovation expenditure shares are better at decreasing MRPK
dispersion over firm-cohort age. Additionally, a slightly significant positive correlation exists
between resource reallocation and contractibility: Industries in which it is easier to contract the
sales of their capital inputs at less discounted values upon exit also experience a faster decrease
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in MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age. I will build these ideas formally in the dynamic firm
model in section 1.4 to assess their explanatory power.
1.3 Life-Cycle MRPK Dispersion: Controlling for Cohort and Time
The previous section reports the average MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age simply.
Although understanding the data with minimal structure and assumptions is useful, this exercise
does not address certain issues. The identification of first-order age effects is a well-known
challenge due to the collinearity between age, year, and cohort indicators. In this section, I
address the identification issues.
Though Figures 1.2 and 1.3 track the same firm cohorts over time and find a consistent
trend of decreasing dispersion with firm-cohort age, they still leave open the possibility that
the trend is driven by year effects rather than age effects. For instance, one may expect large
negative year effects as China deepens its privatization reforms and shuts down the inefficient
state-owned enterprises. The year effects, which are cohort-neutral, could lead to decreasing
life-cycle MRPK dispersion within every cohort. In this scenario, year effects lead to a spurious
relationship between MRPK dispersion and firm-cohort age for all the cohorts.
The goal of this section is to estimate flexible versions of the MRPK dispersion profile
with firm age. The specifications take the following form:
σmrpk,st j = α0+∑
j∈J
φ jD j +χc+ψt +θs+ εst j. (1.5)
D j is a dummy equal to 1 if firms in the industry-year-age bin st j are observed at age j.
ψt captures year fixed effects, χc captures cohort fixed effects, θs captures industry fixed effects,
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and εst j is a mean-zero error term.
1.3.1 Three Approaches to Identifying Age Effects
The main challenge to estimat the age effects on MRPK dispersion is that age indicators
are correlated with cohort indicators and year indicators. Therefore, identifying the age effects
separately without any additional assumption is impossible. This section uses three approaches to
identify age effects while controlling for cohort and year effects.
To resolve the difficulty of collinearity, I follow [46] and imposes one additional linear
restriction on the set of cohort and time effects to estimate equation (1.5). Consider the decrease
in aggregate MRPK dispersion over time, as plotted in Figure 1.18, which reflects the combined
result of cohort-neutral year effects and effects of changes in the composition of firm cohorts in
a calendar year. To identify age effects, I need to discipline the relative role of year effects and
cohort effects in the decrease in aggregate MRPK dispersion over time.
Preferred Approach. My preferred identification approach assumes a linear trend in age
effects on MRPK dispersion after age 10. For example, consider the assumption of no trend in the
age effects after firm-cohort age 10 as a special case of the linear effects. Then year effects can
be identified by following the firm cohorts older than age 10 because all the changes over time
are only due to year effects in the absence of cohort and age effects. This assumption is actually
also in accord with the empirical findings of [66]: Mature firms in the US have stable dynamics
compared to the younger firms.
Furthermore, I can also test this assumption, because the second derivatives of age effects,
which inform the curvature of age effects, are always identified as shown in [95]. I find the age
effects are convex for the young firms, meaning MRPK dispersion decreases at a decreasing
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rate with firm cohort age. In addition, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the age effects on
MRPK dispersion are linear after age four. I describe the econometric details in section 1.9. The
test results provide econometric foundations for identifying first-order age effects by assuming a
linear trend in the age effects at older ages.
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Note: This figure plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age in equation (1.6)
using the second identification approach, which assumes (a) no trend in the age effects on MRPK
dispersion after age 10 (dashed orange line with circle markers); (b) a small decreasing trend of 0.005
points per age after age 10 (long-dashed blue lines with triangle markers); (c) a moderate decreasing
trend of 0.01 points per age after firm age 10 (solid black lines with square markers).
Figure 1.4: Estimated MRPK Dispersion by Firm Age, Preferred Approach
Figure 1.4 plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age using the
second identification approach. In particular, I impose three different plausible magnitudes of the
linear trend in the age effects on MRPK dispersion after firm-cohort age 10: (a) no trend in the
age effects after age 10 (dashed orange line with circle markers); (b) a small decreasing trend of
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0.005 points per age after age 10 (long-dashed blue lines with triangle markers); (c) a moderate
decreasing trend of 0.010 points per age after age 10 (solid black lines with square markers).
The three different trends imposed on age effects after firm-cohort age 10 all yield a substantial
and convex decline of dispersion in MRPK for the young firms. In particular, MRPK dispersion
decreases 0.22 to 0.25 point before age five.
Alternative Approach One. Instead of picking a plausible magnitude of the trend in age
effects, the alternative identification approach estimate it by imposing the assumption that two
consecutive old cohorts are the same, as in [64]. In the context of my sample between 1998 and
2007 in China, this assumption is based on the background that old firm cohorts founded in the late
1970s are similar because they were founded at the beginning of the economic reform and were
adapting gradually, whereas the young firm cohorts could be drastically different because they
are founded in different years in the fast-changing economy as China deepened its privatization
reforms and largely opened up. The assumption in this approach is also a relaxed constraint of
the assumption in [64] (p.248), who assumed all vintages have the same cohort effects to identify
the age effects on the prices of used trucks.
This assumption identifies the slope of the linear trend in age effects by observing the old
cohorts in the same years. Consider the two consecutive old firm cohorts founded in 1979 and
1980, both observed in the year 1998: one at age 18 and the other at age 19. Because they are
observed in the same year, there is no difference in the year effects. The cohorts effects are the
same as well under the assumption; hence, the difference in MRPK dispersion is only due to the
different age effects at age 18 and age 19. In total, they are observed for ages 19-28 and 18-27,
respectively, during 1998-2007. The average difference across years then gives the least-squares
estimate of the age effect per year. In addition, by following all firm cohorts over time, this
assumption can now help identify the trend in year effects given the age trend.
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I implement this approach by estimating equation (1.5) in the framework as described in
section 1.11. In practice, I assume every two adjacent cohorts founded during 1979 to 1983 are
the same. They are observed from age 15 to 28. For each of the four pairs of adjacent cohorts, I
calculate the difference in MRPK dispersion in each year between 1998 and 2007. Then I take
the average of the differences of the four pairs as the trend in age effects after age 15, which turns
out to be .009. I force the cohort effects of firms born in 1979 - 1983 to be the same.
Figure 1.5 plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age using this
approach: MRPK dispersion decreases substantially through the first five years of a firm cohort’s
life cycle, accumulating to more than -0.24 points. It further decreases after age five, though at a
slower rate, accumulating to -0.35 points at age 28 compared to age zero.
Alternative Approach Two. This approach makes econometric assumptions to split the
decreasing trend of dispersion over time between time effects and cohort effects as in [46], and
does not make assumptions on the curvature of age effects. This approach also illustrates the
econometric difficulty in disentangling the three effects.8
In practice, I implement two ways to split the decline in aggregate MRPK dispersion over
time: One version attributes all the decline to cohort effects, and the other version attributes all the
decline to cohort-neutral year effects. I show in Appendix section 1.10 that the two restrictions
provide the lower and upper bounds of age effects if all three effects of age, year, and cohort
on MRPK dispersion have non-positive trends. The condition of a non-negative trend in all
three effects is a plausible case because the patterns of MRPK dispersion decrease with firm age,
calendar year, and the birthyear of a firm cohort, as shown in section 1.2.2.
Specifically, I estimate equation (1.5) under restrictions. The first version attributes all the
8This methodology is commonly used in the literature on individuals’ life-cycle consumption and income
dynamics (e.g., ?), and was recently used for firms in [102] and [8].
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Note: This figure plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-chort age when assuming
the two adjacent firm cohorts founded in 1979 - 1983 have the same cohort effects.
Figure 1.5: Estimated MRPK Dispersion by Firm Age, Alternative Approach One
decline over time to cohort effects. It makes the same assumption as in the original analysis in
[46] and uses year dummies to capture only cyclical fluctuations. In practice, the first age dummy
and the first cohort dummy are omitted as the benchmark reference, and the time dummies are
transformed to meet the restriction that the time effects are orthogonal to a time trend. The second
version is the opposite extreme case and attributes all decline to time effects. In this version,
I assume the cohort effects are orthogonal to a time trend. See Appendix 1.11 for a formal
description of this approach and the details of implementing it.
The long-dashed line in Figure 1.6 plots MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age estimated
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under the assumption in the first version that all decline is driven by cohort effects. It provides the
lower bound of the age effects, if all three effects of age, cohort, and year have non-positive trends,
as shown in Appendix section 1.10. In this version, MRPK dispersion decreases substantially
with firm age, accumulating to a magnitude of 0.6 points at age 28. The dashed line in Figure
1.6 plots the profile of MRPK dispersion estimated in the second version, where I assume all
the decline over time is driven by year effects. In the second version, MRPK dispersion again
decreases with firm age; note the decrease is most substantial before age five and flattens out
afterward. This version also provides the upper bounds of age effects, as shown in Appendix
section 1.10.
In conclusion, the first alternative approach shows MRPK dispersion decreases substan-
tially with firm age, both in the lower and upper bounds. In particular, MRPK dispersion within a
firm cohort decreases more than 0.04 points per age on average until age five, though the slope
of MRPK dispersion at older ages is sensitive to the restrictions used for identification. When I
attribute all the decline in MRPK dispersion over time to year effects, the estimated profile of
MRPK dispersion closely resembles the results in the preferred approach.
In summary, although identifying the first-order age effects directly without any additional
assumptions is impossible, the three identification approaches in this section establish a substantial
decrease in MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age. The estimation result of the three cases in the
preferred approach lies between the upper and lower bounds (estimated in alternative approach
two). The result from alternative approach one is also consistent with the upper and lower bounds,
with estimates closer to the lower bounds. All three approaches conclude a substantial decrease
in MRPK dispersion within the firm cohorts at young ages, accumulating to a magnitude of 0.2 to
0.3 by age five. In addition, the estimated profiles of MRPK dispersion through the first five years
of the firm cohort’s life cycle are convex, as McKenzie tests predict. The age effects on MRPK
dispersion after age five are generally negative across the three approaches, though the magnitude
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Note: This figure plots the estimated MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age using the first approach.
The long-dashed line plots MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age estimated using equation (1.5),
under the assumption that all the decline in MRPK dispersion over time is driven by cohort effects.
The dashed line plots MRPK dispersion by firm cohort age estimated using equation (1.5), under the
assumption that all the decline over time is driven by year effects. See Appendix 1.11 for a detailed
description of implementing this methodology.
Figure 1.6: Estimated MRPK Dispersion by Firm Age, Alternative Approach One
is sensitive to the specific identification assumptions.
1.3.2 Robustness
This section assesses the robustness of the fact I document that MRPK dispersion decreases
substantially with firm-cohort age. In particular, I consider other plausible factors that can affect
the profile of life-cycle MRPK dispersion within a firm cohort: exit selection, time-series volatility
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of productivity, firm ownership, financial frictions, firm size, and measurement errors.
Controlling for the Volatility of Productivity
In this section, I investigate the life-cycle MRPK dispersion after controlling for the
volatility of productivity at each age of the firm cohort. [10] argue the dispersion in MRPK can
largely be explained by capital adjustment costs in an environment with productivity volatility,
where firms choose the capital stocks in the current period, taking into consideration that the
volatility of productivity in the future, thus resulting in ex-post static MRPK dispersion in the
current period. If volatility in productivity decreases as the firm cohort ages and matures, the
older firms will tend to have less dispersion in the ex-post MRPK than the younger firms. In this
case, MRPK dispersion may decrease over the firms’ life cycles due to decreasing productivity
volatility with firm-cohort age. Therefore, not controlling for the volatility of productivity could
overstate the magnitude of negative age effects.
I define the time-series productivity volatility to be σ∆z,st j, as in [10], which measures the
standard deviation of productivity changes, (zit− zit−1), from one period to the next. The index
st j indicates the standard deviation is taken across firms within the same industry-year-age bin.
Adding σ∆z,st j as a control variable in equation (1.5), I use the second identification approach to
estimate
σmrpk,st j = α0+αvol ·σ∆z,st j +∑
j∈J
φ jD j +θs+χc+ψt + εst j.9 (1.6)
Consistent with [10], I find higher productivity volatility is correlated with a higher level
of dispersion in marginal capital products. A one unit increase in the volatility of productivity
9The third approach, which assumes two adjacent old cohorts have the same cohort effects, becomes less
straightforward here, because the two cohorts have different volatility of productivity even when observing in the
same year.
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predicts a 0.32-point increase in the cross-sectional MRPK dispersion, significant at the 1-percent
level. The estimated profile of MRPK dispersion, after controlling for volatility of productivity,
also decreases with firm age. As before, the decrease is most substantial through the first few
years of a firm cohort’s life cycle, though at a slightly smaller magnitude, accumulating to -0.18
to -0.22 points by age five compared to entry. I conclude that the decrease in MRPK dispersion
with firm-cohort age cannot be explained by declining volatility of productivity as a firm cohort
ages. See the estimation results plotted in Appendix Figure 1.22.
State-owned and Non-state Firms
The misallocation of capital between the state-owned and the non-state-owned firms is a
salient feature in the Chinese economy (see, e.g., [27, 14, 26]). One may worry that the life-cycle
production of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China responds largely to government policies
and do not reflect the market outcomes. The SOEs might drive the pattern of MRPK dispersion
over the firm cohort’s life cycle. This section reports the life-cycle MRPK dispersion by firm
ownership.
I define the firm as a SOE if more than half of its assets is owned by the state, and define
the firm as a non-state firm otherwise. Figure 1.7 plots the weighted average MRPK dispersion for
the SOEs, the non-state firms, and the pooled aggregate sample. The life-cycle MRPK dispersion
of the non-state firms closely resembles that of the pooled sample, which decreases from 1.5 to
around 1.2 between entry and age 27. Dispersion in MRPK across SOEs within a cohort also
decreases with firm age. In addition, it constantly remains at a higher level than the dispersion
among non-state firms, which may reflect larger informational frictions or less learning among
SOEs. I conclude that MRPK dispersion robustly decreases with firm-cohort age, both for the
SOEs and the non-state firms.
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average MRPK dispersion for the SOEs, the non-state firms, and
the pooled sample.
Figure 1.7: MRPK Dispersion by Firm Ownership
In addition, Table 1.2 reports the difference in the dispersion of MRPK at an older age
relative to entry, for the full sample and for only the non-state firms. The t-test results of the equal
means show that all the differences are strongly significant. For the full sample, the dispersion in
MRPK decreases by 0.4 points until age 27. This decline through entry to age 27 is slightly larger
for the non-state firms. Both for the full sample and for the non-state firms, MRPK dispersion
decreases substantially before age five. In particular, it drops by almost 0.2 points until age five
compared to entry, which accounts for around half of the decrease in MRPK dispersion during
firm entry to age 27.
To further identify age effects, I estimate the dispersion in MRPK with firm-cohort age
after restricting the sample to only non-state firms, using the second identification approach
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Table 1.2: Dispersion of MRPK by Firm Age
σ¯ j Full Sample Non-state Firms
Dispersion at Age 1 -.04∗∗∗ -.03∗∗
(.01) (.01)
Dispersion at Age 5 -.18∗∗∗ -.19∗∗∗
(.01) (.01)
Dispersion at Age 10 -.23∗∗∗ -.25∗∗∗
(.01) (.01)
Dispersion at Age 20 -.30∗∗∗ -.37∗∗∗
(.02) (.02)
Dispersion at Age 27 -.41∗∗∗ -.44∗∗∗
(.04) (.04)
Note: This table reports σ¯ j, the average standard deviation of MRPK at a given age, in the data compared to entry with
the estimate of standard error in parentheses. Row 1 uses the full sample, and Row 2 uses only the non-state firms.
and controlling for volatility of productivity. It yields the same coefficient on volatility (0.32),
significant at 1%, as the full sample. Dispersion in MRPK across non-state firms decreases 0.20
to 0.25 points by age five compared to age zero, which has a slightly larger magnitude than the
estimates using the pooled sample. See the estimation results plotted in Appendix Figure 1.23.
Financial Frictions
An alternative explanation for the pattern I document is financial frictions, which could
generate MRPK dispersion if they were high for some firms and low for others. Then they could
gradually go away for various reasons, such as internally generated funds, or learning by banks. If
young firms overcome financial constraints over time, they will start with high marginal product,
and then decrease it.
However, financial frictions cannot explain why some firms start out with low marginal
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product and then raise it. In the data, 56% of the firms have higher MRPK than the previous
year. In particular, 67% of the survived firm entrants have higher MRPK at age 1, and 59% of the
survived age-one firms have higher MRPK at age 2; this percentage fluctuates between 54% to
56% from age 3. Because financial frictions cannot reconcile MRPK dynamics over time of these
many firms in the data, I conclude financial constraints are not the driving force of the decline in
MRPK dispersion with firm age.
Firm Size and Measurement Error
Because average firm size and firm-cohort age are strongly and positively correlated, one
may worry about whether the fact that I document is robust across firm groups with different
average sizes. This section assesses the robustness of the decreasing MRPK dispersion with
firm-cohort age to firm size.
Figure 1.8 plots the weighted average MRPK dispersion by firm size. The bottom-quartile
firms have around 45 employees on average, and the top quartile firms on average have more than
166 employees. For firms in quartile two and three, and the top-quartile of firm-size distribution,
MRPK dispersion decreases substantially with firm age, particularly for young firms. For firms in
the bottom quartile, MRPK dispersion within a firm cohort decreases through the first five years
but increases afterward. I conclude the age effects, particularly before age five, are robust to firm
size. This is also consistent with the finding in [66] that effects of firm size become insignificant
after controlling for firm age.
Measurement error has been an important and challenging concern for the misallocation
literature and, more broadly, for measuring capital stocks and revenue outputs using firm-level
data.10 For this paper in particular, one may worry that measurement errors are larger for young
10[124] argue that the editing strategies used for U.S. Census of Manufactures may largely decrease the measured
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average MRPK dispersion by firm-size quartile.
Figure 1.8: MRPK Dispersion by Firm Size
and small firms because they lack the resources and experiences to report measurements precisely.
If one thinks of larger firms as those that are competent in corporate finance and accounting,
and thus have relatively small measurement errors in reported revenue output and capital stocks,
then there is less concern about measurement errors when we look at MRPK dispersion within
large firms. The black lines in Figure 1.8 show that MRPK dispersion decreases robustly with
firm-cohort age for the third-quartile and top-quartile firms, which have an average of 120 and
520 employees, respectively. That MRPK dispersion across large firms decreases over the firm
cohort’s life cycle provide indirect evidence of the pattern’s robustness to measurement error.
MRPK dispersion in the cleaned dataset, leading to lower MRPK dispersion in the US than in India. However,
because I focus on the firm panel-data within one country, differential data editing strategies across countries is much
less concerning.
30
In addition, I follow the approach in [23] to estimate how much additive measurement
errors in the revenue output and capital input for firms at each age accounts for observed
MRPK dispersion (σ2mrpk). This approach essentially involves estimating the following regres-
sion: ∆log(yit) = φerrmrpkit +Ψerr∆log(kit)−Ψerr(1−λerr)mrpkit ·∆log(kit)+Dst +εit , where
∆log(yit) and ∆log(kit) denote changes in log revenue output and capital, and Dst denotes the
industry-year fixed effects. They show that (1−λerr) represents the contribution of measurement
error to observed variance in MRPK under certain assumptions. The estimates of 1−λerr, using
samples restricted to firm cohorts at age one to 28, respectively, have an average value of 0.02,
which suggests measurement errors contribute to only 2% of the observed MRPK dispersion on
average. Regressing the estimated 1− λ̂err on age j, one will find a positive and insignificant
coefficient of 0.15 with a P-value of 0.19, thus suggesting that the additive measurement error
does not contribute differently to MRPK dispersion within firm cohorts at different ages.
1.3.3 Empirical Evidence of Firm Life-Cycle Learning
The decline in the variance of firm growth with firm age is evidence of firm life-cycle
learning ([50]). Corresponding to the focus of this paper on MRPK, I use capital investment, the
difference in the capital between two consecutive years, as the measure of firm growth. Figure
1.9 then plots the weighted average variance of investments across industry-year-age bins by firm
age. It shows that investment dispersion decreases substantially with firm age, particularly for
young firms. This is consistent with the basic Bayesian learning mechanism: firms enter with
imprecise beliefs about their true productivity and they learn over time by observing revenue
output realizations. Therefore, young firms face larger uncertainty about their productivity and
revise their beliefs and investments relatively more, compared to the older firms, who are better
informed with more observations. Furthermore, the pattern of decreasing variance of investment
with firm age highly resembles that of MRPK dispersion, which implies the decline in MPRK
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average variance of investments by firm age.
Figure 1.9: Variance of Investment by Firm Age
dispersion with firm age is likely to be associated with learning. 11
1.4 Model of Firm Life-Cycle Learning
In this section, I develop a general equilibrium model to match the convexly downward
sloping profile of MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age in the data. The model features firm
life-cycle learning and endogenous exit as in [79]. By adding capital to his original model, I bring
in capital adjustment costs and capital fire-sales upon exiting the market, which are important to
match the fact that firms scale down their capital stocks prior to exiting the market. Furthermore,
11Using firm-level panel data from Japan, [41] show that older firms make less forecasting errors about their
idiosyncratic demand than younger firms, which is more direct evidence of firm learning.
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the model with capital input choices in this paper generates losses in aggregate productivity due
to informational frictions and capital market frictions over the firms’ life cycles.
To conduct quantitative analyses, I build the model with multiple market frictions and
firm-level distortions that can contribute to MRPK dispersion. Firms choose inputs facing (i)
informational frictions, in the form of imperfect signals about their own fundamental productivity
as well as contemporaneous uncertainty due to idiosyncratic shocks in each period, (ii) exit
frictions, in the form of discount value from capital fire-sale on exit, (iii) technological frictions,
in the form of quadratic capital adjustment costs, and (iv) a generic class of idiosyncratic firm-
level distortions as in [73]. The key mechanism is that as firms learn over time, those with too
much or too little capital stock adjust and the less productive firms within a cohort exit over time,
leading to decreases in MRPK dispersion over a firm cohort’s life cycle.
1.4.1 Environment and Equilibrium
Consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon economy, populated by a representative house-
hold. The household inelastically supplies a fixed amount of labor N and has a preference over
consuming the final good. The household discounts time at rate β. I deliberately keep the
household side of the economy simple because of its limited role in the analysis.
Distribution of fundamentals. The distribution of firm fundamental productivity xi is
log-normally distributed, that is, xi ∼ N(µx,σ2x). In each period, with probability λ ∈ (0,1), a firm
i carries over the same fundamental to the next period, and with probability 1−λ, the firm exits
exogenously.
Production. At the beginning of every period, each firm draws a productivity zit , which
combines its fundamental and an idiosyncratic transitory shock eit ∼ N(0,σ2e). That is, zit =
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xi+ eit . I assume the standard Cobb-Douglas production function, where output yit(kit ,nit ;zit) =
ezit kα1it n
α2
it with α1 +α2 < 1. Recall that kit denotes capital input and nit labor input. Note the
assumption of decreasing return to scale is equivalent to an alternative environment in which firms
produce differentiated products and face downward-sloping demand curves due to decreasing
marginal utility of consumption. In that setup, zit can be interpreted as an idiosyncratic demand
shifter. In this paper, I will refer to zit as the productivity specific to firm i at time t.
Learning. Firms learn about their own fundamental productivity by experimenting and
observing realized outputs in the previous periods, as in [79] and [82]. The firms’ beliefs about
their fundamentals are summarized in expected mean x̂it and expected variance σ̂2it . At the
beginning of the firm-entry period, where t = 0 and no realizations of productivity zit arrive yet,
firms have a common prior belief about their fundamental technology as N(x̂i0, σ̂2i0)≡ N(µx,σ2x).
In every period t, they use the noisy signal zit to update and form a posterior belief about their
fundamental productivity xi as N(x̂i,t+1, σ̂2i,t+1). Bayesian updating is based on the following
equations:
x̂i,t+1 =
σ̂2itzit +σ2e x̂it
σ̂2it +σ2e
(1.7)
σ̂2i,t+1 =
σ̂2itσ2e
σ̂2it +σ2e
. (1.8)
Fixed and Input Costs. Firms pay a fixed operation cost fo in every period they produce.
Labor is hired period by period in a spot market with the competitive wage w. With capital
depreciation rate δ and quadratic adjustment costs parameter ξ, the total cost of choosing capital
stock ki,t+1 is given by
Φ(kit ,ki,t+1) = ki,t+1− (1−δ)kit + ξ2
(
ki,t+1
kit
− (1−δ)
)2
kit . (1.9)
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I also consider other factors that affect capital stock choices in addition to the fundamental
productivity or demand. These factors include, for example, government policies, such as size-
dependent taxes, or institutional environment, such as legal forms. As in [73] and [44], to
capture these factors, I introduce a class of idiosyncratic firm-level “distortions” that appear in
the firm’s problem as proportional taxes on capital. I leave out the wedges on hiring decisions for
simplicity. I allow distortions on capital to covary with contemporaneous productivity, that is,
taxes T kit = e
zitτk , where τk denotes the correlation that determines the extent to which the capital
price comoves with the contemporaneous productivity. If τk is positive, distortions discourage the
investment of firms with stronger fundamentals while protecting those with weaker fundamentals,
which is arguably the empirically relevant case ([76, 21]). The opposite incentive is true if τk is
negative.
Firm’s problem. At the beginning of each period t, firms choose whether to exit per-
manently or continue operating the business, and choose capital stocks ki,t+1 if they continue
operating. When exiting the market, firms turn to fire sales for their capital stocks and retain
discounted values of γkit , as in [116]. A firm’s state variables, or information set, includes the
capital stock kit , the observation of a noisy signal in productivity zit , and the belief about the
their fundamentals, summarized in x̂it and σ̂2it . Because σ̂2it has a deterministic path over firm
age j, I make the j an explicit state variable instead of σ̂2it . Therefore, the value of an incumbent
firm at age j is given by V (kit ,zit , x̂it , j) =maxD∈{0,1}
{
V E(kit ,zit , x̂it , j),VC(kit ,zit , x̂it , j)
}
, where
the dummy variable D denotes the exit choice, VC(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) denotes the value of continuing
operation, and V E(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) = γkit is the value of exit. Writing the value of continuation in the
recursive form yields
VC(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) = max
ki,t+1,nit
{ezit kα1it nα2it −wnit−T kitΦ(kit ,ki,t+1)− fo+
β
(
(1−λ)EV (ki,t+1,zi,t+1, x̂i,t+1, j+1)+λV E(ki,t+1,zi,t+1, x̂i,t+1, j+1)
)}
,
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where E denotes the firm’s expectation of the value in t+1 conditional on the current information
set {kit ,zit , x̂it , j}. Maximizing over the choice of labor inputs yields nit(zit ,kit) =
(
α2
ezit k
α1
it
w
) 1
1−α2 .
After substituting the optimal choice of labor inputs, the value of continuation becomes
VC(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) = max
ki,t+1
{GAkαit −TkΓ(kit ,ki,t+1)− fo+ (1.10)
βλγki,t+1+β(1−λ)V (ki,t+1,zi,t+1, x̂i,t+1, j+1)},
where G≡ (1−α2)
(α2
w
) α2
1−α2 , A= ez
1
1−α2 , and α≡ α11−α2 is the curvature of revenues net of wages.
Stationary equilibrium. We can now define a stationary equilibrium as follows: (i)
a wage w; (ii) a set of value and policy functions of the firm: V (kit ,zit , x̂it , j), D(kit ,zit , x̂it , j),
and ki,t+1(kit ,zit , x̂it , j); and (iii) a joint distribution of Ω(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) such that (a) taking wages
and the law of motion for information set as given, the value and policy functions solve the
firm’s optimization problem, (b) the labor market clears as labor demand equals labor supply:∫
nit(zit ,kit)dΩ(kit ,zit , x̂it , j) = N, and (c) the joint distribution is the fixed point through time.
1.4.2 Intuitions of the Firm’s Problem
Intuitively, without distortions (i.e., τk=0), the choice of the next period’s capital ki,t+1
should be weakly increasing in the three state variables kit , zit , and x̂it at any age j. However,
sufficiently large distortions, which disincentivize investment of more productive firms, may lead
to less investment of more productive firms. Although ki,t+1 is always weakly increasing in kit
given the other state variables, it is not necessarily increasing x̂it given the other state variables.
In section 1.5, I discuss the relevant case of distortions and investment decisions.
Figure 1.10 plots two examples of one firm’s state variables over the firm’s life cycle, using
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the same parameter values as in section 1.5. The left panel plots a firm with a low fundamental,
in which case the firm chooses to downsize its capital stock in the next period after updating its
belief of xi from zero to negative at age two. When a large negative shock arrives at age three, this
firm chooses to exit. The right panel plots a firm with a high fundamental, in which case the firm
updates its belief of xi upward smoothly and accumulates the capital stably through the first 10
years of its life cycle. This figure shows that less productive firms endogenously exit the market
over time, whereas more productive firms stay and grow larger. Because initial capital stocks at
entry may not match the firms’ fundamentals for various reasons, including imprecise priors and
large shocks, MRPK dispersion is large within the firm cohort at entry. This dispersion decreases
over time as firms learn over time, adjust their capital stocks, and some firms exit the market.
Now I turn to a formal expression of computing the effects of MRPK dispersion on
aggregate productivity. As shown in Appendix 1.12, combining the firm’s optimal labor choice
with the labor market and capital market clearing condition gives the expression of aggregate
productivity as
z = z∗− 1
2
α1(1−α2)
(1−α1−α2)σ
2
mrpk, (1.11)
where z∗ is the TFP in the frictionless and undistorted economy without any dispersion
in MRPK, and σmrpk is the aggregate standard deviation of MRPK. Taking the partial derivative
of equation (1.11) reveals the relationship between MRPK dispersion (σ2mrpk) and productivity
losses (z− z∗):
dz
dσ2mrpk
=−1
2
α1(1−α2)
(1−α1−α2) .
This expression provides a natural way to quantify the effects of changes in σ2mrpk on aggregate
productivity. In Section 1.5.2, I use this strategy to decompose the quantitative contribution of
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each factor to MRPK dispersion and TFP losses.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
Throughout the analysis, I focus on dynamics of MRPK dispersion over the firm cohort’s
life cycle. Consider an economy with exogenous firm entry: Every period, the firm cohort with a
joint distribution over {ki0,xi,ei0} enters. The model can predict the firm cohort’s distribution over
its life cycle by solving the firms’ optimization problems. The joint distribution over {x̂it ,zit ,kit}
is then fixed over time for any given firm-cohort age j. Therefore, stationary equilibrium must
exist given the distribution of the firm cohort at entry, as long as exogenous exit rate λ is positive.
1.5.1 Parameterization
I begin by directly assigning parameter values in the production function based on
aggregate moments in the Chinese economy. I set the capital share α1 to 0.28, which is the
weighted average capital share in the manufacturing sector, and set the labor share to 0.53 as
in the Annual National Accounts. These two numbers lead to decreasing returns to scale as
α1+α2 = 0.82, which is in line with the standard value in the literature. The discount factor is
set to 0.97 based on an interest rate of 10-year China government bonds of 3% during my sample
period. I set the discount rate of capital fire-sale upon exit to 0.5, as used in [116]. I set the
depreciation rate to 0.1, which is close to the median ratio of reported current-year depreciation
value to capital stock. I use an exogenous firm exit rate of 0.04, which is close to the average
exit rate of old firms in the US. I normalize µx, the mean of the firm cohort’s fundamentals at
entry, to be zero, which is also the common initial belief of expected fundamentals. Regarding
the productivity process in the model with time-invariant fundamental xi, the dispersion of
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fundamentals and transitory shocks, σ2x and σ2e , are exactly identified by the TFPR variance of the
entrants, Var(zit | j = 0), and the variance of time-series TFPR changes, Var(zi,t+1− zit).
Treating entry as exogenous in the model, I take directly the joint distribution of capital
stocks and TFPR of all 60,972 age-zero firms in my sample as the initial distribution of {ki0,zi0}
among the firm cohort. I back out the fundamentals xi = zi0− ei0, using randomly generated
ei0 ∼ N(0,σ2e). Now, given the initial joint distribution of {ki0,xi0,ei0}, a unique stationary
equilibrium always exists.
I calibrate the remaining three parameters to jointly match three key moments in the data.
The three parameters are the correlated distortion τk, the fixed operating cost every period f0,
and the parameter in quadratic adjustment cost ξ. Let capital investment be iit = ki,t+1− kit . The
three moments are the exit rate of the firm entrants (11%), the autocorrelation of firm investments
(-0.21), and the correlation of investment and productivity (0.17).12
Table 1.3 reports each parameter I used in the calibration. In particular, the calibrated value
of correlated distortion τk is 0.5. The positive value is consistent with the positive correlation
between distortion and fundamental in the literature ([140, 44]). In addition, [21] and [51]
show evidence of stronger correlation in poorer countries than in richer countries. Because a
large correlation can potentially offset the positive correlation between capital investment and
productivity, it is helpful to get a sense of the magnitude of τk in the calibration. Appendix
Figure 1.24 plots the policy functions of ki,t+1 in the calibrated model, which shows ki,t+1 is
always increasing in kit , as I discussed earlier. In addition, the intuition that firms with lower
12Because the China Annual Industry Surveys keep the non-state firms only if their revenues are above 5 million
RMB, exit in the survey does not necessarily mean the firm goes out of business. To get a more precise measure of
firm exit rates, I searched the operating status of a random sample of firms that exited from the survey during my
sample period on the “National Enterprise Credit Information Pulicity System”. Among the 528 firms I did find a
record, 58% of the firms did shut down and unregistered. Therefore, I calibrate the model to target the adjusted exit
rate of 11% rather than the 19% attrition rate for the firm entrants in the survey. If I nonetheless targets an exit rate of
19% in the calibration, the model then over-explains 10% of the data dynamics of MRPK dispersion.
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Table 1.3: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Panel A: Pre-assigned Parameters
α1 - Capital share 0.28
α2 - Labor share 0.53
β - Discount factor 0.97
δ - Depreciation rate 0.1
γ - Exit discount in capital 0.5
λ - Exogenous Exit Rate 0.04
µx - Mean of fundamentals 0
Panel B: Exactly Matched Parameters
σ2x - Dispersion of fundamentals 0.70
σ2e - Dispersion of transitory shocks 0.33
Panel C: Calibrated Parameters
τk - Correlated distortion 0.50
f0 - Fixed operating costs 0.41
ξ - Adjustment cost 7.20
capital stock and lower idiosyncratic productivity are more likely to exit carries to the calibrated
model with distortions. However, firms with the strongest beliefs of fundamentals and the highest
contemporary productivities choose smaller capital stocks in the next period than firms with
weaker beliefs and fundamentals due to severe distortions, as shown in the bottom-right panel
in Figure 1.24. Therefore, correlated distortions in the model calibration under τk = 0.5 are
substantial, which strongly disincentivise more productive firms.
Table 1.4 reports the targeted moments in the data and model, which match decently.
Although the three parameters are disciplined jointly by three moments, some useful intuitions
apply. As in standard firm models, fixed operation costs positively relate to exit rates; and capital
adjustment costs are most informative about the autocorrelation of investments. The correlated
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Table 1.4: Moments Targeted in the Model and Data
Moments Target Model
ρ(i,z) 0.17 0.17
Exit rate of the entrants 11.0 12.1
ρ(i, i′) -0.21 -0.18
distortions captured in τk are informative about the correlation between capital investments and
productivity. This is because a larger τk mitigate the investment responses to the productivity
signals for the young firms, but asymptotically ρ(i,z) always goes to 1 for the mature firms,
independent of the value of τk. Hence, τk is negatively associated ρ(i,z).
1.5.2 Quantitative Predictions
I take the initial distribution of the firm cohort at entry as given in the data and report
predictions of the calibrated model on the dynamics of MRPK dispersion over the firm cohort’s
life cycle. This section focuses on the model predictions over the first 10 years of the firm cohort’s
life cycle, where the data MRPK dispersion decreases robustly with firm-cohort age. In addition,
the model MRPK dispersion stabilizes after age 10.
Figure 1.11 plots MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age in the model and data. As the
cohort of firms learn over time and adjust their capital stocks, the model predicts a decrease
in MRPK dispersion by 0.15 points until age 10, compared to 0.22 in the data. Hence, the
decrease in the model accounts for around two thirds of the magnitude in the data. Accordingly,
within the firm cohort, σ2mrpk decreases by 0.43 (that is, 1.50
2−1.352) from age zero to age 10,
corresponding to 15% TFP gains, based on equation (1.11). The sizable TFP gains over the firms’
life cycles suggest considerable improvements in how efficiently resources are allocated across
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firms within the firm cohort.
Table 1.5: Second Derivatives φ˜ j in the Model and Data
Age 0 Age 1 Average of Age 2 - 9
Data 95% CI (0.005, 0.05) (0.02,0.05) (-0.01, 0.02)
Model 0.01 0.03 -0.005
Furthermore, the model correctly predicts the convex relationship between MRPK disper-
sion and firm-cohort age, matching the curvature in the data without targeting it directly. Table
1.5 reports second derivatives of the age effects in the model, which are 0.01 at age zero and 0.03
at age one, respectively. These estimates fall right in the confidence interval of second derivatives
in the data, as plotted in Figure 1.19. The average second derivative for firms between two and
nine years of age is close to zero in the model, consistent with the insignificant values in the data.
That MRPK dispersion decreases at a decreasing rate with firm age both in the model and data is
consistent with the theory of firm life-cycle learning. For young firms, the number of observations
is small, which limits the precision of firm priors. Hence, marginal gains of learning are larger at
younger ages, which leads to larger decreases in MRPK dispersion.
To emphasize the selection in exit over the firms’ life cycles, Figure 1.12 plots the
distribution of firm productivity at age 0, 1 and 5. As in the data, the model predicts that
the productivity distribution shifts to the right (i.e., the average productivity increases) as less
productive firms exit over time. The growth rate of average productivity from age zero to age
one is around 5.7% in the model, which matches the growth rate of 5.4% in the data, without
targeting it directly.
In order to understand the quantitative contribution of each mechanism in the decrease in
MRPK dispersion, I simulate how MRPK dispersion changes with firm-cohort age by sequentially
adding mechanisms in the model. In the basic version, I shut down the exit channel by setting the
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fixed operation cost and capital fire-sale value to zero, and shut down the learning channel by
solving the optimization problem when the firms never updated their beliefs. I find the dispersion
barely decreases over age in this scenario. Specifically, σmrpk decreases 0.007 points by age 10
in a model without firm life-cycle learning and an endogenous exit option, which is only 5% of
the 0.15-point decrease in the benchmark model. Next, I add Bayesian updating to firms’ beliefs
about their fundamental productivity but still do not allow endogenous exits. The model then
predicts a decrease of 0.08 points in MRPK dispersion by age 10, which accounts for as much as
54% of the decrease in the benchmark model. Further adding endogenous exit brings the model
back to the benchmark version and accounts for the remaining half of the life-cycle decrease in
MRPK dispersion as plotted in Figure 1.11.13
What are then the consequences of life-cycle learning for aggregate TFP rather than for
one firm cohort? I begin with a hypothetical baseline in which all firms have completed their
life-cycle learning. In particular, I assume MRPK dispersion within each firm cohort remains
constant after age 10 in the stationary equilibrium. This assumption is consistent with quantitative
predictions in the calibrated model. In effect, I regard the firm cohorts age 10 and older as having
learned sufficiently about their fundamental productivities that they cannot reduce their levels of
MRPK dispersion by further learning.
Consider the model predictions on two moments: the age distribution of firms, and MRPK
dispersion at each age. The aggregate MRPK dispersion is given by the average MRPK dispersion
across all firm ages weighted by the number of firms at each age in the equilibrium, that is, 1.46
in the model. Meanwhile, aggregate MRPK dispersion in the hypothetical baseline is calculated
by replacing the model MRPK dispersion across firms at ages zero to nine with the dispersion of
13If I consider the decomposition of aggregate capital stock within the firm cohort by age, from age zero to age 10,
as in [108], the covariance between capital stock and market share (defined by revenue output share) increases by
72%, from 0.11 to 0.19. This increase in covariance with firm age is consistent with the theory of firm life-cycle
learning, but unlike the quantitative analysis of my model, it cannot estimate the contribution of life-cycle capital
adjustments separately from learning.
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age-10 firms, while keeping the age distribution of firms the same as in the benchmark model
predictions. Mechanically, the aggregate MRPK dispersion is lower in the hypothetical baseline
than in the model, because of the absence of firm life-cycle adjustments. I can use equation (1.11)
to compute the implied TFP losses, ∆z, for any given model prediction on σmrpk relative to the
hypothetical baseline.
In the first column of Table 1.6, I report the differences in aggregate MRPK dispersion and
in log TFP between predictions of the benchmark model and its hypothetical baseline. Aggregate
MRPK dispersion in the hypothetical baseline is 0.11 points lower. This difference shows firm
life-cycle adjustments accounts for 7% of MRPK dispersion across firms in the economy, which
lead to a 10 percent loss in TFP.
Table 1.6: Consequences of Firm Life-Cycle Learning in the Model
Learning Distortions + Learning
∆σmrpk 0.11 0.21
∆σmrpk
σmrpk 7% 14%
∆z 0.10 0.19
To consider the consequences of firm-level distortions for aggregate TFP, I conduct the
counterfactual experiment of removing firm-specific distortions by setting τk to 0 in the benchmark
model. The standard deviation of MRPK (σmrpk) across firms at age 10 becomes 1.25, which is
0.1 points smaller than in the benchmark model. As reported in the second column of Table 1.6,
in the corresponding hypothetical baseline, which removes both distortions and firm life-cycle
adjustments, the aggregate MRPK dispersion would decrease 0.21 points, from 1.46 to 1.25.
Hence, distortions and firm life-cycle learning together account for 14% of MRPK dispersion in
the economy, which leads to a 19 percent loss in TFP. Omitting learning over the firm cohort’s
life cycle will attribute all changes in MRPK dispersion in the hypothetical baseline to distortions,
which causes more than half of the TFP losses to be incorrectly attributed to distortions.
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I conclude that the model featuring firm life-cycle learning explains around two thirds of
the life-cycle MRPK dispersion. Without targeting the curvature of age effects and the productivity
growth over the firm cohort’s life cycle directly, the model correctly matches these moments
in the data. Through the lens of this model, omitting firm life-cycle learning leads to a sizable
overestimation of TFP losses from misallocation.
1.6 Evidence from Colombia and Chile
In this section, I report patterns of MRPK dispersion over the firms’ life cycles using older
data from the manufacturing sectors in Colombia and Chile.14
The Colombia Industrial Surveys during the period 1977 - 1991 cover around 6,600 plants
per year on average. I measure the capital stock (kit) as the book value of fixed assets, and measure
revenue output (yit) as value added constructed by subtracting intermediate inputs from the sum of
the value of production, inventory changes, and sales tax ([121]). Again, I use the industry-level
capital share from the NBER-CES database and equation (1.3) to calculate MRPK in log terms.
To keep sufficient observations to measure dispersion, I calculate the standard deviation of MRPK
across plants within the same year-age bins, rather than the same industry-year-age bins.
Figure 1.13 reports the average MRPK dispersion with firm cohorts measured in two
ways as firms age from zero to 10 in Colombia. The standard deviation of MRPK decreases
from almost 1.4 to 1 by age five, and remains below 1.1 until age 10. The log difference of
MRPK between the 90th and the 10th percentile plant decrease from 3.4 to around 2.6 by age
five and stays at around 2.8 till age 10. That is, the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile MRPK
drops one half, from 30 to around 15, during the first five years of the firm cohort’s life cycle. In
14I thank Mark Roberts for sharing his data with me.
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addition, similar to the convex age effects estimated using Chinese data, both measures of MRPK
dispersion in Colombia decrease at a decreasing rate before age 10.
The data I have on the manufacturing sector in Chile cover plants with at least 10
employees during the period 1979 - 1986. Though the year of plant entry is not reported in the
survey, based on the panel structure of the data, I can identify the year of plant entry t if one plant
does not have a record in year t−1 but shows up in year t. Hence, the oldest plant cohort with a
well-defined plant age is established in 1980 and can be observed until age five. The final sample
size grows from 226 plants in 1980 to 1,037 plants in 1986.
Using the older and much smaller dataset from Chile, I measure revenue output (yit) as
value added, and measure capital stocks (kit) by summing up the annual investments in buildings,
machinery, and vehicles net of depreciation since birth year ([121]). Then I calculate MRPK in
log terms using equation (1.3) as before, and I calculate the standard deviation of MRPK across
plants within the same year-age bins. I find that, between firm-cohort age zero and five, the
average standard deviation of MRPK in Chile decreases from 1.7 to less than 1.2, and the average
log difference of MRPK between the 90th and the 10th percentile plant decrease from 4.5 to
around 2.5. Note the decrease in MRPK dispersion in the Chilean data is larger than that in China
and Colombia during the same age range. Because of the large confidence intervals due to the
small number of firms in Chile, I report the t-test results of the differences of average MRPK
dispersion between age 0-1 and age 2-5 firms. Table 1.7 shows that both the standard deviation
and 90-10 percentile difference of MRPK are significantly larger for young firms in Chile.
I conclude that evidence from Colombia and Chile is in accord with my finding using
Chinese data that MRPK dispersion decreases over the firm cohort’s life cycle. In Colombia,
MRPK dispersion decreases substantially before age five and at a decreasing rate. As in the
Chinese data, this pattern is consistent with the theory of firm life-cycle learning, which has larger
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Table 1.7: Chile: MRPK Dispersion by Firm Age Group
Age 0-1 Age 2-5 Difference
Average σmrpk,t j 1.60 1.48 -0.12∗∗∗
Average 90-10 4.00 3.62 -0.38∗∗∗
Obs. of firms 1,935 989
impacts at younger ages.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a new interpretation of MRPK dispersion as firm life-cycle learning.
I draw on the panel firm-level data in China to document substantial decreases in MRPK dis-
persion with firm-cohort age. In addition, for young firm cohorts, MRPK dispersion decreases
substantially and at a decreasing rate. The pattern also holds broadly for data on the manufac-
turing sectors in Colombia and Chile. Building on the new facts, I develop a dynamic model
featuring informational frictions over the firm cohort’s life cycle as the firms learn about their
own fundamental productivity. The model predicts that as firms learn over time and adjust their
capital stocks, possibly through endogenously exiting the market, MRPK dispersion decreases
over their life cycles. I highlight the importance of firm life-cycle learning to ex-post aggregate
MRPK dispersion. Quantitative analysis suggests that omitting this dimension leads to sizable
overestimation of the TFP losses due to misallocation. In addition, TFP losses resulting from
firm life-cycle learning to overcome informational frictions is an optimal constrained equilibrium,
which may not be fixed by policy interventions.
Though direct measurements of firm- or individual-level information learning is scarce,
[133] provide empirical evidence that more productive Japanese firms make more accurate
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forecasts about the macro economy. Their findings suggest learning may be endogenous: firms
can pay costs to learn better information. Although the learning process in this paper is essentially
mechanical and homogeneous across firms, I leave the discussion of richer learning models to
future research.
This paper shows that data from developing countries generally show decreasing MRPK
dispersion over the firm cohort’s life cycle. Further exploration of the profiles of life-cycle MRPK
dispersion in developed countries would be worthwhile. Comparing economies at different
income levels can potentially shed light on the theory of cross-country TFP.
1.8 Appendices
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Note: This figure plots two examples of a firm’s state variables over the firm’s life cycle. The maroon
line plots realizations of productivity zit over time; the black line plots corresponding beliefs of the
fundamental x̂i,t+1 with a 95% confidence interval based on σ̂2i,t+1; and the blue line plots capital
stock kit .
Figure 1.10: Examples of One Firm’s Life Cycle in the Model
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Figure 1.11: MRPK Dispersion (σmrpk) in the Model and Data
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a) Life-Cycle Productivity in the Data
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b) Life-Cycle Productivity in the Model
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Figure 1.12: Distributions of Productivity in Model and Data
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Figure 1.13: MRPK Dispersion by Firm Age, Colombia
52
Employment
Labor Input
Value Added
Capital
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 L
og
 M
ea
su
re
s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Age
Note: This figure plots the standard deviation of log value-added (yit ), log capital input (kit ), log labor
input (nit ), and log employment by firm age.
Figure 1.14: Dispersion of Key Variables by Firm Age
standard deviation
90−10 percentile
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 9
0−
10
 P
er
ce
tile
 M
RP
L
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 M
RP
L
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
age
Note: This figure plots the weighted average standard deviation of MRPL and the weighted average
value of the 90th minus the 10th percentile MRPL by firm age.
Figure 1.15: Dispersion of MRPL by Firm Age
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Note: This figure plots the average standard deviation of TFPR (σ¯t f pr, j) over age, weighted by the
number of firms in industry-year-age bins. The gray line replicates the dispersion in MRPK as Figure
1.1 for reference.
Figure 1.16: Dispersion of TFPR (σ¯t f pr, j) by Firm Age
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average standard deviation of MRPK (σ¯ j) and the weighted
average value of the 90th minus the 10th percentile (D¯90−10j ) by firm-cohort age, for the firms are
recorded every year during the sample period 1998 - 2007.
Figure 1.17: Dispersion of MRPK by Firm Age, Balanced Panel
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Note: This figure plots the weighted average σmrpk,st j during 1998 - 2007.
Figure 1.18: Dispersion of MRPK by Year
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1.9 Curvature of the Age Effects
I use the second derivatives of age effects to test the curvature of age effects. Though none
of the first-order effects of age, cohort, or time can be identified separately, their second derivatives
are always identified ([95]). Recall that the cohort of firms aged j in time period t is denoted
as ct− j. Consider equation (1.5) for the cohort ct− j observed in year t and t +1. To eliminate
cohort effects, taking the first difference yields the sum of the first-order age effect between
j and j+ 1 and the year effect between t and t + 1: ∆σmrpk,st j ≡ σmrpk,s,t+1, j+1−σmrpk,st j =
(φ j+1−φ j)+(ψt+1−ψt)+∆cεst j, where ∆cεst j ≡ εs,t+1, j+1−εst j. Consider an older firm cohort
ct− j−1, observed at age j+1 and j+2 in the same year t and t+1. Again, we can identify the
sum of the first-order age effect and year effect: (φ j+2−φ j+1)+ (ψt+1−ψt). Now taking the
difference of the two first-order effects gives the second derivative of age effects:
φ˜ j ≡ (φ j+2−φ j+1)− (φ j+1−φ j).
The second derivative of age effects φ˜ j is the difference between two slopes: one slope of MRPK
dispersion between age j+2 and age j+1, and the other slope between age j+1 and age j. If
φ˜ j = 0, that is, if the two slopes are the same, the age effects between age j and j+2 are linear.
If φ˜ j > 0, the profile of MRPK dispersion is convex between age j and j+2. Therefore, I can
estimate φ˜ j to inform the curvature of age effects.
I estimate φ˜ j for each age j between zero and nine, and put the older ages into groups
for tighter confidence intervals. Figure 1.19 plots the second derivatives of age effects with 95%
confidence intervals. It shows the second derivatives are significantly positive at age zero, one,
and three, and become near zero and insignificant after age five. Based on the point estimates,
firm age has convex effects on MRPK dispersion through the first five years of the firm cohort’s
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life cycle; that is, MRPK dispersion decreases at a decreasing rate before age five.
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Note: This figure plots the estimates of the second derivatives of age effects φ˜ j with 95% confidence
intervals. It is estimated for each age between zero and nine, and for each four-age group afterward
in order to get tighter confidence intervals.
Figure 1.19: Second Derivatives of Age Effects
Table 1.8: McKenzie Test of Linear Age Effects
H0: Linear Range Age 0-5 Age 5-10 Age 10-28
P-value 0.00 0.30 0.15
H0: Linear Range Age 5-28 Age 4-28 Age 3-28
P-value 0.12 0.14 0.03
Note: This table reports the p-value of the McKenzie test of linear age effects over several age ranges.
Table 1.8 further reports p-values of the Mckenzie tests on linear age effects. It is
essentially a formal Wald test for the null hypothesis H0 of φ˜ j being jointly zero for a set of j
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values. Jointly zero second derivatives imply the corresponding age effects are linear. The tests in
the first row strongly reject the hypothesis that the age effects are linear between age zero and age
five, but cannot reject they are linear between age 5 to 10 or 10 to 28. The tests in the second row
show one cannot reject the null hypothesis of linear age effects between age four or five and age
28. But the McKenzie test rejects the linear age effects with a p-value of 0.03 if one extends the
age range to between three and 28. Based on these results, I will assume a linear trend in age
effects after age 10 in the second alternative approach to identify the first-order age effects.
1.10 Lower and Upper Bounds of Age Effects
In this section, I show the two restrictions that I impose in the second alternative approach
provide the upper and lower bounds of age effects if all three effects of age, year, and cohort on
MRPK dispersion have non-positive trends.
Consider the case of a linear trend in the three effects of age, year, and cohort: φ j =
gφ j+uψ, j, ψt = gψt+uψ,t , and χc = gχc+uχ,c. The condition that all three effects of age, year,
and cohort have non-positive trends on MRPK dispersion gives gφ,gψ,gχ ≤ 0. I show below that
(i) gψ = 0 (attributing the entire decline in MRPK dispersion over time to year effects) yields the
upper bounder of gφ, and (ii) gχ = 0 (attributing the entire decline in MRPK dispersion over time
to cohort effects) yields the lower bounder of gφ.
Substituting the identity of cohort birth year c = t− j into the observed result, which is
the sum of three effects:
φ j j+ψtt+χcc = (gφ−gχ) j+(gψ+gχ)t+u,
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where u = uψ, j +uψ,t +uχ,c. Denote gM∗ = gφ−gχ and gM = gψ+gχ. The unobserved negative
trend in age effects gφ can be expressed as gM∗+gχ. Note that gM is negative by definition; thus,
the trend in cohort effects satisfies gχ ∈ [gM,0], given the condition of three non-positive trends.
Therefore, gφ is bounded between gM∗+gM and gM∗ .
The first restriction, which attributes the entire deline in MRPK dispersion over time
to cohort effects, gχ = 0 is now equivalent to gχ = gM. Hence, it gives the lower bound of the
negative gφ, that is, gM∗+gM. Similarly, the second restriction, gχ = 0, yields the upper bound of
the negative gφ, that is, gM∗ . Figure 1.6 shows the first restriction indeed yields a much steeper
profile of MRPK dispersion with firm-cohort age.
1.11 Details of Alternative Approach Two
Here I explain the details of estimating equation (1.5) under the framework of imposing
one additional linear restriction as in [46]. In particular, I describe the two different linear
restrictions I impose for results in section 1.3.1 and how to implement them in practice.
To derive the restrictions, consider the weighted average dispersion of marginal products
in year t:
SDt = ∑
c∈Ct
ωst j ·SDst j(mrpkit),
where ωst j is a weight defined as the number of firms in an industry-age-year bin divided by
the total number of firms. Let CIC denote the set of all 4-digit industry codes. Substituting in
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SDst j(mrpkit) from equation (1.5), it is easily shown that the weighted average can be written as
SDt = α+ψt + X¯t + Φ¯t (1.12)
X¯t = ∑
c∈Ct
Φct
Φ¯t
χc
Φ¯t = ∑
c∈Ct
Φct ,and Φct = ∑
s∈CIC
ωst j(φ jD j + εst j).
We see in Figure 1.18 that the weighted average dispersion of marginal products of capital (or SDt)
declines from one year to the next. equation (1.12) shows clearly that the decline of dispersion
has three sources: the decline due to the time effects ψt , the decline due to the aggregate cohort
effects captured in X¯t , and the decline due to composition of firms at different ages captured in
Φ¯t . The restrictions will be imposed on the term
Ωt = α+ψt + X¯t . (1.13)
This term Ωt captures the year-specific aggregate effects. It changes over time as a result of
two effects: (i) cohort-neutral effects captured in ψt , and (ii) effects due to the changes in the
composition of active cohorts operating, captured in X¯t . For example, if younger cohorts are born
with a small dispersion of marginal products, the observed aggregate dispersion can decease over
time only because young cohorts enter and older cohorts exit the market.
The basic idea of this approach is to decompose the time series of Ωt into a trend
component and a cyclical component. To identify cohort and year effects in addition to age
effects, this approach makes assumptions on the relative role of time and cohort effects in the
trend component.
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In practice, the first step of implementation is to transform the time dummies as equation
(2.94) in [46] such that two restrictions are satisfied: (i) the year dummies add to zero: ∑Tt=0 t = 0,
and (ii) the normalization of all year effects adding up to zero: 1T ∑
T
t=0ψt = 0. I also want to
normalize the cohort effects X¯t such that 1T ∑
T
t=0 X¯t = 0. I do so by appropriately choosing the
constant term α in equation (1.13). Second, the time series of ψt and X¯t can be decomposed into
a trend component and a cyclical component:
ψt = gψt+uψ,t , X¯t = gχt+uχ,t , (1.14)
where gψ =
∑Tt=0ψt t
∑Tt=0 t2
and gχ =
∑Tt=0 X¯t t
∑Tt=0 t2
. Intuitively, the estimates are simply regressing ψt and X¯t on
time, thereby decomposing each time series into a trend component and the cyclical component
orthogonal to time. It is the same method as proposed in [67]. Finally, substituting equation (1.14)
into equation (1.13) gives
Ωt = α+gMt+uM,t ,
where uM,t = uψ,t + uχ,t and recall that gM = gψ+ gχ. The restrictions I used in Section 1.3.1
simply make assumptions on how gM is split between gψ and gχ.
I can also use the McKenzie test, as described in section 1.9, to test the linearity restriction
on the series of ψt . In practice, I first take the difference of MRPK dispersion of the same
cohort observed in the two adjacent years to eliminate the cohort effects ∆cSDst j. Then I take
the second difference for observations of the same age but in two adjacent years: ∆c∆aSDst j =
∆cSDst j−∆cSDst ′ j. Therefore, I can test the hypothesis that the second derivative of time effects,
(ψt+2−ψt+1)− (ψt+1−ψt), is zero. As a result, I cannot reject the linear hypothesis except for
t equal to 2003 and 2004, meaning linear specifications are good enough to estimate the time
effects at all other sample years. This McKenzie test result is intuitive by looking at Figure 1.18.
We cannot reject the linear hypothesis at year 2003 and 2004, because the MRPK dispersion
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deviates from the linear fit in 2004, thus decreasing relatively significantly between year 2004
and 2005. Actually, even at this outlier, the deviation from the linear trend is only around 0.01
point in 1.18. This deviation from the linear trend is relatively small compared to the age or time
effects I estimated, which have magnitudes around 10 times larger. So I conclude that the linear
restriction in the first approach is a reasonable approximation.
Specifically, the two restrictions I use to get the results in Figure 1.6 are the following:
Restriction 1 (All Decline due to Cohort Effects):
gψ = 0, gχ = gM
By the definition of gψ, this restriction implies ∑Tt=0ψt = 0, meaning that the year effects gψ only
capture the cyclical variations and are orthogonal to the time trend. This restriction is the same as
illustrated by [46, pp. 123 - 127].
Restriction 2 (All Decline due to Time Effects):
gψ = gM, gχ = 0
This restriction actually implies the linear restriction ∑Tt=0 X¯tt = 0, or
T
∑
t=0
∑
c∈Ct
Φct
Φ¯t
χct = 0.
Note the term Φct enters this restriction, which requires estimating equation (1.5). In practice, I
use an iterative algorithm to meet this restriction.
Figure 1.20 plots the estimates of the cohort and time effects under the two restrictions
above. The top-panel results impose Restriction 1, so we see a declining trend in the cohort
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effects, but the time effects are relatively flat. The bottom-panel results impose Restriction 2, so
the cohort effects are relatively flat but the time effects have a declining trend. Note the cohort
and time variations are large, with the largest magnitudes at -0.3 for cohort effects and -0.1 for
the year effects.
In addition, Figure 1.21 plots the exit rates by firm-cohort age of the same firm cohorts in
Figure 1.2 after removing zero-sum year effects using this methodology.
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(a) All MRPK Decline Driven by Cohort Effects
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(b) All MRPK Decline Driven by Time Effects
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Note: This figure plots the MRPK dispersion by birth year of the firm cohorts and by calendar
year estimated using the first alternative approach. The top panel shows the dispersion-cohort and
dispersion-year profiles estimated in equation (1.5) using Restriction 1: gψ = 0. The bottom panel
shows the dispersion-cohort and dispersion-year profiles estimated in equation (1.5) using Restriction
2: gχ = 0.
Figure 1.20: MRPK Dispersion by Cohort and Year in Alternative Approach One
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Note: This figure plots the exit rates by cohorts born in 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999, respectively,
after removing the zero-sum year effects following [46].
Figure 1.21: Exit Rates by Cohort
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Note: This figure plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age in equation (1.6)
using the second approach, which assumes (a) no trend in the age effects on MRPK dispersion after
age 10 (dashed orange line with circle markers), (b) a small decreasing trend of 0.005 point per age
after age 10 (long-dashed blue lines with triangle markers), (c) a moderate decreasing trend of 0.01
points per age after age 10 (solid black lines with square markers).
Figure 1.22: Dispersion Profiles over Age, Robustness with Volatility of Productivity
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Note: This figure plots the estimated profile of MRPK dispersion by firm-cohort age in equation (1.6)
using the second approach when restricting the sample to only non-state firms. It plots the estimation
results assuming (a) no trend in the age effects on MRPK dispersion after age 10 (dashed orange line
with circle markers), (b) a small decreasing trend of 0.005 point after age 10 (long-dashed blue lines
with triangle markers), (c) a moderate decreasing trend of 0.005 point after age 10 (solid black lines
with square markers).
Figure 1.23: Dispersion Profiles over Age, Robustness with Only Non-state Firms
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1.12 Aggregate Productivity and MRPK Dispersion
Substituting the optimal labor choice of nit(zit ,kit) =
(
α2
ezit k
α1
it
w
) 1
1−α2 into the production
function gives
yit =
(α2
w
) α2
1−α2 ezit
1
1−α2 k
α1
1−α2
it . (1.15)
Meanwhile, the labor market clearing condition requires that the fixed labor supply
equals the aggregate labor demand N =
∫
nitdi =
(α2
w
) 1
1−α2
∫ (
ezit kα1it
) 1
1−α2 di, so that
(α2
w
) 1
1−α2 =
N∫ (
ezit k
α1
it
) 1
1−α2 di
. Substituting this expression in yit gives
yit =
ezit
1
1−α2 k
α1
1−α2
it N
α2(∫ (
ezit kα1it
) 1
1−α2 di
)α2 .
Further taking derivative with respect to kit yields MRPKit = α11−α2
e
zit
1
1−α2 k
α1+α2−1
1−α2
it N
α2(∫ (
ezit k
α1
it
) 1
1−α2 di
)α2 ,
which can be rearranged to express kit in terms of MRPKit :
kit =
( α1
1−α2 e
zit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2
·
( N∫ (
ezit kα1it
) 1
1−α2 di
)α2(1−α2)
1−α1−α2 .
Meanwhile, capital market clearing condition implies
K =
∫
kitdi =
( α1
1−α2
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2
( N∫ (
ezit kα1it
) 1
1−α2 di
)α2(1−α2)
1−α1−α2
∫ ( ezit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2 di.
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Cancelling out the term with N in the last two expressions yields
kit =
(
e
zit
1
1−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2
∫ (ezit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2 di
K.
Now substituting kit in terms of K into the expression of yit and rearranging gives
yit =
e
zit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− α11−α1−α2
it(∫ ( ezit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2 di
) α1
1−α2( ∫
e
zit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− α11−α1−α2
it di(∫ ( ezit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2 di
) α1
1−α2
)α2 Kα1Nα2.
Finally, aggregating the revenue output yit gives Y =
∫
yitdi = ZKα1Nα2 , where the aggregate
productivity is
Z =
(∫
ezit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− α11−α1−α2
it di(∫ (ezit 11−α2
MRPKit
) 1−α2
1−α1−α2 di
) α1
1−α2
)1−α2
.
Taking the log of the expression above gives
z =(1−α2)
[
ln
(∫
ezit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− α11−α1−α2
it di
)
− α1
1−α2 ln
(∫
ezit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− 1−α21−α1−α2
it di
)]
.
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Expanding the two terms in the brackets respectively,
ln
(∫
ezit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− α11−α1−α2
it di
)
=
z¯−α1mrpk
1−α1−α2 +
σ2z +α21σ
2
mrpk−2α1σmrpk,z
2(1−α1−α2)2 ,
ln
(∫
ezit
1
1−α1−α2 MRPK
− 1−α21−α1−α2
it di
)
=
z¯− (1−α2)mrpk
1−α1−α2
+
σ2z +(1−α2)2σ2mrpk−2(1−α2)σmrpk,z
2(1−α1−α2)2 .
Finally, combining them into the expression of z reveals the relationship between the
productivity loss (z− z∗) and dispersion in MRPK (σ2mrpk):
z = (1−α2)
[
z¯+
σ2z −α1σ2mrpk
2(1−α1−α2)
]
= z∗− α1(1−α2)
2(1−α1−α2)σ
2
mrpk.
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Note: This figure plots the policy function of ki,t+1 for age-one firms. The top two panels fix the state
variable zit at a relatively high level and plot the firm choice of ki,t+1 against kit with low belief (left)
and high belief (right); the bottom panels plot ki,t+1 on the space of (kit ,zit) with low belief (left) and
high belief (right). Blank space in the top- and bottom-left two panels represent missing ki,t+1 values
when the firm chooses to exit the market.
Figure 1.24: Policy Function Given Low and High Beliefs in Model
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Chapter 2
Unemployment and Development
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2.1 Introduction
No single measure of labor-market performance receives more attention among academics
and policy makers than the unemployment rate. It is well known, for example, that average
unemployment rates are higher in Western Europe than in the United States and Japan. But there
is little systematic evidence about how average unemployment rates vary across the entire world
income distribution. Internationally comparable data from the poorest countries of the world are
particularly lacking. This lack of data hampers research on the determinants of national average
unemployment levels, and on the link between unemployment and development, to name two
important topics.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by building a database of national unemployment rates
covering countries of all income levels. To do so, we draw on evidence from 199 household
surveys from 84 countries spanning 1960 to 2015. The database covers numerous rich countries
and around two dozen nations from the bottom quartile of the world income distribution. Since
measures of employment and job search vary across surveys, we divide the data into several
tiers based on scope for international comparability. We then construct unemployment rates at
the aggregate level and for several broad demographic groups, and compare how they vary with
average income.
We find, perhaps surprisingly, that unemployment rates are increasing in GDP per capita.
This finding is present for men and for women, for all broad age groups, within urban and rural
areas, and across all comparability tiers of our data. For prime-aged adults, a regression of
the country average unemployment rate on log GDP per capita yields a statistically significant
positive coefficient of 1.8 percent. Our findings contrast with the (scarce) existing evidence in the
literature, and in particular, the work of [36], who finds in an earlier database that unemployment
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rates do not systematically vary with income per capita.
In addition, we document that unemployment patterns across countries differ markedly
by education level. Among high-educated workers (secondary school or more), unemployment
rates do not vary systemically with GDP per capita. Among low-educated workers, in contrast,
unemployment rates are substantially higher in rich countries. Regressing the country average
high-educated unemployment on log GDP per capita yields an insignificant slope coefficient of 0.5
percent, whereas the slope coefficient for the low-educated is a significant 3.2 percent. Our data
imply that in rich countries, low-educated workers are more likely than high-educated workers to
be unemployed. In poor countries, the opposite is true, and unemployment is concentrated among
the high-educated.
To understand these facts, we build a simple two-sector model with frictional labor
markets, based on [47] and [103], and heterogeneous workers that sort by ability as in [125]. In
the modern sector, labor markets are governed by search frictions, and worker productivity is
determined by a worker’s ability level. In the traditional sector, workers are self-employed and do
not need to search for jobs; however, productivity is independent of ability. Outputs of the modern
and traditional sectors are perfect substitutes, and firms operate competitively in the modern
sector, with unrestricted entry. Countries differ exogenously in modern-sector productivity, with
a single traditional-sector technology available to all countries. This assumption builds on the
mounting evidence that cross-country productivity differences are skill-biased, as opposed to skill
neutral (see, e.g., [37, 93, 78, 71]).
Our simple model has several main theoretical predictions that are qualitatively consistent
with the facts we document. First, as modern-sector productivity increases, the traditional sector
shrinks, as progressively less able workers sort into the modern sector. Second, as modern-sector
productivity increases, the aggregate unemployment rate increases. This is because as the modern
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sector expands, a greater fraction of workers now search for jobs in frictional labor markets
rather than working in self-employment. Moreover, the job-finding rate falls in equilibrium, since
average ability is lower in the modern sector. Third, as productivity increases, unemployment
rates rise faster for less able than for more able workers, since a greater share of less able workers
are drawn into job search. This third prediction is consistent with the rising ratio of unemployment
for low- to high-educated workers with GDP per capita that we document.
To assess the model’s quantitative predictions, we extend the simple model in several
ways so as to be consistent with salient features of the cross-country data. In particular, we allow
modern and traditional sector outputs to be imperfect substitutes, and we allow countries to differ
exogenously in both traditional- and modern-sector productivity. We also allow for two education
groups, with the distribution of ability for the high-educated group stochastically dominating that
of the low-educated. We calibrate the distribution of ability using moments of the U.S. wage
distribution, and parameterize other aspects of the model to match key moments of the U.S. labor
market—in particular the average unemployment rate and the ratio of the unemployment rate for
low- to high-educated workers.
Our main quantitative experiment lowers productivity in the modern and traditional sectors,
as well as the fraction of high-educated workers, and then computes how the model’s predictions
for unemployment – in the aggregate and by education level –vary with GDP per capita. We
discipline the cross-country values of modern-sector productivity to match GDP per capita levels
across the world income distribution, and we discipline traditional-sector productivity to match
the relative prices of traditional goods. We proxy traditional sector employment in the data by
the set of workers who are self-employed without paid employees, and who work in low-skilled
occupations. Not surprisingly, this share is strongly decreasing in GDP per capita, ranging from
around three quarters of the workforce in poor countries to less than three percent in the richest
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countries.1
The calibrated model predicts that unemployment rates are increasing in GDP per capita,
as in the data, though the model underpredicts the magnitude of the relationship. Compared to the
observed 1.8 percentage-point increase in unemployment for an increase in one log point of GDP
per capita, the model predicts an increase of 0.5 percent. For unemployment by education, the
model correctly predicts that the ratio of low- to high-educated unemployment is increasing in
GDP per capita. Yet it again underpredicts the magnitude of the relationship, with a semi-elasticity
of 0.47 in the data compared to 0.25 in the model. We conclude that our mechanism explains 30
percent of the relation between aggregate unemployment and average income, and 53 percent
of the relation between the unemployment ratio and average income. Furthermore, the model’s
predicted share of employment in the traditional sector by GDP per capita corresponds closely
with the data. We also show that our results are sensitive to one parameter value in particular:
the elasticity of substitution between modern and traditional sector outputs, which governs the
strength of our mechanism, the decline of the traditional sector.
As an alternative and complementary theory, we incorporate the less generous unemploy-
ment benefits of poor countries relative to richer countries. In the model, lower unemployment
benefits in poorer countries discourage search, thus lowering unemployment rates in equilibrium.
We find that adding this alternative mechanism increases the explanatory power of our quanti-
tative model from 30 percent to 41 percent of the slope of the aggregate unemployment rate in
GDP per capita. On the other hand, it offers little additional explanatory power for the relation
between the ratio of low- to high-educated unemployment and income. We conclude that our
quantitative model explains a substantial fraction of the cross-country unemployment patterns that
1Note that this decrease in the traditional sector after excluding agriculture is of similar magnitude, ranging from
around half of the workforce to less than two percent. Thus, the traditional sector is not simply agriculture, but
represents the unskilled self-employment that is widespread throughout developing economies (see e.g., ([58, 127,
53]).
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we document, but that even including the less generous social security nets of poorer countries,
there is a lot left unexplained by the model.
We close the paper by presenting historical data on unemployment from the United States
and four other advanced countries for which long time series on unemployment are available:
Australia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. We ask whether unemployment rates
are higher now than they were before World War I, which is the earliest period for which
unemployment data are available, to our knowledge. We find that for all countries, average
unemployment rates are indeed higher now than they were before World War I, and for four of
the five countries, the difference is statistically significant. Using the U.S. data, which we have
at a more disaggregated level, we ask in addition whether unemployment is particularly higher
now for the less-educated. We find that average unemployment has indeed risen faster for the
less-educated than for the more-educated, at least since 1940. In 1940, the less-educated were
about 1.5 times as likely to be unemployed as the more-educated. Today, the ratio is close to 2.5.
We conclude that historical unemployment data are broadly consistent with our cross-country
findings, suggesting that unemployment is largely a feature of advanced economies, rather than a
by-product of under-development.
Related Literature. Most of the literature on average unemployment differences across
countries has focused on Europe and the United States (see, e.g., [24, 107, 91]). The few
studies that have addressed unemployment across a wider range of income levels have come
to contradictory conclusions, most likely due to a lack of comparable cross-country data. [17]
compile World Bank unemployment data that suggest a decreasing pattern of unemployment
in income per capita, though their data are largely from middle-income and richer countries.
Perhaps the most systematic look at aggregate unemployment rates across countries is by [36],
who draws on a 1996 World Bank dataset covering 60 countries. These data show no correlation
between GDP per capita and average unemployment, though they cover just three countries in the
77
bottom half of the world income distribution. Older studies did not have sufficient data points
to draw firm conclusions about cross-country patterns, but tended to find that unemployment
rates in developing economies studies were not that different from those of richer economies (see,
e.g., [55, 132, 134, 54]). More recently, [112] draws on surveys from 68 countries to study the
relationship between self-employment and the ratio of unemployment to wage employment. His
explanation emphasizes differences in labor market frictions across countries, whereas our theory
emphasizes different forces altogether.
Our paper is closely related to the growing literature on structural change, though our
two sectors do not fit neatly into the standard agriculture-manufacturing-services division (used
by e.g., [49, 69, 97]).2 In our modern and traditional sectors, we emphasize skilled wage em-
ployment versus unskilled self-employment, both of which can be present within the agriculture,
manufacturing, and service sectors. In this way, our sectors are closer to the split between
high-educated services and low-educated services taken by [32] and [34], though their models
focus on non-homothetic preferences, which play no role in our theory.
By emphasizing the transition from self-employment to wage employment in frictional
labor markets, our paper builds on the macroeconomic literature on home production and its role
in the development process. This transition to market production with development is a key theme
in the model of [106], for example. [60] argue that measured output differences across countries
may be overstated due to missing home production in poorer countries. Similarly, [109] show that
policies that distort capital accumulation can lead to bigger output losses once a home production
sector is introduced into a standard neoclassical growth model, since capital distortions encourage
producers to move into self-employment. Empirically, [30] show that the share of household
production in total hours decreases with GDP per capita. None of these studies focuses on the
2Other multi-sector models in macro split the economy into the consumption vs investment sectors ([120, 74]),
goods vs service sectors (e.g., [25]), urban vs rural areas ([38, 141]), or agriculture vs non-agriculture sectors (e.g.,
[1, 86, 110]). Our modern-traditional division does not correspond cleanly to these splits either.
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link between unemployment and development, however.
Finally, our paper builds on the old literature on two-sector models in development,
particularly [89] and [68]. However, our model is focused on the determinants of actual measured
unemployment (often called “open unemployment”), as opposed to “underemployment” or
“disguised unemployment,” which corresponds to some extent to our traditional sector. Negative
selection into our traditional sector is also quite related to the negative selection into the “informal
sector” as characterized by [117], [85, 84] and others. Unlike [68], the urban-rural divide plays
no role in our theory; we find similar unemployment patterns in both rural and urban areas and,
hence, abstract from them.
2.2 Data
This section describes the household survey data that we use to measure unemployment
in the aggregate and by demographic group across our set of countries.
2.2.1 Data Sources
Our data come from household surveys or censuses that are nationally representative.
Many, but not all, are available from the International Integrated Public Use Microdata Surveys
(IPUMS) ([101]) or the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). Tables
2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 in the Appendix list the full set of surveys employed, plus their sources.
The key benefit of nationally representative surveys, as opposed to (say) administrative records
on unemployment, is that they cover all individuals, including the self-employed. In total, our
analysis includes 199 country-year surveys, covering 84 countries, and spanning 1960 to 2015.
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Most of our data come from the 1990s and 2000s.3
To measure GDP per capita, we divide output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in 2011
US$) by population, both taken from the Penn World Tables 9.0. Unlike in previous studies,
our data have a high representation of the world’s poorest countries, with 23 countries from the
bottom quartile of the world income distribution, and 27 from the second quartile.
In our main analysis, we restrict attention to prime-aged adults (aged 25-54) of both sexes.
We also report our results for males and females separately, for broader age groups, and for urban
and rural regions. Throughout, we exclude those with missing values of key variables and those
living in group quarters. We use sample weights whenever they are available.
2.2.2 Unemployment Definition and Data Tiers
We define an unemployed person as one who (1) is not employed, and (2) has searched
recently for a job. We define employment following the U.N. System of National Accounts as
“all persons, both employees and self-employed persons, engaged in some productive activity
that falls within the production boundary of the SNA” [135]. Thus, we count those working in
self-employment as employed. We define the unemployment rate as the ratio of unemployed
workers to employed plus unemployed workers.4
The key measurement challenge we face is that not all surveys allow us to define un-
employment in exactly the same way. To ensure that our cross-country comparisons are as
3[48] use surveys from 13 countries to document high-frequency labor market patterns in the urban areas of
middle and high income countries. Our paper covers many more low income countries, whereas their study brings in
repeated observations from the same individuals.
4The BLS Handbook of Methods defines an unemployed individual as one who (1) is not employed, (2) has
searched recently for a job, and (3) is “available to work” ([136]). However, only 49 of our 199 country-year surveys
asked whether the interviewee is “available for work” in some way.
80
informative as possible, we divide the surveys into tiers, based on their international compara-
bility. Tier 1 has the highest scope for comparability, followed by Tier 2 and then Tier 3. We
describe these further below.
In Tier 1 and Tier 2 countries, employment specifically covers all economic activities that
produce output counted in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). In other words,
employment specifically comprises wage employment, self-employment or work at a family
business or farm, whether or not the output is sold or consumed directly.5 With regard to recent
job search, Tier 1 includes surveys in which workers who searched did so either in the last week or
the last four weeks. Tier 2 includes surveys in which workers are searching “currently” (without
specifying a time frame) or in some time period other than the last week or last four weeks, such
as the last two months.
In Tier 3 countries, the employment question has lower scope for comparability. It may,
for example, consider those working for their own consumption or those not working for a
monetary wage as non-employed. It may include a minimum number of hours worked, or cover
only a specific period of time, such as the last seven days. Appendix Table 2.14 lists the way in
which each country in Tier 3 has a non-standard employment question. In terms of job search,
Tier 3 countries cover any time.
All in all, our dataset consists of 129 Tier 1 surveys, 40 Tier 2 surveys and 30 Tier 3
surveys. In our empirical findings below, we begin with data from all tiers, which maximizes the
number of observations available. We then restrict attention to Tier 1 first, followed by Tiers 1
and 2, to explore how our results change when we take into consideration a smaller but more
comparable set of countries.
5See e.g. [59] for a more detailed treatment of which outputs are covered in NIPA. Not counted is work on
home-produced services such as cooking, cleaning or care of one’s own children. Home-produced services are not
counted in NIPA, and previous studies of time use, such as [3], [115] and [22], treat these categories as “home
production” rather than as work.
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2.2.3 Comparison to ILO and World Bank Data
Two readily downloadable sources of data on unemployment rates at the country level are
the “ILO modeled estimates” from the International Labor Office (ILO), and the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (which are in fact derived directly from the ILO). However, many
of the ILO’s modeled estimates are, by definition, modeled or imputed rather than computed
directly from an underlying survey. Even by the ILO’s own admission, the modeled estimates
are fraught with serious non-comparabilities. For example, some estimates cover only main
cities or metropolitan areas, while others use non-standard employment definitions that exclude
self-employed workers or first-time job seekers.
Acknowledging the lack of international comparability in its full database, the ILO also
publishes “ILO-comparable” unemployment rates from 30 countries, which are always based on
a household labor force survey ([87]). Unfortunately, the ILO-comparable unemployment rates
have very limited coverage of the bottom half of the world income distribution, covering just one
such country. Therefore, the ILO-comparable unemployment dataset is ill-suited to answer the
question of how average unemployment rates vary between poor and rich countries. In addition, it
does not provide disaggregated unemployment rates, such as by education level, which we show
are crucial to understanding the aggregate patterns.
If one nonetheless uses these ILO data to estimate how average unemployment rates vary
with income per capita, one will find a statistically insignificant or negative relationship. Using
the ILO modeled unemployment estimates, a regression of the 2014 unemployment rate on log
GDP per capita yields a slope coefficient of 0.02 with a p-value of 0.96. This lack of correlation
between unemployment and income is comparable to what [36] found. With the much smaller
ILO comparable database, available from 1994 to 2003, the regression coefficient is -3.44 with
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a p-value of 0.01. Thus, either of the readily available ILO unemployment databases paint a
misleading picture of how unemployment rates vary with income level.
2.3 Empirical Findings
In this section, we report how average unemployment rates vary with GDP per capita. We
first compare aggregate unemployment rates, and then look beneath the surface at unemployment
by sex, by age group and by rural-urban status.
2.3.1 Aggregate Unemployment Rate
Figure 2.1 plots the country average unemployment rate for prime-aged adults (on a log
base 2 scale) against log GDP per capita. The figure includes countries from all three tiers with at
least two years of data. The dotted black line – the linear regression line – shows a substantial
positive slope. The slope coefficient for a regression of the unemployment rate in natural units on
log GDP per capita is 1.8 and is statistically significant at the one-percent level. Taking simple
averages by country income quartile, the bottom (poorest) quartile has an average unemployment
rate of 2.5 percent. By contrast, the top (richest) quartile has an average unemployment rate of
8.7 percent.
Besides the positive slope, Figure 2.1 highlights the large variation in average unem-
ployment rates within each income group. To what extent does this variation simply reflect
measurement error? To what extent does the correlation of unemployment rates and GDP per
capita survive once we restrict attention to more comparable data?
To help answer these questions, we report the slope coefficient of average unemployment
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Note: This figure plots the average unemployment rate for prime-aged adults in each country with at
least two observations across all years of data from all tiers.
Figure 2.1: Unemployment Rates by GDP per capita
on log GDP per capita using various alternative cuts of the data. The first data column of Table
2.1 reports these slopes. When considering all 199 country-year surveys separately, the slope
falls somewhat to 1.1, and is again statistically significant at the one-percent level. When using
only Tier 1 surveys, the slope coefficient becomes 1.4, and with Tier 1 and 2 surveys, the slope
becomes 1.3. We conclude that the pattern of increasing unemployment is not an artifact of our
choice of countries in the main analysis.
84
2.3.2 Unemployment Rate by Education Level
In this subsection, we report our findings by education level, which are helpful in account-
ing for the aggregate patterns we document above. Later we present results by other demographic
groups. We define two education groups, which can be measured consistently across nearly all of
our countries. The low education group are those that did not finish secondary school. This could
mean no school, some or all of primary school completed, some secondary education, or some
other specialty education that lasts less than 12 years. The high education group are those that
completed secondary school or more. This could mean exactly secondary school, some college or
university completed, or an advanced degree.
Table 2.1: Slope Coefficients of Unemployment Rate on GDP per capita
All Workers N Low Education High Education Ratio
All surveys 1.1∗∗∗ 199 2.9∗∗∗ -.2 .50∗∗∗
(.3) (.4) (.3) (.03)
Country average 1.8∗∗∗ 55 3.2∗∗∗ .5 .48∗∗∗
(.5) (.6) (.4) (.05)
Only Tier 1 surveys 1.4∗∗∗ 127 3.2∗∗∗ .4 .48∗∗∗
(.3) (.4) (.3) (.03)
Only Tier 1 + 2 surveys 1.3∗∗∗ 167 2.9∗∗∗ -.1 .50∗∗∗
(.3) (.4) (.3) (.03)
Note: The table reports the slope coefficient from a regression of the prime-age unemployment rate
on log GDP per capita and a constant. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent,
5-percent and 10-percent levels. The first row includes all surveys in our data. The second row
includes one observation per country: the average unemployment rate for those with at least two
observations across all years from all tiers. The third row includes only Tier 1 surveys. The fourth
row includes only Tier 1 and Tier 2 surveys. Surveys with missing education level data are dropped
in the last three columns.
Figure 2.2 plots the unemployment rates for prime-aged adults by education group. As
before, we plot the unemployment rates in log base 2 and GDP per capita in natural logs. As
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one can see, the patterns differ sharply by group. For the low-educated group, unemployment
is strongly increasing in GDP per capita. For the high-educated group, unemployment rates are
roughly constant across income levels. Again, there is quite a lot of variation in unemployment
rates for each income level, though somewhat less than for the aggregate unemployment rates.
Taking simple averages by income quartile, for the low-educated workers in the bottom quartile,
the average unemployment rate is 2.7 percent. This rises to 8.1 percent in the second quartile, 9.5
in the third and 14.3 in the richest quartile. For the high-educated, the average unemployment
rate is not monotonically increasing in income per capita. It rises from 4.9 percent in the bottom
quartile to 7.7 in the second, and then falls to 6.2 and 7.3 in the third and fourth quartiles.
The third and fourth data columns of Table 2.1 report the regression coefficients for the
low-educated and the high-educated separately. For the low-educated, the coefficient is 2.9 across
all surveys, and statistically significant at the one-percent level. When restricted to country
averages (i.e., the average across all surveys available for each country), we get a significant slope
of 3.2. Across our Tier 1 surveys only, the slope is also 3.2, and when including both Tier 1 and
Tier 2 surveys, the slope is 2.9, with statistical significance at the one-percent level in both cases.
For the high-educated, in contrast, the slope is statistically insignificantly different from zero in
all cases. Across all surveys, the slope coefficient is -0.2 but with a standard error of 0.34. The
estimated slopes are noisy and statistically insignificant for country averages, for Tier 1 and for
both Tiers 1 and 2, as well.
Figure 2.3 plots the ratio of unemployment for the low-educated to that for the high-
educated group. As the figure shows, this ratio is strongly increasing in GDP per capita. It is also
less variable across countries within each broad income level than in Figure 2.1, for example.
Virtually all of the poorest countries have ratios less than one, meaning that the low-educated
workers are less likely to be unemployed than the high-educated. All of the richest countries
have a ratio above one, meaning that the less-educated are more likely than the high-educated to
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be unemployed. For the poorest quartile of the world income distribution, the average ratio is
0.52. It rises to 1.1 in the second quartile, 1.5 in the third and 2.1 in the richest quartile. Table 2.1
reports that a regression of this ratio on log GDP per capita yields an estimated slope coefficient
always in the ballpark of 0.5 across all surveys, with little variation by data comparability tier.
2.3.3 Robustness
In this section, we report how unemployment patterns vary by sex, age, and within rural
and urban areas. Table 2.2 presents the slope coefficients from a regression of unemployment
rates on log GDP per capita for various disaggregated categories of individuals. We do this
separately for the low-education and high-education groups, first over all of our surveys (left
panel), and then using only country averages over all available years (right panel).
The first row of Table 2.2 reports the slope for prime-aged males only. Across all surveys
and country averages, low-educated prime-aged males have a statistically significant positive
slope with GDP per capita, while high-educated ones have an insignificant slope. This pattern
is replicated and even stronger in the full sample of households (second row), which includes
household members aged 16 to 25, those above age 55, and both sexes. The patterns hold
separately for males of all ages (third row) as well, while for females (fourth row), there is even a
significant negative trend with GDP per capita among the high-educated. We conclude that our
patterns hold for both sexes.
When looking by age group, the low-educated always have a significant and positive
relationship with GDP per capita, with the strongest relationship for those aged 16 to 24. The
young high-educated have a significant negative slope with GDP per capita, at least across
all surveys; the prime-aged have an insignificant negative trend; and the old have a small but
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Table 2.2: Robustness of Slope Coefficients of Unemployment Rate on log GDP per capita
All Surveys All Country Averages
Low Edu. High Edu. N Low Edu. High Edu. N
Prime males 2.5∗∗∗ -.3 195 2.9∗∗∗ .4 54
(.4) (.3) (.6) (.3)
Full sample 3.3∗∗∗ -.5 197 3.4∗∗∗ .5 54
(.4) (.4) (.7) (.6)
Males 2.9∗∗∗ -.4 197 3.1∗∗∗ .4 54
(.4) (.3) (.6) (.5)
Females 3.8∗∗∗ -.8∗ 197 3.9∗∗∗ .3 54
(.4) (.5) (.8) (.8)
Age 16-24 6.2∗∗∗ -1.2 183 6.6∗∗∗ .5 52
(.7) (.8) (1.2) (1.3)
Age 25-54 2.9∗∗∗ -.2 195 3.2∗∗∗ .5 54
(.4) (.3) (.6) (.4)
Age 55+ 2.0∗∗∗ .5∗ 173 2.4∗∗∗ .8∗ 49
(.4) (.2) (.6) (.4)
Rural 2.7∗∗∗ -.02 107 3.4∗∗∗ 1.8∗ 29
(.6) (.7) (1.0) (1.0)
Urban 2.5∗∗∗ -.9 107 3.4∗∗∗ .6 29
(.9) (.6) (1.2) (.8)
Note: The table reports the slope coefficients from regressions of the unemployment rate on log GDP
per capita and a constant. Observations include aggregate unemployment rates across all Tier 1, 2,
and 3 surveys. Country averages are restricted to countries with at least two years’ observations. ***,
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels.
significant positive slope. Thus, our patterns are robust across age groups. Finally, we look
separately at rural and urban individuals. For both groups, we see the same patterns: strong
positive increases in low-educated unemployment with GDP per capita and insignificant slopes
for the high-educated. Thus, our findings are present in both rural and urban areas.6
6One may worry that surveyors in poor countries may systematically avoid times when workers are unlikely
to be unemployed, such as harvest times, so as to ensure adequate survey participation. If so, our surveys would
overestimate the unemployment rates in the poor countries, thus, underestimating the slope of the relationship
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2.3.4 Employment, Unemployment, and Not in the Labor Force
Other data sets show that average employment rates are lower in rich countries than in poor
countries, at least for males (see e.g., [22]). Does this imply that unemployment rates are higher in
rich countries? Basic accounting identities show that the answer is no. Those not employed can be
either unemployed or not in the labor force. The lower employment rates of rich countries could
in principle correspond to lower labor force participation rates, or higher unemployment rates, or
both. In practice, we show that the relationship between employment rates, unemployment rates,
the percent not in the labor force (NLF), and income per capita varies considerably by gender and
education, and cannot be inferred directly from evidence on employment rates alone.
Table 2.3: Employment, Unemployment and Not in the Labor Force
Low Education High Education
Income Quartile Bottom Top Difference Bottom Top Difference
Male
Employed 87.5 72.8 -14.7∗∗∗ 83.1 86.3 3.2
Unemployed 2.3 11.2 8.9∗∗∗ 4.0 6.1 2.1∗∗∗
Not in labor force 10.2 16.0 5.8∗ 12.9 7.6 -5.3∗∗
Female
Employed 60.4 46.0 -14.4∗ 63.1 69.7 6.6
Unemployed 1.9 9.1 7.2∗∗∗ 4.2 6.7 2.4∗
Not in labor force 37.7 44.9 7.2 32.7 23.7 -9.0∗
Note: This table reports summary statistics of prime age employment, unemployment and percent
not in the labor force for the bottom and top quartile countries, by gender and education. The rows
present the average of poor countries, the average of the rich countries, and the difference between
the poor and rich means, plus the results of a permutation test of the differences in means.
Table 2.3 reports the percent of prime aged adults – by sex and education level – that are
employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force, for countries in the bottom and top income
quartiles. For low-educated males, employment rates are substantially lower in the richest quartile
between average unemployment and income per capita.
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than in the poorest. This reflects a substantially higher percent of low-educated males not in
the labor force in the richest quartile, as well as their higher unemployment rates in the richest
quartile. A similar pattern also holds for women, though with lower employment levels in both
quartiles.
Among high-educated males, employment rates are modestly higher in the richest quartile
than in the poorest quartile (though the difference is statistically insignificant). Yet the percent
of high-educated males that are unemployed is also modestly higher in the richest quartile. The
reason that both are higher in the richest quartile is that, as Table 2.3 shows, the percent not in
the labor force is substantially lower for high-educated males in the richest quartile. A similar
pattern again holds for females, though with larger increases in employment rates and labor force
participation rates than for the males. We conclude that there is no simple way one can infer
cross-country unemployment patterns by looking solely at data on employment rates, which
reflect a margin of labor force participation as well.
2.4 A Simple Model of Unemployment and Development
In this section, we build a simple model to qualitatively match the increasing unemploy-
ment rate with development, and the patterns of unemployment by education level. Since the
main focus of the paper is on unemployment rates, we abstract from the decision of whether to
join the labor force. Since our empirical patterns are present for both sexes, all age groups and
within both rural and urban areas, we abstract from demographics and regional considerations.
In order to match the large decrease in the traditional (low-skilled self-employment) sector that
coincides with development, we allow for two sectors in our model.
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2.4.1 Environment
There is a unit measure of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers, each of whom is endowed
with efficiency units drawn from a fixed distribution G(x) on [x, x¯]. We assume that G(x) is
differentiable and let g(x)≡ G′(x) be its probability density function. There is also a continuum
of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived firms, each of which can employ one worker. In this simple model,
we assume undirected search in the aggregate distribution of ability. Later, in the quantitative
version of our model, we relax these assumptions and allow firms to direct their search efforts
toward high and low education groups of workers.
Workers can choose to work in one of two sectors: a traditional sector, in which workers
are self-employed without returns to ability, and a modern sector, in which firms hire workers
subject to matching friction. and production displays constant returns to ability. The technologies
in the traditional and modern sectors, respectively, are given by:
YT = AT NT , and (2.1)
YM = AMXM, (2.2)
where YT , AT and NT are output, productivity and the number of workers in the traditional sector,
and YM, AM and XM are output, productivity and the total number of efficiency units in the modern
sector. Countries vary in their level of productivity AM but not AT , so technological change in
our model is skill-biased. Here we assume the outputs of the modern and traditional sectors to
be perfect substitutes for simplicity. We relax this assumption and the invariance of AT in the
quantitative model that follows. Our assumption of exogenous modern-sector productivity is
abstract, though it may capture more concrete channels that affect firm size and hence the extent
of wage employment, such as firm financial frictions (e.g., [62, 15, 33]), or monitoring frictions
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(e.g., [5, 43]).
We now combine a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of steady-state unemployment
with a Roy model of selection into the modern versus the traditional sector.
Steady State. In the steady state, workers will not move between sectors in the absence
of shocks. Denote by x∗ the efficiency units of the marginal worker who is indifferent between
self-employment and entering the modern sector unemployed. We will show below that the
value of being unemployed is increasing in x; hence, in steady state, workers with x < x∗ prefer
self-employment in the traditional sector, and workers with x ≥ x∗ prefer to enter the modern
sector as unemployed.
Modern Sector. In order to hire a worker, a firm must post a vacancy at flow cost AMc.7
Let the flow of matches be given by the constant returns to scale function
m(u,v) = ηuαv1−α, (2.3)
where u is the endogenous measure of unemployed workers and v is the endogenous measure
of vacancies in the economy. Define θ≡ vu as “market tightness.” The job-finding rate is then
f (u,v)≡ mu = ηθ1−α, and the vacancy hiring rate is q(u,v)≡ mv = ηθ−α.
We assume that workers and firms separate at an exogenous rate s. Let AMbx denote the
unemployment flow payoff,8 where 0 < b < 1. One rationale for this choice is that unemployment
benefits are typically indexed to wages, which we will show scale with AMx in equilibrium. A
second rationale is that job finding rates are approximately constant across skill groups, which
is consistent with a model where unemployment benefits scale with the expected wage ([99, 65,
7We shall see later that, in equilibrium, wages scale with AM . If the productivity of the vacancy posting process is
not affected by AM , the cost of posting a vacancy should also scale with AM .
8Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we let AMb denote the unemployment flow payoff.
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104]). Denoting by δ the rate of time discount for all agents, the values of unemployment and
employment for an individual with efficiency units x are given, respectively, by
U(x) = AMbx+δ
[
f E(x)+(1− f )U(x)] (2.4)
E(x) = w(x)+δ
[
sU(x)+(1− s)E(x)], (2.5)
where w(x) is the endogenous flow wage.
Because firms will be matched only with agents in the modern sector, who have efficiency
units x≥ x∗, we can specify the value of a job to a firm if matched with a worker with efficiency
units x and the value of maintaining a vacancy as:
J(x) = AMx−w(x)+δ
[
sV +(1− s)J(x)] (2.6)
V =−AMc+δ
[
qE
(
J|x > x∗)+(1−q)V ], (2.7)
where E
(
J|x > x∗)= ∫ x¯x∗ J(x)g(x)dx1−G(x∗) is the expected value to the firm of a job match conditional on
the workers having entered the modern sector.
Because of the free-entry condition for firms, we have V = 0. Let S(x)≡ E(x)−U(x)+
J(x) denote the total surplus of a match, and β ∈ (0,1) be the Nash bargaining power of the
worker. The firm then receives (1−β)S(x) when a vacancy is filled. Combining this division of
the surplus with equations (2.4) to (2.7) allows us to solve for U(x) and w(x), with the former
given by:
U(x) =
1
1−δ
(
AMbx+δηθ1−α
β
1−β
AMx(1−b)(1−β)
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs
)
. (2.8)
Equation (2.8) shows that U(x) is increasing, as we asserted previously. We also show in Appendix
2.8.2 that steady state in the modern sector is characterized by the following relationship between
θ and x∗:
93
c =
(1−β)δηθ−α
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs(1−b)E(x|x > x
∗). (2.9)
Note that market tightness θ is unaffected by AM for a given x∗. By equation (2.11) below,
this implies that unemployment is unaffected by AM for a given x∗. Thus, in the absence of a
traditional sector, our model predicts that unemployment remains constant as per capita income
increases. If b or c did not scale with AM, θ would instead decrease with AM for a given x∗, and
in the absence of a traditional sector, our model would predict that unemployment decreases as
per capita income increases.
Indifference Condition. The value of staying in the traditional sector is AT1−δ , since any
traditional worker produces AT in every period. The worker with efficiency units x∗ is indifferent
between staying in the traditional sector and entering the modern sector as unemployed:
AT
1−δ =U(x
∗) =
1
1−δ
(
AMbx∗+δηθ1−α
β
1−β
AMx∗(1−b)(1−β)
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs
)
. (2.10)
Unemployment Rate. Letting uM denote the measure of the modern-sector unemployed
and its steady-state value, we can write the change in modern-sector unemployment as u˙M =
(LM−uM)s−uM f (θ), where f (θ) =ηθ1−α is the steady state job finding rate and LM = 1−G(x∗)
is the labor that participates in the modern sector. We can then set u˙M = 0 to obtain the measure
of steady-state modern sector unemployment, which is the same as the overall unemployment
rate, since the overall measure of workers is one and there is no unemployment in the traditional
sector:
u =
s
(
1−G(x∗))
s+ηθ1−α
. (2.11)
Note that the unemployment rate depends on the separation rate, s, the (endogenous) market
tightness, θ, and the (endogenous) cutoff x∗ for working in the modern sector. The fraction
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1−G(x∗) represents the measure of workers in the modern sector. The higher is this fraction,
all else equal, the higher is the unemployment rate. Similarly, the lower is θ, all else equal, the
higher is unemployment.
2.4.2 Model Solution and Predictions
We now establish the uniqueness of our model solution, and characterize how the endoge-
nous variables θ and x∗ vary with modern-sector productivity, AM.
Proposition 1. If an interior solution x∗ ∈ (x, x¯) exists, the model solution (x∗,θ) is unique, and
the cutoff ability x∗ decreases as modern-sector productivity AM increases.
Proof. See Appendix 2.8.2.
Proposition 1 shows that an increase in modern sector productivity reduces x∗, drawing
workers out of the traditional sector into the modern sector. This result plays an important role in
determining how unemployment rates vary with modern-sector productivity. In particular, we can
use it to help establish:
Proposition 2. The aggregate unemployment rate u increases as modern-sector productivity AM
increases.
Proof. See Appendix 2.8.2.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, as AM increases, workers are drawn out
of the traditional sector and into search for wage employment in the modern sector, as shown
in Proposition 1. Because modern-sector jobs involve regular separations, a larger modern
sector means larger steady-state unemployment, all else equal. Second, as AM increases, market
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tightness, θ, falls in equilibrium. Because the workers drawn into the modern sector are of lower
ability than existing modern-sector workers, the expected value of a match to the firm falls. For
the free-entry condition to hold, the job filling rate for a vacancy must rise. This means fewer
vacancies per unemployed person, i.e., a smaller θ.
Proposition 3. Let x∗ be an interior solution and x0 > x∗ denote a fixed ability level. Then the
ratio of the unemployment rate for workers with ability lower than x0 to that of workers with
ability higher than x0 increases as modern-sector productivity AM increases.
Proof. See Appendix 2.8.2.
In short, this result states that the relative unemployment of less-able to more-able workers
increases with development. Intuitively, this occurs because a larger share of less-able workers are
drawn into the modern sector as AM rises. Figure 2.4 illustrates how Proposition 3 works. Denote
the “high-ability workers” as those with ability above x0, and those below x0 as the “low-ability
workers.” The initial cutoff is depicted as x∗1, and hence regions A and B represent the traditional
sector, whereas C and D are the modern sector. Once AM rises, the cutoff falls, by Proposition 1,
to a lower cutoff which we denote by x∗2. Region B switches from the traditional to the modern
sector. Since these are low-ability workers, and no high-ability workers switch sectors, the ratio
of low- to high-ability unemployment increases.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
Though the simple model above is useful for establishing the qualitative properties of our
theory, the model is a bit too stylized to use in our quantitative analysis. Thus, in this section we
build a richer quantitative version of the model. We then calibrate the model to match features
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of the U.S. labor market, and compute the model’s predictions over the full range of the world
income distribution.
2.5.1 Quantitative Version of the Model
In our simple model the outputs of the modern and traditional sectors are perfect sub-
stitutes, so their relative price cannot change as AM rises. This is at odds with the well-known
tendency for the relative price of non-traded services, in which the traditional sector is intensive,
to rise with per capita GDP. With this in mind, we now allow traditional and modern sector
outputs to be imperfect substitutes. We specify the following constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) aggregate production function:
Y =
(
γYσT +(1− γ)YσM
) 1
σ , (2.12)
where YT and YM are the aggregate outputs of the traditional and modern sectors, respectively,
and the elasticity of substitution between them equals 11−σ . Denote the price of traditional-sector
output relative to modern-sector output by PT . In a competitive market, the ratio of prices equals
the ratio of marginal productivities:
PT =
∂Y/∂YT
∂Y/∂YM
=
γ
1− γ
(
YM
YT
)1−σ
. (2.13)
Technological change that is skill-biased across countries is a core assumption of our
model. The assumption that technological change in the traditional sector is zero, however, is an
oversimplification. In our quantitative exercise we allow for an elasticity of technological change
in the traditional sector with respect to technological change in the modern sector that is less than
one. Specifically, in our calibration procedure we will assume that log(AT ) = θ0+θ1 log(AM),
97
where we expect to find that θ1 < 1.9
Increases in PT or AT with AM cause workers who remain in the traditional sector in rich
countries to earn more than traditional sector workers in poor countries. This is more realistic
than the prediction of the simple model that earnings of traditional sector workers in rich and
poor countries will be the same.
Key predictions of our model concern traditional employment and unemployment by
worker ability. Unfortunately, direct measures of ability across many countries are not available.
Wage is a linear function of ability in our model, but we cannot observe wages for the self-
employed in the traditional sector or the unemployed. Instead, for the purpose of quantifying our
predictions regarding traditional self-employment and unemployment by ability, we use education
as our proxy for ability. Specifically, we divide the labor force into the two education groups used
above, in particular the low education group, which did not finish secondary school, and the high
education group, which completed secondary school or more. We incorporate education into our
model as a proxy for ability by assuming that the distribution of ability for the high-education
group first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of ability for the low-education group:
Gh(x)< Gl(x) for all x ∈ (x, x¯).10
Countries differ exogenously in the fraction λ of their workers that are in the low-education
group. The remaining 1−λ are in the high-education group. We assume employers can observe
this education credential ex ante and divide the modern sector labor market into two search
markets, one for each education level. Finally, we treat the outputs of modern-sector firms that
9In our theory, the higher relative output of goods produced by skilled workers that occurs with development
results only from increased productivity in the modern sector relative to the traditional sector. In reality, however,
development leads to an increase in the relative demand for skill-intensive goods, as richer households demand more
skill-intensive products and services ([32, 34]). Our results would still apply, at least qualitatively, if we were to
extend our model to include non-homothetic preferences in which higher income causes higher relative demand for
skill-intensive goods.
10This condition is sufficient, but not necessary, for the results of this subsection. We verified that the distributions
calibrated in the next subsection satisfy this condition.
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search in the high-education and low-education labor markets as perfect substitutes, and add them
to obtain YM in equation (2.13).
We also allow for the possibility that the separation rate for high-educated workers is
less than for low-educated workers, though this is not necessary to obtain any of our qualitative
results: sh ≤ sl . All other parameters are assumed to be the same across the two labor markets.
We can now prove:
Lemma 1. For any interior solution to the model with two labor markets, x∗h < x
∗
l .
Proof. See Appendix 2.8.2.
It follows from Lemma 1 and Gh(x)< Gl(x) that the share of high-educated agents who
are self-employed in the traditional sector is lower than the corresponding share of low-educated
agents:
Proposition 4. For any interior solution to the model with two labor markets, Gh(x∗h)< Gl(x
∗
l ).
As modern sector productivity AM increases in our simple model, Proposition 1 states
that the share of workers who are self-employed in the traditional sector falls (x∗ decreases).
Similarly, if increasing AM dominates increasing traditional sector relative price PT and traditional
sector productivity AT in our quantitative model, the shares of both high- and low-educated
workers who are self-employed in the traditional sector will fall (x∗h and x
∗
l both decrease). The
unemployment rates of both high- and low-educated workers must then increase, just as did the
aggregate unemployment rate in the simple model (Proposition 2). Here, however, the aggregate
unemployment rate does not necessarily increase, despite increases in the unemployment rates
for both education groups. The aggregate unemployment rate in the quantitative version of our
model is a weighted average of the unemployment rates of high- and low-educated workers, with
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weights 1−λ and λ. In the data, as modern sector productivity and thus GDP per capita increases,
the share of low-educated workers λ tends to decrease. If the high-educated unemployment rate is
smaller than the low-educated unemployment rate, it is possible for the aggregate unemployment
rate predicted by the quantitative version of our model to decrease with AM and GDP per capita.
Whether the ratio of low-educated to high-educated unemployment rates increases with
AM in the quantitative model, which would be the equivalent of Proposition 3 in the simple model,
depends on the calibration. However, we can establish a strong presumption that our quantitative
model will display this property. The basis for Proposition 3 is that, as AM increases, participation
in the modern sector by workers with low ability increases relative to participation by workers
with high ability. We can expect, similarly, that as AM increases, participation in the modern sector
of low-educated workers will increase proportionately faster than participation of high-educated
workers. The reason is that low-educated workers’ participation in the modern sector must be
lower according to Proposition 4, but both participation rates must approach 100 percent as AM
increases. In our quantitative predictions in Subsection 2.5.3 below, participation of low-educated
relative to high-educated workers in the modern sector does indeed increase as AM, and thus per
capita GDP, increases.
2.5.2 Parameterizing the Model
We begin by directly setting some parameter values following the literature. We set the
quarterly discount factor to δ= 0.99, consistent with an annual interest rate of around four percent.
We set the worker’s bargaining weight to β= 0.7 and the elasticity parameter of the matching
function to α= 0.7, which are the values used in [56] and are in line with the standard parameter
choices used in macro search models. We set the quarterly separation rate for the high-educated
workers to sh = 0.045, which is the value estimated in [138]. We use the unemployment benefits
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replacement rate of 45 percent. This is in line with the 40 percent used by [129] , the 42 percent
in [29], and the 50 - 60 percent range in [83]. We also normalize the mean of the ability for
low-educated workers to be one.
We set the elasticity of substitution between traditional and modern goods to be 3 in our
benchmark calibration, though we explore sensitivity to this parameter, as we describe below.
Our elasticity of substitution relates to some extent to the elasticity of substitution between
home and market goods that is emphasized by the large literature emphasizing home production
in the macroeconomy.11 Though our model’s elasticity is related to these, it is not exactly
comparable, and one may imagine that there are greater substitution possibilities between modern
and traditional goods than between home and market production, since modern and traditional
goods are both purchased in the market. For example, one type of substitution between the modern
and traditional sector may be getting older shoes shined and repaired (from a self-employed
shoe repairer) rather than purchasing newer shoes (from a modern shoe factory). Another
example is buying produce from an informal road-side vendor versus buying produce at a modern
supermarket. It is therefore worth looking at alternative evidence on substitution between different
categories of purchased goods and services. In a widely cited study, [31] estimate elasticities of
substitution across a diverse set of goods varieties, finding a median estimate of around 2.2 to
3.7 across goods categories.12 Our benchmark value of 3 is right in the middle of their estimates,
though since there is not a more precise value suggested by the literature, we explore a lower
11See eg. [20, 61, 19, 106, 122, 105, 80]. [9] choose a value of 1.8, and argue that this is close to the midpoint of
the range suggested by previous estimates in this literature. For example, [126] use panel data from the PSID with
evidence on time spent in home production and market work, and estimate an elasticity of substitution between 1.8
and 2.0. [94] and [39] use U.S. time series data and come up with estimates of 1.5 to 1.8 and 2.3 respectively. [2]
draw on detailed household-level data on market goods consumption and time spent on home production, such as
cleaning, cooking and home repair. They estimate an elasticity of substitution of 2.1 when considering all home
production categories in their data.
12We are not aware of any estimates of substitution elasticities between goods with low and high levels of skill
inputs. On the production side, the closest estimate would be for the substitution elasticity between high- and
low-skilled labor in the aggregate production function; ?, pg. 11 argues that the “consensus across estimates for the
U.S.” is that this elasticity is approximately two. [96] estimates an elasticity of substitution of around 6.5 between
informal and formal labor, though this is again about production and not final consumption goods.
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Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
Panel A: Pre-Assigned Parameters
δ - Discount factor (quarterly) 0.99
β - Workers’ bargaining power 0.7
α - Matching parameter 0.7
sh - Separation rate (quarterly) for high-educated workers 0.045
b - Unemployed benefits 0.45
1
1−σ - Elasticity of substitution 3
AT (US) - U.S. traditional-sector productivity 1
ml - Mean of ability dfor low-educated workers 1
Panel B: Calibrated Parameters
mh - Mean of ability for high-educated workers 1.66
vl - Variance of ability for low-educated workers 0.45
vh - Variance of ability for high-educated workers 1.15
c - Vacancy cost 0.15
η - Matching efficiency 0.85
γ - Traditional-sector share in aggregate production function 0.01
sl - Separation rate (quarterly) for low-educated workers 0.112
max(AM) - Modern-sector productivity for the richest country 0.04
Note: The table reports the values and interpretations of the parameters of the quantitative model
under the benchmark calibration.
value of 2.5, closer to the home-production literature, and a higher value of 3.5, close to the upper
end of the values estimated by [31].
We calibrate the remaining eight parameters to jointly match eight moments in the data.
These parameters are: (i) the mean of the ability distribution for the high-educated workers, mh;
(ii) and (iii): the variances of the ability distributions for the low- and high-educated workers, vl
and vh; (iv) the vacancy cost c as a share of the modern-sector productivity for a worker with one
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unit of ability; (v) the efficiency term, η, of the matching function; (vi) the traditional-sector share
in the aggregate production function, γ; (vii) the quarterly separation rate for the low-educated
workers, sl; and, finally, (viii): the maximum value of AM, which corresponds to the U.S. level.13
The eight moments are: (i) the ratio of the average modern-sector wages for the high-
over low-educated that we calculated using the 2000 Census 5% sample (1.60); (ii) and (iii) the
variances of log wages for the high- and low-educated (0.34 and 0.28), using the same 2000
census; (iv) the vacancy cost of 17 percent of average output in the modern sector as used in
[56]; (v) the average U.S. unemployment rate of 5.71 percent in the United States among the 18
samples in our data from 1960 to 2014; (vi) the U.S. expenditure share in the traditional sector,
which we conjecture to be smaller than two percent; (vii) the ratio of unemployment for the the
low-educated to high-educated (2.31); and (viii) an average employment share of two percent in
the traditional sector (as we explain below).
We define the traditional sector as the intersection of own-account (self-employed without
employees) workers and occupations with low skill content – in particular, shop and market sales,
agricultural and fishery workers, crafts and related trades workers, plant and machine operators
and assemblers, and “elementary occupations.” Unfortunately, the U.S. data after 1960 distinguish
only between incorporated and unincorporated businesses among the self-employed, rather than
between own-account workers and employers as in the countries in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 below.
Considering that the Canada samples have an average of 2.8 percent prime-aged employment
in the traditional sector, which is defined consistently with the other countries, we conjecture
that the United States has a smaller share of two percent. As with our benchmark unemployment
measures, all traditional sector employment shares reported in this section are calculated for
prime-aged workers.
13Note that although the absolute value of AM is smaller than AT , the modern sector is more productive than the
traditional sector in value terms. The traditional and modern sectors produce different goods, and the relative price of
the traditional good, PT , is around 0.01 in the United States in our calibrated model.
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Table 2.5: Moments Targeted in the Model vs Data
Moment Target Model
Ratio of average wage for the high- vs low-educated 1.60 1.61
High-edu log(wage) variance 0.34 0.33
Low-edu log(wage) variance 0.28 0.28
U.S. vacancy cost as % of average output in modern sector 17 16.9
U.S. unemployment rate 5.71 5.69
U.S. % expenditure share of traditional sector <2.0 0.67
U.S. ratio of unemployment rates ul/uh 2.31 2.32
U.S. traditional sector employment share 2 1.84
Note: The table reports the moments targeted in the benchmark calibration of the quantitative model
and the model’s predictions for each moment.
Table 2.4 reports the value of each parameter used in the calibration. Our calibrated
quarterly separation rate for the low-educated is 0.112, similar to the direct estimate of 0.06 - 0.12
during 1980 to 2010 computed by [138] for low-educated workers. Our estimate is also broadly
consistent with the separation rate in low-skilled services in the United States. For example,
according to the 2017 Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, the monthly separation rate in
wholesale and retail trade, transportation and utilities is around 3.5 percent. This corresponds to a
quarterly separation rate of around 10 percent.
We report each moment and its model counterpart in Table 2.5. Overall, the model
matches the desired moments quite well. Although all of the eight parameters reported above
jointly discipline all the parameters, it is useful to provide some intuition about which moments
are most informative about each parameter. In particular, the mean of the ability distribution for
high-educated workers, mh, largely governs the ratio of average wage of the high- to low-educated
workers. The variances of the two ability distributions govern the variances of log wages for the
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low- and high-educated workers. The model vacancy cost and model unemployment benefit are
most informative about the relative size of vacancy cost and unemployment benefits to the average
output per worker in the modern sector. The matching efficiency parameter η mostly informs the
average unemployment rate, and the sector share parameter in the aggregate production function
mostly informs the expenditure share of traditional-sector output. The quarterly separation rate for
low-educated workers is most informative about the unemployment ratio of low- to high-educated
workers. Finally, the maximum AM value governs the traditional sector employment share in the
richest country (the United States).
It remains to calibrate the elasticity of traditional sector productivity with respect to
modern sector productivity. To do so, we use the fact that greater increases in AT will result in
smaller increases in PT as GDP per capita increases, all else equal. Specifically, we target the
elasticity of the relative price of traditional goods with respect to GDP per capita.
We draw on disaggregated evidence on average national prices for specific products from
the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP). The ICP data are the best available data on the
prices of identical (or nearly identical) goods and services around the world, and are available for
almost every country in the world. How do we define traditional goods in these data? Consistent
with our definition of the traditional sector, we pick goods or services that are have low skill
content and are likely to be provided by self-employed workers. We identified eight specific
services that plausibly meet these criteria: (i) a shoe repair for women’s street shoes; (ii) a shoe
repair for men’s classic shoes; (iii) a shoeshine; (iv) a 7km taxi ride from the town center; (v) a
men’s basic haircut; (vi) a ladies haircut with curlers; (vii) a manicure; (viii) a ladies haircut, long
hair. Appendix Table 2.15 provides the exact definitions of these eight traditional sector services.
Since investment goods largely fit our definition of a modern output, we take the aggregate price
level of investment from the Penn World Table as a proxy for our modern sector price. For
each traditional-sector service, we then compute the relative price of the service compared to
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Table 2.6: Slope of Log Relative Prices on log(GDP) in Data
Shoe repair - women’s street shoes .39∗∗∗ Men’s basic haircut .61∗∗∗
(.002) (.001)
Shoe repair - men’s classic shoes .53∗∗∗ Ladies haircut - curlers .63∗∗∗
(.004) (.002)
Shoeshine .56∗∗∗ Manicure .44∗∗∗
(.002) (.003)
Local taxi ride .42∗∗∗ Ladies haircut - long hair .68∗∗∗
(.006) (.002)
Note: Data come from the unpublished ICP 2011 disaggregated price data for the Global Core list
of goods and services. See Appendix Table 2.15 for the exact definition of each good and service.
The table reports the slope coefficient from a regression of the log of the item price relative to the
investment goods price on log GDP per capita and a constant. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels.
investment goods in each country.
Table 2.6 reports the slope coefficient from a regression of the log of the item relative
price on log GDP per capita and a constant. As shown in the table, the elasticity of the relative
price ranges between 0.39 to 0.68. We target the median of these relative price elasticities, which
is around 0.60. Our calibration uses the parameter θ1, the elasticity of AT with respect to AM, to
target this relative price elasticity. This yields θ1 = 0.26, with the intercept θ0 in the equation
log(AT ) = θ0 +θ1 log(AM) determined implicitly by our normalization of AT to be one in the
United States.14
14Specifically, to match the elasticity of relative price to GDP per capita, we have to solve the full set of countries
in the model with potential values of θ1. In contrast, we only need to solve one country in the model to calibrate the
eight U.S. moments.
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2.5.3 Quantitative Predictions
With the model calibrated to the U.S. data, we then lower AM, AT , and λ, the fraction of
workers that are low-educated. We discipline λ directly using data on the fraction of workers
with less than high school education across our set of countries (see Appendix Figure 2.9). After
solving each economy, we use the equilibrium prices PT from all economies to compute a single
international price, the average of PT weighted by traditional-sector output in each economy. We
use this international price to compute the values of model outputs for all economies, including
the U.S., and then scale all output values such that the richest economy matches the U.S. GDP
per capita of exp(10.7) or $44,355.
Figure 2.5 plots the traditional-sector size in the model and data. As GDP per capita
decreases from the U.S. level, our model predicts an increase in the traditional-sector size from
two percent to almost 60 percent. This is largely in line with our data. Furthermore, our model
gets the curvature largely correct – in particular, the convex relationship between traditional-
sector share and GDP per capita. This occurs partly because in richer economies almost all
high-educated workers in the model are in the modern sector, so when those workers start to
switch to the traditional sector, its size increases faster.
To emphasize the mechanisms further, Figure 2.6 plots the traditional-sector shares by
education level. As in the data, the model predicts decreasing relationships between the traditional
sector shares and per capita GDP for both groups. Crucially, it predicts much higher shares
of traditional sector employment for the low-educated in poor countries. As AM rises, there
are more low- than high-educated workers to sort out of the traditional sector, and as a result
unemployment rises more for the low-educated (as in the data). This differential rate of exodus
from the traditional sector as AM rises is thus key to our theory, and Figure 2.6 shows that the
107
magnitudes here are largely consistent with the data. Note that the aggregate traditional-sector
share in Figure 2.5 is nearly the same as the low-educated traditional sector share in Figure 2.6,
because the labor force in poor countries is dominated by low-educated workers.
Figure 2.7 plots the aggregate unemployment level in the model and data. As GDP per
capita increases, our model predicts that the unemployment rate will increase from less than 4
percent to the calibrated value of 5.7 percent. This is similar to the magnitudes in the data, though
the model somewhat under-predicts the steepness of the relationship. Further, consistent with the
data, our model predicts a sharper increase when GDP per capita is lower. This is a result of the
faster decrease in the traditional-sector share when GDP per capita is lower.
Figure 2.8 plots the ratio of unemployment for the low-educated to the high-educated in
the model and data. The model is calibrated to obtain the correct ratio for the United States. For
lower levels of GDP per capita, the model predicts a decline in this ratio, as in the data. Again,
the the model underpredicts the steepness of this relationship. The model predicts that this ratio
is just above one for the poorest countries, whereas in the data, the ratio is closer to 0.5.
Table 2.8 reports the slope coefficients from regressions of the unemployment rate and
other key variables for prime age workers on log GDP per capita and a constant, in our model
and in the data. For the aggregate unemployment rate, the model yields a semi-elasticity of 0.5
compared to 1.8 in the data. Thus, the model accounts for around 30 percent (0.5/1.8) of the
empirical relationship between unemployment and log GDP per capita. Unemployment rates
for the low-educated have a semi-elasticity of 1.7 in the model, compared to 3.2 in the data.
The high-educated semi-elasticities are fairly similar, at 0.4 in the model and 0.5 in the data.
The ratio of low- to high-educated unemployment rates is 0.5 in the data and 0.3 in the model.
Largely consistent with the above discussions, the model yields magnitudes similar to the data
but underpredicts the empirical elasticities. Traditional-sector slopes are similar in the model and
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Table 2.7: Slope Coefficients in Data and Quantitative Model
Data Model
Aggregate traditional sector share -15.9 -13.4
Traditional-sector share for low educated -16.7 -12.7
Traditional-sector share for high educated -4.9 -5.0
Aggregate unemployment rate 1.8 0.5
Unemployment rate for low-educated 3.2 1.7
Unemployment rate for high-educated 0.5 0.4
Ratio of unemployment rates ul/uh 0.5 0.3
Relative price PT 0.6 0.60
Note: The table reports estimated slope coefficients from regressions of the statistics in each row on
log GDP per capita. The first data column reports the slopes from our cross-country database, and the
second data column reports the slopes from the quantitative model.
data, at -15.9 in the model and -13.4 in the data.
We also calibrated our model using an alternative strategy to discipline the elasticity of
technological change in the traditional sector with respect to technological change in the modern
sector. We targeted the slope of the aggregate traditional sector share on log GDP per capita
instead of the elasticity of the relative price of traditional sector output with respect to GDP per
capita. This yields θ1 = 0.19 when we match the traditional sector share slope of -15.9 precisely.
When calibrated this way, the model yields a slightly higher relative price elasticity of 0.67,
which is still in the range of the empirical estimates 0.4 to 0.7. Using this strategy, the model
accounts for more than 40 percent (0.75/1.8) of the empirical relationship between unemployment
and log GDP per capita. It yields the same slope of 0.3 for the ratio of low- to high-educated
unemployment as in the benchmark. Appendix Table 2.16 reports all the model slopes when
using the alternative calibration strategy.
In our benchmark model, the unemployment benefits replacement rate b is set to 0.45 in
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all economies. But in reality, the benefits replacement rate is higher in richer countries. To study
the quantitative impact of varying b values, we now calibrate the model using increasing b values
from 0 in the poorest country to 45 percent in the United States.
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the slope coefficients from regressions of the unemployment
rate and unemployment ratio on log GDP per capita and a constant, in our benchmark model
and in the model with varying b values. The model with varying b values predicts an aggregate
unemployment rate elasticity of 0.72, compared to 0.52 in the benchmark model. This accounts
for 41 percent of the empirical relationship in the data, which is 11 percentage points higher than
in our benchmark model. For the unemployment ratio, the model with varying b values has an
elasticity of 0.26, very similar to 0.25 in the benchmark model. In addition, Panel B of Table 2.8
reports the difference of average unemployment rates and ratios for the top and bottom income
countries, both in the data and in two versions of the model. The top income quartile countries in
our sample have an average unemployment rate of 8.0 percent compared to 2.7 percent for the
bottom quartile countries. The difference is 5.3 percentage points. The model with varying b
values can account for 52 percent of this unemployment rate difference, compared to 42 percent
for the benchmark model. For the unemployment ratio difference, the two versions of model have
similar explanatory power, 51 percent for the benchmark model and 54 percent for the model
with increasing b values.
In summary, an alternative model which includes increasing unemployment benefits with
development helps to explain the increase in the unemployment rate with GDP per capita, but not
the increase in the unemployment ratio. Thus, although the quantitive model explains a substantial
portion of the aggregate unemployment patterns in question, and the higher unemployment
benefits in richer countries increase the model’s explanatory power, much of the data are left
unexplained by the model. Additional forces that help to explain the cross-country relationship
between average unemployment and income per capita are a subject for future research.
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Table 2.8: Benchmark Model and Model with Varying b
Panel A: Slope Coefficients
Data Benchmark Explained Varying b Explained
Unemployment 1.76 0.52 30% 0.72 41%
uL/uH 0.47 0.25 53% 0.26 55 %
Panel B: Top Quartile Minus Bottom Quartile
benchmark Data Benchmark Explained Varying b Explained
Unemployment 5.3 2.2 42 % 2.78 52%
uL/uH 1.3 0.7 51% 0.69 54 %
Note: Panel A reports the slope coefficients from regressions of the unemployment rate and unem-
ployment ratio on log GDP per capita and a constant. Panel B reports the difference between the top
and bottom quartiles of the world income distribution. The first data column reports the values from
our cross-country database. The second and third data columns report the values from the benchmark
model and the percent of the data explained. The fourth and fifth columns report the values from the
alternative model, with varying b, and the percent explained from that model.
2.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
As noted above, the literature provides us with a range of plausible elasticities of substi-
tution rather than a single firm value. In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our model’s
predictions to the value for the elasticity of substitution. We compute the model’s predictions for
elasticities 2.5 and 3.5, in particular, in addition to the benchmark value of 3.
We present the results in Table 2.9. Each row reports the slope coefficient from a
regression of the variable on question on log GDP per capita. The first column is the data slope
coefficients, the second is that of the benchmark model, and the third and fourth columns are the
slope coefficients in the model with the lower and higher values of the substitution elasticities,
respectively. For the lower value of 2.5, the model underpredicts the slope of the traditional
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Table 2.9: Sensitivity Analysis of Model Elasticity of Substitution, 11−σ
Data Benchmark 11−σ = 2.5
1
1−σ = 3.5
Aggregate traditional sector share -15.9 -13.4 -9.2 -17.1
Traditional-sector share for low educated -16.7 -12.7 -8.4 -16.4
Traditional-sector share for high educated -4.9 -5.0 -2.6 -7.8
Aggregate unemployment rate 1.8 0.5 0.1 0.9
Unemployment rate for low-educated 3.2 1.7 1.2 2.1
Unemployment rate for high-educated 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5
Ratio of unemployment rates ul/uh 0.5 0.25 0.17 0.32
Relative price PT 0.6 0.60 0.64 0.56
Note: This table reports the slope coefficients from regressions of the statistics in each row on log
GDP per capita and a constant. The first column is for an elasticity of substitution between modern
and traditional output of 2.5, the second column is the benchmark model, and the third column is for
an elasticity of substitution of 3.5.
sector shares on log GDP per capita. As a result, the aggregate unemployment rate varies less
with GDP per capita (0.1 versus 0.5 in the benchmark model), as do unemployment rates for
low-educated workers (1.2 versus 1.7 in the benchmark) and high-educated workers (0.2 versus
0.4 in the benchmark). The ratio of low-to-high unemployment rates also varies less with GDP
per capita than in the benchmark (0.17 versus 0.25). The relative price varies more than in the
benchmark (0.64 versus 0.60).
For the higher value of 3.5, the model over-predicts the slope of the traditional sector
share on log GDP per capita. The unemployment rate varies substantially more with GDP per
capita than in the benchmark, both in the aggregate and by education level. The unemployment
ratio has a slope of 0.32 compared to 0.25 in the benchmark, and is somewhat closer to the slope
of 0.5 in the data.
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The intuition for these results is as follows. The change in the level of unemployment is
driven by the exodus from the traditional sector, which, in turn, is driven by the increase in the
ratio of marginal value products of labor: AMPT AT . The smaller is the elasticity of substitution, the
less this ratio changes because the rise in PT offsets the rise in AM as we move from the poorest to
the richest country. In the benchmark model, the slope of this ratio on log GDP per capita is 0.87,
only 0.79 when the elasticity is 2.5, and 0.95 when the elasticity is 3.5. That is why the model
predicts so much more change in unemployment when the elasticity is 3.5 than when it is 2.5.
We conclude that the model is sensitive to values of the elasticity of substitution between
modern- and traditional-sector output. For our benchmark value of 3 the model explains the
traditional-sector employment share across countries quite well, suggesting that this may be a
sensible value ex-post. For all three of the values chosen, the model underpredicts the slope of
the relationship between unemployment and GDP per capita.
2.6 Historical Evidence
In this section, we report historical evidence from countries that have high income per
capita today to explore how their average unemployment rates have evolved over the long run with
income levels. We first look at aggregate unemployment rates from Australia, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States in the period before World War I compared to the most
recent evidence. We then look at more disaggregate evidence from the United States.
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Table 2.10: Historical Unemployment Rates
Country Early Period Unemployment Difference
(source) Early Recent (p-value)
Australia 1901 - 1913 5.17 5.26 0.09
(Mitchell 1992) (.48)
France 1895 - 1913 7.35 8.91 1.55∗∗∗
(Mitchell 1992) (.00)
Germany 1887 - 1913 2.37 7.55 5.18∗∗∗
(Mitchell 1992) (.00)
United Kingdom 1881 - 1913 4.71 7.29 2.57∗∗∗
(UK Central Statistical Office) (.00)
United States 1869 - 1913 5.11 6.38 1.27∗∗∗
(Vernon 1994, Mitchell 1992) (.00)
Note: The table reports the average unemployment rates in the early and recent periods, and the
results of a one-sided permutation test of whether the recent period has a larger unemployment
rate. The early period is defined as the years before WWI; and the recent period is defined as a
corresponding year to 2016 such that we have the same number of years for the two periods in each
country; see the text for exact dates.
2.6.1 Historical Unemployment Rates
The earliest evidence on unemployment that we can find comes from the late 19th century
or early 20th century. For simplicity, we consider two periods: an early period containing all data
pre-World War I, and a recent period comprised of the most recently available data covering the
same number of years. There are five countries for which we found aggregate unemployment
data for at least ten years before WWI started in 1914: Australia, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The recent period is then defined as 2004 - 2016 for Australia,
1998 - 2016 for France, 1990 - 2016 for Germany, 1984 - 2016 for the UK, and 1972 - 2016 for
the U.S. The recent aggregate unemployment rate data are combined from the World Bank, the
U.K. office for National Statistics, and the U.S. BLS.
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Table 2.10 reports the average unemployment rates in the early and recent periods for
these five countries, the difference between the recent and early periods, and a permutation test
of the difference between the recent and early periods. The recent unemployment rate is larger
than the early period for all five countries. Among them, Australia’s unemployment rate is very
similar in the two periods, and the difference is statistically insignificant. For the remaining four,
average unemployment is economically and statistically significantly higher in the recent period.
France’s unemployment is the highest overall in both periods, and rises from 7.4 to 8.9 percent.
Germany’s unemployment rises from 2.4 to 7.6 percent. The United Kingdom rises from 4.7 to
7.3 percent, and the United States rises from 5.1 to 6.4 percent. All of these countries had very
large increases in GDP per capita over this period. We conclude that the historical evidence is
consistent with our cross sectional finding that the aggregate unemployment rate increases when
GDP per capita increases.
2.6.2 Disaggregated U.S. Time Series Evidence
We now turn to evidence from the U.S. time series micro data. These data allow us
to go beneath the aggregate unemployment rates and to study what happens to unemployment
and traditional sector employment by education group. The data allow us to test our theory’s
prediction that unemployment rates rose, particularly for the low-educated.15
To do so, we draw on the U.S. census every decade from 1910 to 2010 from IPUMS
International [101]. To maintain consistency across years, we restrict attention to workers aged
16 and over in all states except Alaska and Hawaii. The first row of Table 2.11 reports the slope
coefficients from regressions of the unemployment rates on log GDP per capita and a constant. As
the table shows, unemployment rates rose with log GDP per capita on average, particularly for the
15Strictly speaking, our theory applies to comparisons across steady states, so the predictions in this section are
suggested by our theory rather than directly derived from it.
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Table 2.11: Slope Coefficients for U.S. Time Series
Worker Education Group
All Workers Low High Ratio
Unemployment rate 3.3∗∗ 10.6∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗ .7∗∗
(1.6) (2.3) (1.6) (.3)
Traditional sector share -2.6∗∗ -1.6 -.4
(1.0) (1.3) (.7)
Note: The table reports the slope coefficients from regressions of unemployment rates and the
traditional sector share on log GDP per capita and a constant. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent levels.
less-educated. The estimated slope of the ratio of low-educated unemployment to high-educated
unemployment is 0.7 using these data, compared with 0.5 in the cross-country data. We conclude
that disaggregated unemployment rates from historical U.S. data are largely consistent with our
theory and our cross-country evidence.
Our theory also predicts that the size of the traditional sector has fallen over time in the
United States. To test this prediction, we use the census data from 1960 to 2010 to measure
the size of the traditional sector according to our proxy of self-employed workers in low-skilled
occupations. The second row of Table 2.11 reports the slope coefficient from a regression of
the traditional sector share on log GDP per capita and a constant. As the theory predicts, the
traditional-sector share decreases significantly with log GDP per capita, mostly driven by the
decrease for the low-education group. We conclude that our theory performs adequately here as
well.
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2.7 Conclusions
We draw on household survey evidence from around the world to document that unem-
ployment rates are higher, on average, in rich countries than in poor countries. The pattern is
particularly pronounced for the less-educated, whose unemployment rates are strongly increasing
in GDP per capita, whereas unemployment for the more-educated is roughly constant on average
across countries. Our findings imply that the low-educated are more likely to be unemployed than
the high-educated in rich countries, whereas the opposite is true in poor countries.
To explain these facts, we build a two-sector model that combines labor search, as in [47]
and [103], with a traditional self-employment sector, as in [109]. In our model, countries differ
exogenously in the productivity of the modern sector, in which worker productivity depends on
ability, and workers offer their services in a labor market with search frictions. All countries
have access to an identical traditional sector governed by self-employment and production in
which ability plays no role. As such, our model features skill-biased technology differences
across countries, as emphasized by, for example, [37]. Workers are heterogeneous and sort as
in [125]. As productivity of the modern sector rises, progressively more workers sort into the
modern sector. Unemployment levels rise, and particularly so for the less able, as proxied by low
education in our empirical findings. A quantitative analysis of the model shows that the model
explains a reasonable fraction – on the order of one third – of the cross-country facts that we
document.
Our model suggests that at least some rise in unemployment is a natural consequence
of the development process, as skilled workers search for jobs, rather than a sign of worsening
economic opportunities as countries grow. At the same time, by making unemployment more
predictable, we take the first steps toward providing a benchmark against which policy makers
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can judge the efficiency of their labor markets.
Chapter 2, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the
material. It is coauthored with David Lagakos and James E. Rauch. The dissertation author was a
primary investigator and author this material.
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(a) Low-Education Group
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Note: This figure plots the average unemployment rate for prime-aged adults by education level in
each country with at least two observations across all years of data from all tiers. Low education
means less than secondary school completed; high-education means secondary school completed or
more.
Figure 2.2: Unemployment Rates by GDP per capita and Education
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Note: This figure plots the average unemployment ratio of the low-educated workers over the high-
educated workers for prime-aged adults across all years of data for each country with at least two
years’ observations, for Tiers 1, 2 and 3 of surveys. See the Data Appendix for more details.
Figure 2.3: Ratio of Unemployment Rates for Low- to High-Educated
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Note: This figure illustrates comparative statics in AM , characterized formally in Propositions 2 and
3.
Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics in AM in Simple Model
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Note: This figure plots the size of the traditional sector against log GDP per capita in the data and
model. Each dot represents one country, and the solid line is the prediction of the quantitative model.
Figure 2.5: Traditional-Sector Share in Model and Data
122
MLI
MWI
ZMB
KHM
TZA
IND
SLV
IDN
GHA
BOL
MARARG
NIC
NGA
JAM
ECU
DOM
PER
FJIPANBRACHLVENCRIBWA
URY
ROUZAF
TUR
MYS
MEX
TTO
IRN
PRT
HUN
GRCAUT
ESPFRAIRLCAN
CHE
Model
0
20
40
60
80
Tr
ad
itio
na
l S
ec
to
r S
ize
 (P
erc
en
t) f
or 
Hi
gh
 E
du
ca
tio
n
6 7 8 9 10 11
ln(GDP per capita)
MLI
MWI
ZMB
KHM
TZA
INDSLV
IDN
GHA
BOL
MAR
ARG
NIC
NGA
JAM
ECU
DOM
PER
FJI
PAN
BRA
CHLVEN
CRI
BWA
URY
ROU
ZAF
TUR
MYS
MEX
TTO
IRN
PRT
HUN
GRC
AUTESPFRA
IRL
CAN
CHE
Model
0
20
40
60
80
Tr
ad
itio
na
l S
ec
to
r S
ize
 (P
erc
en
t) f
or 
Lo
w 
Ed
uc
ati
on
6 7 8 9 10 11
ln(GDP per capita)
Note: This figure plots the size of the traditional sector against log GDP per capita in the data and
model. The top panel is for high-educated workers, and the bottom is for low-educated workers.
Figure 2.6: Traditional-Sector Share by Education
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Note: This figure plots the aggregate unemployment rate against log GDP per capita. Each dot
represents one country in our data, and the solid line is the prediction of the quantitative model.
Figure 2.7: Unemployment Rates in the Model and Data
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Note: This figure plots the ratio of unemployment for the low-educated to unemployment for the
high-educated. Each dot represents one country in our database. The solid line is the prediction of
the quantitative model.
Figure 2.8: Unemployment Ratio in the Model and Data
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2.8 Appendices
2.8.1 Data Appendix
Among the 199 surveys listed below, there are 11 from earlier than 1990, 59 from the
1990s, 88 from the 2000s, and 41 from 2010 and later. Among the 84 countries, there are 55 for
which we have at least two surveys.
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Table 2.12: Tier 1: Most Comparable Surveys
Tier 1a: Searched for work last week
Country Year Source
Azerbaijan 1995 Survey of Living Conditions
Bangladesh 2000, 2005, 2010 Household Income-Expenditure Survey (HIES)
Bolivia 1992, 2001 IPUMS-I
Botswana 2001, 2011 IPUMS-I
Brazil 2010 IPUMS-I
Burkina Faso 2014 LSMS
Burkina Faso 2006 IPUMS-I
Canada 2011 IPUMS-I
Chile 1992, 2002 IPUMS-I
Colombia 1993, 2005 IPUMS-I
Costa Rica 2000, 2011 IPUMS-I
Cuba 2002 IPUMS-I
Dominican Republic 2002 IPUMS-I
Ecuador 1990, 2001, 2010 IPUMS-I
El Salvador 1992 IPUMS-I
Fiji 2007 IPUMS-I
Ghana 1984, 2000 IPUMS-I
Ghana 1998 Living Standards Survey
Greece 1996, 2001, 2011 IPUMS-I
Hungary 2011 IPUMS-I
India 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2004 IPUMS-I
Indonesia 1990, 1995, 2010 IPUMS-I
Indonesia 2014 Indonesia Family Life Survey
Ireland 2011 IPUMS-I
Jamaica 1991, 2001 IPUMS-I
Kenya 2009 IPUMS-I
Malaysia 1991, 2000 IPUMS-I
Mexico 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010, 2015 IPUMS-I
Mongolia 2000 IPUMS-I
Mozambique 1997, 2007 IPUMS-I
Nigeria 2010 IPUMS-I
Pakistan 1973 IPUMS-I
Panama 1990, 2000, 2010 IPUMS-I
Paraguay 1992 IPUMS-I
Peru 2007 IPUMS-I
Peru 1994 Living Standards Survey
Philippines 1990 IPUMS-I
Poland 2002 IPUMS-I
Portugal 1991, 2001 IPUMS-I
Romania 1992, 2002, 2011 IPUMS-I
Rwanda 2002 IPUMS-I
Saint Lucia 1980, 1991 IPUMS-I
South Africa 1993 Integrated Household Survey
South Sudan 2008 IPUMS-I
Spain 2011 IPUMS-I
Sudan 2008 IPUMS-I
Tajikistan 1999 LSMS
Tanzania 2002, 2012 IPUMS-I
Trinidad and Tobago 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2011 IPUMS-I
Uganda 1991, 2002 IPUMS-I
United States 1960 IPUMS-I
Venezuela 2001 IPUMS-I
Zambia 1990, 2010 IPUMS-I
Tier 1b: Searched for work in the last 4 weeks
Country Year Source
Argentina 1991 IPUMS-I
Armenia 2011 IPUMS-I
Belarus 2009 IPUMS-I
Brazil 2000 IPUMS-I
Canada 1991, 2001 IPUMS-I
Dominican Republic 2010 IPUMS-I
Italy 2001 IPUMS- I
Jordan 2004 IPUMS-I
Panama 2010 IPUMS-I
Paraguay 2002 IPUMS-I
South Africa 2007, 2011 IPUMS-I
United States 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005 IPUMS
United States 2001-2014 American Community Survey (ACS)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 Living in Bosnia and Herzegovina Survey
Brazil 1997 Survey of Living Conditions
Bulgaria 2007 Multi-topic Household Survey
Iran 2011 IPUMS-I
Iraq 2012 Household Socio-economic Survey
Malawi 2013 Integrated Household Panel Survey
Serbia 2007 LSMS
Uganda 2011 National Panel Survey
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Table 2.13: Tier 2: Comparable Search Questions, Less Comparable Duration Questions
Country Year Source Seeking window
Armenia 2001 IPUMS-I Current
Bangladesh 1991, 2001 IPUMS-I 7 days, main activity
Bangladesh 2011 IPUMS-I Current status
Brazil 1980 IPUMS-I Current
Burkina Faso 1996 IPUMS-I At least 3 days in the last week
Cambodia 1998, 2008 IPUMS-I 6 months
Egypt 2006 IPUMS-I current
El Salvador 2007 IPUMS-I Current/ last week
France 2006, 2011 IPUMS-I Current
Haiti 2003 IPUMS-I Last month
Hungary 1990 IPUMS-I Current
Iran 2006 IPUMS-I Past 30 days
Iraq 1997 IPUMS-I Current
Ireland 1991, 1996, 2002, 2006 IPUMS-I Current
Kyrgyz Republic 1999, 2009 IPUMS-I Current
Malawi 2008 IPUMS-I Last year
Mali 1998, 2009 IPUMS-I 4 weeks
Morocco 1994, 2004 IPUMS-I Current
Nicaragua 2005 IPUMS-I 2 weeks
Portugal 2011 IPUMS-I Current
Rwanda 1991 IPUMS-I Most of the week
Senegal 2002 IPUMS-I Continuously for at least 3 months
Sierra Leone 2004 IPUMS-I 4 weeks
South Africa 1996 IPUMS-I Current
Switzerland 2000 IPUMS-I Current
Turkey 1990, 2000 IPUMS-I Current
Uruguay 2006, 2011 IPUMS-I 4 weeks
Venezuela 1990 IPUMS-I Current
Zambia 2000 IPUMS-I Primary activity, 7 days
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Table 2.14: Tier 3: Least Comparable Search or Activity Questions
Country Year Source Activity Search
Argentina 2001, 2010 IPUMS-I Exclude: for self-consumption 4 weeks
Austria 1991 IPUMS-I
A minimum average of 12
hours per week Current
Austria 2001 IPUMS-I 7 days Only previously employed
Austria 2011 IPUMS-I No text No text
Belarus 1999 IPUMS-I Exclude: for self-consumption Yes
Botswana 2011 IPUMS-I 4 Weeks
Cameroon 2005 IPUMS-I 7 Days
Last 7 days for worked before;
now for looking for the first job
China 1990 IPUMS-I No text No text
Ethiopia 2007 IPUMS-I Standard No text
France 1990, 1999 IPUMS-I Current Enrollment ANPE
Fiji 1996 IPUMS-I Worked for money Not comparable
Ghana 2010 IPUMS-I No text No text
Hungary 2001 IPUMS-I Current Unemployment benefit
India 2009 IPUMS-I Standard Only 12 months main activity available
Liberia 2008 IPUMS-I 12 Months 12 months
Netherlands 2001 IPUMS-I No Text Not comparable
Palestine 1997, 2007 IPUMS-I 7 Days
Included did not seek but
want to work
Peru 1993 IPUMS-I Not comparable Not comparable
Portugal 1981 IPUMS-I 7 Days Text not available
Slovenia 2002 IPUMS-I Current
Registered as unemployed at the
employment service of Slovenia
Spain 1991, 2001 IPUMS-I 7 Days Unemployed, worked previously
South Africa 2001 IPUMS-I 4 Weeks Could not find work
Switzerland 1990 IPUMS-I Principal occupation Current
Ukraine 2001 IPUMS-I Status Unemployment allowances, unemployed
Vietnam 2009, 1991 IPUMS-I Earn income 4 Weeks
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2.8.2 Model Derivation and Proofs
Model Derivations
In this subsection, we develop the expressions for U(x) and w(x), and show the intermedi-
ate steps to develop Equation (2.9). We start by simplifying Equations (2.4) - (2.7) to
(1−δ)U(x) = AMbx+δηθ1−α
[
E(x)−U(x)] (2.14)
(1−δ)E(x) = w(x)+δs[U(x)−E(x)] (2.15)
J(x) =
AMx−w(x)
1−δ(1− s) (2.16)(
1−G(x∗))AMc = δηθ−α∫ x¯
x∗
J(x)g(x)dx. (2.17)
The firm receives (1−β)S(x) = (1−β)[E(x)−U(x)+ J(x)] = J(x) when a vacancy is filled.
Combining this division of surplus with equation (2.16) gives
E(x)−U(x) = β
1−β
AMx−w(x)
1−δ(1− s) . (2.18)
Substituting equation (2.18) into equation (2.14) yields
U(x) =
1
1−δ
(
AMbx+δηθ1−α
β
1−β
AMx−w(x)
1−δ(1− s)
)
. (2.19)
We can then solve for w(x) by combining equations (2.19) and (2.18) with equation (2.15):
w(x) =
AMbx
1+ k(θ)
+
k(θ)
1+ k(θ)
AMx, with k(θ) =
β(δηθ1−α+1−δ+δs)
(1−β)(1−δ+δs) .
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Substituting this solution into equations (2.16) and (2.19) gives us, respectively,
J(x) =
AMx(1−b)(1−β)
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs (2.20)
U(x) =
1
1−δ
(
AMbx+δηθ1−α
β
1−β
AMx(1−b)(1−β)
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs
)
. (2.21)
Equation (2.21) appears as equation (8) in the text. Finally, substituting equation (2.20) into
equation (2.17) and dividing both sides by 1−G(x∗) yields equation (2.9) that determines θ for
any given level of x∗:
c =
(1−β)δηθ−α
βδηθ1−α+1−δ+δs(1−b)E(x|x > x
∗).
Proof of Proposition 1
Equations (2.9) and (2.10) allow us to solve for unique values of θ and x∗. We first
simplify equation (2.10) to
θ1−α =
(AT −AMbx∗)(1−δ+δs)
βδη(AMx∗−AT ) . (2.22)
Substitute this expression into equation (2.9), yielding a single equation that determines
x∗:
(AT −AMbx∗) α1−αAMx∗(1−b)c(1−δ+δs) 11−α
(AMx∗−AT ) 11−α
= (1−β)(δη) 11−αβ α1−α (1−b)E(x|x > x∗).
(2.23)
We assume that a solution x∗ ∈ (x, x¯) to equation (2.23) exists. Since the existence of this
solution implies that AMx∗−AT > 0, it also implies the existence of a solution θ> 0. Moreover,
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if the solution x∗ is unique, then the solution θ is also unique.
To demonstrate uniqueness of the solution x∗, we first show that the left-hand side of
equation (2.23) is decreasing in x∗. Inspection of equation (2.23) shows that a sufficient condition
is that AMx∗/(AMx∗−AT ) 11−α is decreasing in x∗. We have
sign
[d AMx∗
(AMx∗−AT )
1
1−α
dx∗
]
= sign
[
(AMx∗−AT ) 11−α − x
∗
1−α(AMx
∗−AT ) α1−αAM
]
= sign
[
−AT − αAMx
∗
1−α
]
,
which is negative. Since the right-hand side of equation (2.23) is increasing in x∗, then the x∗ that
solves equation (2.23) must be unique.
Having demonstrated that the solution is unique, we turn to comparative statics of an
increase in AM. We want to show that the left-hand side of equation (2.23) is decreasing in AM. It
is sufficient to show:
sign
[d AMx∗
(AMx∗−AT )
1
1−α
dAM
]
= sign
[
(AMx∗−AT ) 11−α −AM 11−α(AMx
∗−AT ) α1−α x∗
]
= sign
[
(AMx∗−AT )− AMx
∗
1−α
]
= sign
[
−AT −αAMx
∗
1−α
]
Thus, we know that the sign of this derivative must be negative. We already know that the left-
and right-hand sides of equation (2.23) are decreasing and increasing in x∗, respectively, so
dx∗/dAM < 0 follows.
132
Proof of Proposition 2
It follows from Proposition 1 that x∗ decreases with AM. As x∗ decreases, we see from
equation (2.9) that θ decreases. Inspection of equation (2.11) then shows that u must increase.
Proof of Proposition 3
The unemployment rate for workers with x < x0 is a weighted average of ss+ηθ1−α , for
workers with x∗ < x < x0, and 0, for workers with x < x∗. Therefore
E
(
u|x < x0
)
=
s
s+ηθ1−α
(
G(x0)−G(x∗)
)
+0 ·G(x∗)
G(x0)
=
s
s+ηθ1−α
(
G(x0)−G(x∗)
)
G(x0)
. (2.24)
The ratio of this unemployment rate to the unemployment rate for workers with ability higher
than x0 is
E
(
u|x < x0
)
E
(
u|x > x0
) = ss+ηθ1−α (G(x0)−G(x∗))
G(x0)
/
s
s+ηθ1−α
= 1− G(x
∗)
G(x0)
. (2.25)
This ratio increases with AM since x∗ decreases with AM, as proved in Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
We can solve for market tightness θh and θl and cutoff ability levels x∗h and x
∗
l using the
equivalents of equations (2.9) and (2.22) for the high- and low-educated labor markets in the
quantitative model:
c =
(1−β)δηθ−αh
βδηθ1−αh +1−δ+δsh
(1−b)Eh(x|x > x∗h) (2.9h)
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θ1−αh =
(AT −AMbx∗h)(1−δ+δsh)
βδη(AMx∗h−AT )
(2.22h)
c =
(1−β)δηθ−αl
βδηθ1−αl +1−δ+δsl
(1−b)El(x|x > x∗l ) (2.9l)
θ1−αl =
(AT −AMbx∗l )(1−δ+δsl)
βδη(AMx∗l −AT )
, (2.22l)
where Eh and El are computed using gh(x) and gl(x), respectively.
It follows that equation (2.23) that determines x∗ can, with appropriate subscripting,
determine x∗h or x
∗
l . We showed in the proof of Proposition 1 that the left- (right-) hand side
of equation (2.23) is decreasing (increasing) in x∗. Inspection of the left-hand side of equation
(2.23) shows that it is increasing in s, hence, any increase in s from sh to sl must increase x∗l
relative to x∗h. Inspection of the right-hand side of equation (2.23) shows that it is increasing
in E(x|x > x∗); thus, computing the expectation using gh(x) relative to gl(x) must decrease x∗h
relative to x∗l , because Gh(x) first-order stochastically dominates Gl(x).
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2.8.3 Appendix Figures and Tables
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Note: This figure plots the values of λ used in the quantitative experiments of Section 3.5 (solid
line), and the percent of the labor force that is low-educated in each of our countries (dots with
identifiers). The data come from IPUMS. Low-educated individuals are defined to be those with less
than a secondary school education.
Figure 2.9: Low-Education Share, λ, in Model and Data
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Table 2.15: Definition of Traditional Sector Goods
Item Details
Shoe Repair - Women Street Shoes Replacement of 2 heels (glued and nailed);
While-you-wait in shop service;
Heel: Synthetic polyurethane, small heel.
Shoe Repair - Men Classic Shoes Re-soling rubber soles (glued & nailed or stitched);
Not “urgent” in shop service.
Shoeshine Cleaning leather shoes with a brush and polishing;
Manual work while keeping the shoes on;
Exclude service in a shop.
Taxi 7 km in the town center on working days at 3 p.m.;
Includes: Possible fixed starting fee + price per km;
Excludes: Taxi called by telephone.
Men basic haircut Scissor cut of short hair for male adults;
Type of establishment: Common men’s barber shop;
No shampoo/washing nor styling/fixing products;
Full price including tips if any.
Ladies haircut - curlers Hair with curlers cut to medium (basic) for female adult;
Shampoo/washing, blow drying, and styling/fixing products;
Establishment: Common hairdresser (exclude hair stylist).
Manicure Standard manicure on natural nails by nail technician;
Establishment: Professional beautician;
Full price including tips if any;
Bath, filing, cuticles treatment, one-color varnishing.
Ladies haircut - long hair Long hair cut to short for female adult;
Shampoo/washing, blow drying, styling/fixing products;
Establishment: Common hairdresser (exclude hair stylist).
Note: The table reports the definitions of each ICP traditional service used in Table 2.6, and described
in Section 2.5.2. The services come from the unpublished ICP 2011 Global Core list of goods and
services.
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Table 2.16: Slope Coefficients in the Alternative Calibration
Data Model Alternative Cali.
Aggregate traditional sector share -15.9 -13.4 -15.9
Traditional-sector share for low educated -16.7 -12.7 -15.2
Traditional-sector share for high educated -4.9 -5.0 -6.7
Aggregate unemployment rate 1.8 0.5 0.7
Unemployment rate for low-educated 3.2 1.7 1.9
Unemployment rate for high-educated 0.5 0.4 0.4
Ratio of unemployment rates ul/uh 0.5 0.3 0.3
Relative price PT 0.6 0.60 0.67
Note: The table reports slope coefficients from regressions of the statistics in each row on log GDP
per capita.
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Chapter 3
Development and Selection into Necessity
versus Opportunity Entrepreneurship
We are grateful to James Rauch for extensive suggestions and support. We also thank David Lagakos, Prashant
Bharadwaj, Douglas Gollin, Ruixue Jia, and Markus Poschke for helpful comments. Any potential errors are our
own.
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3.1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship is often seen as the engine of economic growth. At the same time, it is
widely recognized that only a minority of entrepreneurs fuel that engine. Efforts to distinguish
that minority from the rest have led to labels for entrepreneurs such as “opportunity” versus
“necessity” (the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor), “productive” versus “unproductive” ([18]), and
“transformative” versus “subsistence” ([127]). Policies that target entrepreneurs indiscriminately
risk wasting most of their impact ([16]).1
In this paper, we propose a simple division of entrepreneurs into employers (self-employed
with paid employees) and own account workers (self-employed without employees). This division
has the advantage of being consistently defined across censuses for 56 countries from 162
country-year surveys. To link our work to the earlier literature, we will use the terms “employers”
and “opportunity entrepreneurs” interchangeably and the terms “own account” and “necessity
entrepreneurs” interchangeably.
To fix ideas, we develop a simple two-sector general equilibrium model of labor force
allocation between opportunity entrepreneurs, necessity entrepreneurs, and wage workers. In the
traditional sector, necessity entrepreneurs work on their own accounts without rewards to ability;
in the modern sector, employers and wage workers produce with rewards to their abilities.2 In
equilibrium, agents with abilities below a threshold become own-account self-employed workers
and agents with abilities higher than the threshold enter the modern sector, becoming wage
workers or employers. Higher aggregate productivity is driven by higher returns to ability in
1[16] find that microfinance increases significantly the profits of the top tercile of businesses that started before
the intervention, but its benefits to the rest of the self-employed (the majority of entrepreneurs) are generally
indistinguishable from zero.
2The assumption of differential returns to ability (as proxied by years of schooling) in the two sectors is consistent
with [123], who argues that schooling has little influence on productivity if the tasks are simple, whereas there are
higher returns to schooling if the tasks are substantially complex.
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the modern sector due to technological progress, which reduces the threshold ability level. In
other words, development draws the more able agents from the traditional sector into the modern
sector. Our model thus predicts that, at the aggregate level and across education groups (our
proxy for fixed ability levels), the shares of employers and wage workers rise with GDP per capita
(hereafter GDPPC) at the expense of own-account workers.
Bringing our predictions to the data, we begin with a multinomial probit model of choice
between own-account self-employment, wage employment, and employer status. We find that 91
out of 98 country-year observations have strong negative selection on ability (as proxied by years
of schooling) into own-account self-employment, and 81 out of 98 have positive selection into
employer status. We also find that own-account self-employment decreases from 83% to 6% as
GDPPC increases from I$442 (in 2005 International dollars) to I$41,000 across 162 country-year
observations, whereas the employers’ rate rises strongly from 0.1% to 14.0% over the same range
of GDPPC. Moreover, we show that our parameterized model captures the aggregate quantitative
patterns of labor force allocation over a cross-section of countries.
Since farming entrepreneurs account for a considerable portion of the self-employed,
especially in developing countries, our findings are in line with the literature that shows sorting
by unobserved ability/skill between agriculture and non-agriculture ([86]). However, in this paper
we focus the data analysis on industries excluding agriculture, fishing and forestry, and we model
occupational choices without market frictions. Our empirical results of negative selection into
own-account workers, positive selection into employers, and the impact of development on labor
force allocation are obtained when restricting the samples to non-agricultural sectors. Thus our
work is essentially independent of the literature on sorting into agriculture.
Our findings that the impacts of selection and economic growth work oppositely on
necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs confirm the importance of distinguishing between these
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two types of entrepreneurship rather than grouping them together as self-employed. Otherwise,
the numerical dominance of necessity entrepreneurs can lead researchers to extend conclusions
for the self-employed to entrepreneurship in general. For example, Van der Sluis, Van Praag,
and Vijverberg (2005, p. 248) use entrepreneurship choice and nonfarm self-employment inter-
changeably and conclude from their meta-analytical review of empirical studies in developing
countries that education lowers the likelihood of nonfarm self-employment. Woodruff (2007,
p. 55) interprets the model of [92] to imply that entrepreneurship decreases as an economy’s
income level rises, because increasing income is associated with a higher wage rate that induces
the marginal employer to leave self-employment for a wage job.
Related Literature. The papers closest to our work distinguishes between two types
of entrepreneurs ([111], [113], [88], [131]). However, they do not investigate the pattern of
entrepreneurship as a function of variations in income levels. [88] distinguish between “unincor-
porated” and “incorporated” entrepreneurs in the US. They find that incorporated entrepreneurs
are better educated and have better performance than unincorporated business owners in the
United States. However, this classification of incorporated and unincorporated entrepreneurship
cannot be used to conduct cross-country analysis. First, data are not widely available, especially
for poor countries. Second, the costs and benefits of incorporation differ widely across countries
depending on legal systems, tax policies, and levels of corruption. In contrast, we use the same
classification as that used by [131] for Germany. This division of entrepreneurs into own-account
self-employed and employers is consistently defined across countries by whether paid employees
are hired. Even though more stringent regulations may make it harder to hire employees in
developed countries, this only biases our estimated positive effect of economic growth on the
employers’ rate downward.
This paper also relates to the macro-development literature. In particular, [58] shows that
self-employment declines over development due to productivity differences. However, we differ
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from his work in two aspects. First, we use more recent micro household surveys that allows
analysis by educational groups and industries, whereas [58] used limited national level reports
from International Labor Organization in the 1990s. Second, we distinguishes employers from the
necessity entrepreneurs. The fact that the share of employers rises with development emphasizes
the importance of distinguishes the two types of self-employment. Compared to other papers
([114], [6], [57]) proposes theories of financial access or tax evasion as determinants of informal
sector size, we show that the productivity differences can account for most of the differential
labor market division across countries.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 develops a two-sector general
equilibrium model that explains the impact of development on labor force division. In Section
3.3 and Section 3.4, we present empirical findings and robustness checks for by using household
surveys of 56 countries from all income levels. Section 3.5 parameterizes the model to evaluate
its quantitative predictions. Conclusions are in Section 3.6. The proofs of all propositions and
lemmas are in Appendices.
3.2 Model
We start by positing a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model with two sectors:
a traditional sector where agents are own-account self-employed without returns to ability, and a
modern sector where employers hire wage workers for production with constant returns to ability.
The production functions per self-employed worker are
yT = AT (3.1)
yM = AMG(h,L), (3.2)
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where yT (yM),AT (AM) are output and productivity per self-employed worker in the traditional
(modern) sector respectively, h is the employer’s ability measured in efficiency units and L is the
labor input measured in efficiency units.
Let the aggregate production function for the economy take the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) form3:
y = (γyσT +(1− γ)yσM)
1
σ . (3.3)
Because, in equilibrium, our division of sectors into traditional and modern will match the division
of less and more skill-intensive sectors in the literature, we assume here the output of the two
sectors are imperfect substitutes. Consistent with empirical consensus (e.g. ? and ?), we let
0 < σ< 1: although yT and yM are imperfect substitutes, the elasticity of substitution between
them is high.4 We normalize the output price in the modern sector to be 1, and let the output
price in the traditional sector be PT . In a competitive market, the relative price of the traditional
product equals the ratio of marginal productivities:
PT =
∂y/∂yT
∂y/∂yM
=
γ
1− γ(
yM
yT
)1−σ. (3.4)
Hence, for an own-account self-employed worker in the traditional sector, the payoff
is AT PT . Regarding production in the modern sector, we assume G(h,L) is homogeneous
of degree 1, concave in L, and G(0,L) = G(h,0) = 0. Rewrite the production function as
yM = AMhG(1, Lh ) = AMhg(l), where l ≡ Lh and g(x) ≡ G(1,x). It follows that g(·) is concave
and g(0) = 0.
We assume there is a continuum of risk neutral agents with measure 1 in the economy
3None of our analysis would change if this were a utility function, but calibration would become more difficult
without qualitatively changing our results.
4The elasticity between yT and yM equals 11−σ > 1 under this assumption.
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and each individual is endowed with efficiency units h, which is distributed according to F(h)
on [h, h¯]. We also assume F(h) is differentiable and let f (h) = F ′(h) be its probability density
function. Let a wage worker with efficiency units h be paid wh, where w is the equilibrium wage
per efficiency unit. Employers solve the profit maximization problem to obtain
Π(w,h) = max
L
AMG(h,L)−wL. (3.5)
The first order condition with respect to L gives
AMGL(h,L)−w = AMg′(l)−w = 0. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) determines L = hl(w) as a function of w. Substituting it into equation (3.5)
gives Π(w,h) = hpi(w), where pi(w) = AM(g(l(w))− l(w)g′(l(w)). Because w is taken as given
by the agents, both wage workers and employers see a linear return to abilities. Therefore, the
equilibrium condition requires all agents in the modern sector to be indifferent between a wage
job and being an employer, otherwise there will either be no employers or no wage workers.5
Mathematically, we have
Π(w,h) = hpi(w) = wh, or pi(w) = w. (3.7)
Since pi(w) is decreasing in w, equation (3.7) uniquely determines w. Note that since Π(w,h)
is linear homogeneous in AM and w, so is pi(w). Then by equation (3.7) w must increase
proportionately to AM. Therefore, equation (3.6) yields an invariant l.6
The unique l characterizes the partition of talent allocation between employers and wage
5There is an equilibrium ratio of efficiency units between wage workers and employers in the modern sector, but
whether an individual becomes a wage worker or employer is indeterminate.
6The existence of this unique l is proved in Lemma 4 in the Appendices.
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workers. Because l is invariant across firms and countries, it implies that L, the firm size in
efficiency units, is growing with h, efficiency units of the employer. Note that all agents in the
modern sector are indifferent between being a wage worker and an employer, so firms that hire
more efficiency units will on average have more workers as well. This is consistent with [92] in
the sense that employers with greater talent yield larger firm sizes measured by the number of
workers hired. In addition, since all agents in the modern sector are equally likely to be employers,
the probability density function of firm sizes will be equivalent to a truncated distribution of h for
those workers in the modern sector.
Now denote by h∗ the efficiency units of the marginal agent who is indifferent between
own-account self-employment and receiving the equilibrium wage. We have
PT AT = wh∗. (3.8)
The necessity entrepreneurs’ (own-account) rate is then
Sn = F(h∗). (3.9)
Since the decomposition of the modern labor force into wage workers and employers is
the same as the division in efficiency units, the opportunity entrepreneurs’ (employers’) rate is
So = 1−Sn1+l and the wage workers’ rate Sw =
(1−Sn)l
1+l . Hence, the aggregate traditional and modern
outputs are:
yT = AT Sn (3.10)
yM = AME(h|h > h∗)g(l)1−Sn1+ l . (3.11)
Proposition 5. There exists a unique interior solution h∗ in equilibrium such that agents with
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h ∈ [h,h∗] are own-account self-employed workers, and agents with h ∈ (h∗, h¯] enter the modern
sector.
Preliminary to our main comparative static result, we show
Lemma 2. When AM increases, h∗ falls.
If we think of the traditional sector as intensive in non-traded services such as haircutting,
tailoring or street vending, association of higher PT with higher AM is consistent with the well-
known tendency for the relative price of such services to rise with GDPPC (given Lemma 3).
This also implies that the incomes of own-account workers rise with GDPPC conditional on their
efficiency units.
We now show
Lemma 3. The aggregate output value GDP = y is increasing in AM.7
Our main results now follow by combining Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Proposition 6. When GDPPC increases due to improvements in AM, the share of own-account
workers Sn decreases, whereas both the share of employers So and the share of wage workers Sw
rise.
It is worth pointing out that even though an increase in either AT or AM will increase
aggregate productivity, they have very different implications for the labor market, as shown in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 7. The incomes of agents in the traditional sector rise when AT increases, but the
traditional sector expands at the expense of the modern sector.
Now there are two alternative models: the increase in GDPPC could be driven by a
relatively larger increase in AM, or by a larger increase in AT . A dominating increase in AM will
7Since there is a unit measure of agents in the economy, GDP and GDPPC are equivalent in our model.
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result in a decrease in the labor force share of own-account self-employed workers, whereas a
dominating increase in AT will lead to an increase in the own-account self-employment share.
Empirically, because the own-account self-employment share drops strongly as GDPPC increases,
the former model is supported. That is, we infer that increases in GDPPC across countries are
primarily driven by increases in AM.
3.3 Empirical Findings
In this section, we document that the labor share of employers actually increases with
income levels, whereas the share of own-account workers (self-employed without employees)
decreases. We show this pattern is robust for employment rates separated by main industries or by
education categories. We also find nearly universal negative selection on ability into own-account
status, and positive selection into employer and wage earning statuses in our data.
3.3.1 Measurement of ability/skill
Unfortunately, it is impossible to find direct measures of (or good instruments for) ability
for a wide range of developing and developed countries. Consistent with the macro-development
literature, we use schooling as our proxy for ability. [141] and [70] both argue that the sorting of
more (less) educated workers into urban areas/non-agriculture (rural areas/agriculture) reflects
sorting on underlying ability/skill. Like these papers, we keep in the background the dynamic
process by which individuals with different abilities acquire different levels of schooling and
concentrate on the static allocation of the labor force. We acknowledge that individuals from
richer families or with better educated parents may have more schooling than others despite
similar abilities, but also note that ability is intergenerationally correlated.
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Specifically, we assume log(Ability) = Schooling + u, where the error term u is normally
distributed according to N (0,σu). Therefore, ability of each agent is drawn from a distribution
centered at his education level. As shown in Figure 3.1, our model predicts that agents with
ability h < h∗ (h > h∗) have probability one (zero) to work on own account. Considering agents
A, B with schoolingA < schoolingB as depicted, the probability that agent A’s efficiency units are
smaller than the cutoff h∗ is larger than that for agent B, because it requires a larger positive draw
of u for A to exceed the cutoff. Similarly, an agent with schoolingC has a smaller probability of
working on own-account than agent B. Mathematically, individual i’s probability of working on
own-account is
Pr(vi = own-account) = Pr(hi < h∗) = Pr(schoolingi+ui < h
∗)
= Pr(ui < h∗− schoolingi)
=Φ(
h∗− schoolingi
σu
), (3.12)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore,
our theory predicts that the probability of working on own-account decreases with years of
schooling. By the same logic, the model predicts that the probabilities of being a wage worker
and of being an employer increase with years of schooling.
3.3.2 Data and Summary statistics
The data we use are the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International (IPUMS-I) .
Our analysis covers 56 countries from 1960 to 2010, integrating 162 publicly available population
censuses from IPUMS-I. This paper focuses on occupational choice of labor market participants,
so we restrict the sample to prime age (25-55) male workers.
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In Table 3.1, we classify the labor force into necessity entrepreneurs, opportunity en-
trepreneurs, and salaried/wage workers, which are consistently measured across countries. Op-
portunity entrepreneurship is defined as employers, with permanent employees. Necessity
entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who report their employment status as “working on
own-account”. Table 3.1 provides detailed sub-categories of the three types of labor force from
IPUMS-I. These subcategories differ across countries. For example, only 31 country-year obser-
vations distinguish between wage workers for a private employer and for the government.8 The
undefined labor force, such as unpaid workers and trainees, only accounts for a negligible fraction
of the labor force. The division between employers, wage workers, and own-account workers
provides a universally consistent measure of employment status across countries and time.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for our 162 observations, with each observation rep-
resenting one country in one year. Within one country-year sample, the statistics are constructed
for the prime age (25-55) male workers. Our data cover a wide range of GDPPC, from I$442
(Liberia in 2008) to more than I$41,000 (Ireland in 2006). The self-employment rate also differs
greatly, ranging from 10.6% to 83.1%. Despite the large variations above, own-account workers
always account for more than half of the self-employed labor force. On average, only 4.2% of
the labor force are employers. The average primary school completion is 60% and the university
completion 6.8%. The number of observations drops from 162 to 156 when we need industry
information to omit agriculture, fishing, and forestry. The labor force excluding these three
industries has slightly better average education, slightly smaller self-employed and own-account
average participation rates, and 4.5% employers on average.
There are 98 country-year observations that have data on years of schooling. These
samples cover a much smaller range of GDPPC, from I$442 to I$12,000. Whether or not
8We will use these observations to conduct a robustness check of the selection between wage workers and
employers in Section 3.3.3.
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agriculture, fishing and forestry are included, the self-employed have a lower average schooling
(5.6 and 7.0 years, respectively) compared to the salaried workers (7.6 and 8.3 years, respectively),
but this is driven by the own-account workers in the self-employed. The employers have an
average of 7.9 years schooling, and 8.9 years if we omit agriculture, fishing and forestry. These
basic facts foreshadow our subsequent findings of negative (positive) selection into own-account
(employers’) work.
3.3.3 Results
Selection in the labor force
In this section, we focus on the labor force excluding agriculture, fishing and forestry.
Since this paper models occupational choices without market frictions, it applies less well to
the agricultural industry where agents are born on the farm and grow up working as farmers.
However, including these agents makes our results on selection stronger.
We use the multinomial probit model to estimate the three unordered labor choice re-
sponses. The unobservable utilities of individual i from choosing alternative j ∈ {n,w,o} are
given by
v∗in = αn+βnschoolingi+ηnXi+ εin (3.13)
v∗iw = αw+βwschoolingi+ηwXi+ εiw (3.14)
v∗io = αo+βoschoolingi+ηoXi+ εio, (3.15)
where controls in X are age, age squared, and a dummy for native-born; εi j is a normally dis-
tributed error term; and n,w,o denote necessity (own-account) entrepreneur, wage worker, and
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opportunity entrepreneur (employer), respectively. Note that the εi j are not independently dis-
tributed because the unobservable error term ui is absorbed by εi j.9 We hence use the multinomial
probit estimation model, which allows for a full correlation structure of εi j, unlike the multinomial
logit model. Letting vi be the labor choice of individual i, then
vi = j if v∗i j = max{v∗in,v∗iw,v∗io}. (3.16)
As discussed earlier, taking account of the random error term that connects schooling and
efficiency units, our model predicts that dPr(vi=n)d schooling < 0,
dPr(vi=w)
d schooling > 0, and
dPr(vi=o)
d schooling > 0, i.e., the
marginal effect of schooling on becoming own-account self-employed (wage workers, employers)
is negative (positive).
Taking Thailand in 2000 as an example, Table 3.3 reports the average marginal effects
(AME) on employment at specific schooling years from the above multinomial probit model.
We see strong negative selection into own-account self-employment and positive selection into
employers. At the mean schooling of 8.46 years, if a worker has one more year of schooling, the
average probability of working on own-account will decrease by 1.7% and the average probability
of being an employer will increase by 0.3%. At the 5th percentile (4 years) and the 95th percentile
(16 years), if a worker has one more year of schooling, the probability of working on own-account
decreases by 2.0% and 1.2%, respectively. This suggests that the impact of schooling on selection
into necessity entrepreneurship is greater when the education level is lower.
Table 3.4 reports summary statistics for the AME of schooling on the probability of
working on own-account at mean years of schooling within a country-year observation. Among
the 98 multinomial probit regressions, there are 91 estimations that have significantly negative
selection into own-account workers. On average, an extra year of schooling decreases an
9We interpret β j as the marginal returns to schooling rather than ability, so the interaction of coefficient β j and u
is not in the residual, which preserves the consistency of our estimator.
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individual’s probability of being a necessity entrepreneur by 2%. The largest negative AME is
a 5.7% decline in the probability to work on own-account if an individual’s schooling goes up
by 1 year at the mean schooling in Guinea in 1983. The three observations with positive AME
of schooling on being own-account self-employed tend to be richer economies, and the mean of
these three significant positive AME is only 0.5%. In sum, Table 3.4 provides overwhelming
evidence for strongly negative selection into own-account self-employed workers.
Table 3.5 reports summary statistics for the AME of schooling on the probability of
being employers at mean years of schooling within a country-year observation. Among the 98
regressions, which includes a wide range of GDPPC country-year samples, 81 have significantly
positive selection into employers. On average, an extra year of schooling increases an individual’s
probability of being an opportunity entrepreneur by 0.3%. In Argentina in 1991, the AME of one
more year of schooling at the mean on the probability of being employers is 1%, which is the
largest in our sample. There are only 6 out of 98 country-year observations that have significant
negative selection into employers, and the absolute value of AME is much smaller than for the
positive selections. Table 3.5 shows that employers are positively selected on schooling in the
overwhelming majority of country-year observations.
In the multinomial probit model, the average marginal effects of schooling on the three
outcomes of being own-account, employers and wage workers add up to 0. We thus conclude
there is positive selection into wage workers, because the absolute value of the negative AME of
schooling on being own-account (0.02) is larger than the positive AME of schooling on being
employers (0.003). Now we examine whether there is selection between employers and salaried
workers on ability proxied by education.
Table 3.6 reports a summary of whether the AME of schooling on the probabilities of
becoming wage workers and employers are statistically different within each estimation. In
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around 70% of the 98 multinomial probit estimations, the impact of schooling on selection into
salaried workers is statistically greater than the impact on being employers. But in another 22
country-year samples, the impact of schooling on selection into employers is statistically greater.
In these 22 samples, at mean schooling, if a worker has one more year’s schooling, the probability
of being wage workers decreases by 0.2%. The mean level comparisons in Table 3.6 indicate that
there might be weak selection in favor of wage workers relative to employers, but this may be
driven by government employees subjected to more stringent education requirements than private
employees.
To further examine this selection issue, we restrict the samples to private sector workers
and re-estimate the multinomial probit model (equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15)). There are 31
country-year samples where we are able to distinguish between private sector and government
workers. Table 3.7 reports a summary of whether, in the private sector, the AME of schooling
on the probabilities of becoming wage workers and employers are statistically different within
each of the 31 estimations. We find that schooling has a statistically greater impact on being
wage workers than employers in half of these samples, but either a statistically equal or smaller
impact in the other half of the samples. The results suggest that there is no uniform selection into
employers against private sector wage workers.
The labor force division and development
Another main prediction of our model is that productivity improvement attracts agents
from the traditional sector into the modern sector, so the own-account workers’ rate falls and
employers’ rate rises with GDPPC. In addition, as shown in Proposition 2, the threshold ability
level decreases with AM, therefore with GDPPC. In other words, development draws the more
able agents from the traditional sector into the modern sector. Using education as our proxy for
153
ability, our model thus also predicts that the own-account self-employment (employers’, wage
workers’) rate for any fixed educational attainment decreases (increases) with GDPPC. We test
these predictions in this section.
Figure 3.2 shows that, excluding agriculture, fishing and forestry, participation in own-
account self-employed decreases sharply from around 60% to 10% as GDPPC increases while
participation in employers increases from nearly 0 to 10% in all of our country-year observations.
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the country average patterns of own-account rate and employers
rate, respectively. Table 3.8 reports the results of the following estimations:10
Self-employment Ratec = αs+βs ln GDPPCc+ γsXc+ εs,c (3.17)
Own-account Ratec = αn+βn ln GDPPCc+ γnXc+ εn,c (3.18)
Employers’ Ratec = αo+βo ln GDPPCc+ γoXc+ εo,c, (3.19)
where in regressions (7) to (9), controls in Xc are average years of schooling, average age, and
average native-born rate. Taking all available census samples from IPUMS-I, the dependent
variables self-employment rate, own-account self-employment rate and employers’ rate are
weighted by “person weight” after restricting the samples to prime age (25-55) males. In
regressions (1) to (3) the available datasets cover 56 countries across different years, summing to
161 country-year observations. Dropping samples without industry information, in regressions (4)
to (6), there are 55 countries (Bangladesh drops out) left across different years. These impacts of
economic development on labor force allocation are robust, because the magnitudes of coefficients
stay the same as before when we add controls in regressions (7) to (9).
According to Table 3.8, the strong decline in self-employment against GDPPC is domi-
nated by the decrease in the number of own-account self-employed workers. Including agriculture,
10See Table 3.16 for the all country-year observations’ regression results rather than the country average results.
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fishing and forestry only makes this decline stronger. The employers’ rate increases robustly and
significantly when the economy’s income level rises. Since, in one economy, the participation
in own-account, wage earning, and employers’ status add up to 1, then we know that the wage
workers’ rate increases unambiguously and strongly with GDPPC. This is because the drop in
the share of own-account workers is larger, in absolute value, than the increase in the share of
employers. Consistent with our model, these results show that higher GDPPC pulls agents into the
modern sector, such that both the employers’ rate and wage workers’ rate increase with GDPPC.
Now we test the prediction of decreasing own-account share and increasing employers’
share against GDPPC across fixed education groups. We divide the agents into five constant
educational attainment groups: no primary school completion (less than 5/6 years of education),
primary school completion but not lower secondary school (5/6 to 9 years of education), lower
secondary school completion but not higher secondary school (9 to 12 years of education),
secondary school completion but not university (roughly 12 to 15 years of education), and
university completion. Figure 3.5 presents the plot of own-account rates against GDPPC by
educational attainment, excluding agriculture, fishing and forestry. The figures are consistent
with our predictions.
Table 3.9 reports the estimation of equation (3.18) when restricting the sample to 5
fixed educational attainment groups with controls for average age, age squared, and native-born
rate. The own-account self-employment rate is significantly decreasing in GDPPC for the three
lower levels of educational attainment. However, there are no significant effects for the higher
educational groups. One interpretation is that because, in the majority of countries, h∗ is not high
enough to correspond to secondary school completed, setting the fixed education at high schooling
levels has little test power. Another interpretation is that the own-account self-employed actually
contains two types of agents: the necessity own-account and the “distinguished own-account”
such as consultants or authors. In the overall population, the quantity of the “distinguished
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own-account” is so small that they are negligible in the data. But when we restrict the samples to
highly educated individuals, the share of the “distinguished own-account” rises and the share of
necessity own-account drops, thus making the negative effect of GDPPC on the labor share of
own-account self-employment insignificant. The second interpretation is consistent with [131],
who find that the own-account entrepreneurs are, on average, the poorest labor force but have a
much larger variation in incomes than the employers.
Table 3.10 reports the parallel estimation of equation (3.19). The employers’ rate is
always increasing in GDPPC for all of the educational attainment groups. Since the changes in
labor force share of own-account workers, wage workers and employers add up to zero, we know
the share of wage workers increases with GDPPC by comparing the magnitudes of changes in
own-account workers and employers’ share. These results confirm our model prediction that
higher GDPPC pulls the more able own-account self-employed workers into the modern sector,
thus resulting in higher shares of employers and wage workers at constant educational attainment
groups.
3.4 Robustness checks
3.4.1 Does employers’ rate rise with GDPPC in different industries?
It may be that the pattern of increasing participation in employers with aggregate income
level is a result of industrial transformation rather than general productivity improvement. We
have shown in Section 3.3.3 that this prediction holds when including and excluding agriculture,
fishing and forestry. Now we examine whether this is true in specific industries.
Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 report the estimations of equations (3.18) and (3.19), re-
156
spectively, when restricting the sample to the 4 largest industries in the majority of countries:
manufacturing, sales, service and construction. The own-account self-employment rate is signifi-
cantly decreasing in GDPPC in the three out of the four industries but not in the service industry.
Consistent with discussions in Section 3.3.3, this could be because most “distinguished own-
account self-employed” individuals such as consultants and authors are in the service industry.
The employers’ rate is always increasing in GDPPC in all of the four industries. This evidence
again confirms the mechanism in our model that higher productivity draws agents out of the
traditional sector into the modern sector, thus resulting in a higher employers’ rate.
3.4.2 What happens to one country’s labor market as GDPPC increases
over time?
Previous empirical sections have used country average level statistics to focus on long-run
equilibrium results. Now we examine to what extent the predictions hold within one country’s
time-varying data as GDPPC changes.
Table 3.13 and Table 3.14 report the results of the following estimations with country
fixed effects,
Own-account Ratect = αc+βn ln GDPct + γnXct + εn,ct (3.20)
Employers’ Ratect = αc+βo ln GDPct + γoXct + εo,ct , (3.21)
where controls X are group level average age, age squared, and native-born rate. In the fixed
effect specifications, the negative effect of GDPPC on own-account self-employment rate is still
significant at the aggregate level but not across education groups; and we do not find significant
impact of GDPPC on the employers’ rate either at the aggregate level or across education groups.
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However, these results are not surprising. Our model predictions work for a substantial
development of the economy, which usually takes one country decades or more to achieve.
In addition, changes in occupational choice may require a generation or more, even if there
is substantial productivity improvement. Therefore, the fixed effect regressions capture more
temporal noise and frictions than long-run economic growth’s impact on the labor market.
3.5 Calibration
We calibrate the model in this section to assess its quantitative performance. Our strategy
is to parameterize the model to match the moments of Canada, the benchmark country where we
have wage data, and then lower AM to compute the model’s predictions for other countries.
3.5.1 Quantitative Version of Model
Our benchmark model delivers two key predictions: selection on occupational choice
and sorting according to technological progress. The key mechanism is critically based on the
heterogeneous ability of agents in the labor force. We do not have a direct measure of ability in
the data, but labor income is a linear function of ability in the modern sector. Therefore, for the
purpose of quantifying the model predictions, we use education as our proxy for education. In
particular, we divide the labor force into two education groups: workers who did not finish high
school and workers who have at least a high school diploma. Thus the ability distribution of high
education group Gh(x) and low education group Gl(x) are disciplined by their corresponding
wage distributions respectively. Finally, the aggregate ability distribution is a weighted sum of
draws from Gh(x) and Gl(x) based on the country specific share of low education workers in the
labor force.
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3.5.2 Parameterizing the Model
In order to quantify the model’s qualitative predictions on the division of the labor force
in a cross section of countries, we calibrate the two parameters γ, σ, and the modern sector
production function, and the ability distribution. Our strategy is to parameterize the model to
match the moments of a rich country, and then lower AM to compute the model’s predictions for
other countries. Using cross-country differences in 1988, [37] estimate the productivity of skilled
workers to be strongly increasing with GDP per worker relative to the productivity of unskilled
workers. Hence, we set AT to be fixed and normalized to 1 for all countries and allow AM to vary
across countries.
We choose Canada as the benchmark rich country for target moments, because it is the
only country among the IPUMS-I samples for which we can distinguish between own-account
workers and employers and which has the earned income and hours worked data needed to
compute wages. In particular, we pick the 2001 census of Canada because it is the only available
year for which the sample weights in the Individuals File are calculated by Statistics Canada
adjusting for sex, age groups, and geographic areas.
The parameter γ is related to the share of traditional sector output in aggregate production,
so we will calibrate it to match the share of own-account workers in Canada in 2001. We
choose the modern sector production functional form to be G(h,L) = hαL1−α for simplicity.
The parameter α measures employer’s ability share of modern production, so we will use it to
match the share of employers in Canada in 2001. The parameter σ is related to the elasticity
of substitution between traditional and modern output, 11−σ . After reviewing the evidence, [12]
concluded that the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor is very unlikely
to fall outside 1 and 2.11 Since unskilled labor is correlated with traditional output, whereas
11See also [37].
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skilled labor is correlated with modern output, the two elasticities are also connected. Moreover,
for example, vegetables from traditional farmers are more substitutable for modern agricultural
products than the unskilled farmers for the skilled farmers who operate agricultural machines.
Therefore, we set 11−σ to be 2, the upper bound of the recognized range for the elasticity of
substitution between unskilled and skilled labor, for our benchmark calibration.
Finally, we calibrate the parameters of ability distribution to match the wage distribution of
Canada in 2001. In the calibration exercise, we divide the labor force into two groups: individuals
with only primary school completion (i.e., high school dropouts) as a proxy for the low-skill
workers, and individuals with at least secondary school completion as a proxy for the high-skill
workers. Then the wage distribution is characterized by the ratio of average wages for these
two groups and the variance of aggregate log(wage). To match these two moments, we let
the abilities be drawn from two log-normal distributions with the same variance and different
means. In particular, the mean of the log(ability) distribution for agents without secondary school
completion is normalized to be one, and the mean of those with secondary school completion and
the variance of aggregate log(wage) are calibrated to match the wage distribution of Canada in
2001.
In Figure 3.6, the first graph presents the probability density function of the low- and
high-mean log-normal ability distributions for all countries after fitting the wage distribution of
Canada in 2001. To generate the distribution of ability for the full population in each country, we
make the share of ability draws from the mean one log-normal distribution a linear function of
AM to fit the low-education labor force share in data. The second graph of Figure 3.6 presents the
fitted share of ability draws from the low-mean distribution in the model and the labor force share
of agents who do not complete secondary school in the data. For example, the third graph plots
the mapping of raw AM value to ln(GDPPC), which is imputed from the numeric model total
output to match the scale in data; the fourth graph then presents the aggregate ability distribution
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of the richest country in our model with an almost 11 ln(GDPPC), thus a fitted 54% ability values
drawn from the mean one distribution and the 45% from the higher mean distribution in the first
graph.
Table 3.15 reports the parameter values that are used to match the data of Canada in
2001. Our model matches the wage distribution and own-account workers’ rate accurately, but
over-predicts the employers’ rate in Canada in 2001. This is partly because Canada has the second
lowest employers’ rate among all countries in our sample. Figure 3.7 shows that our model can
accurately predict the labor force share of own-account entrepreneurs across countries. Figure 3.8
shows that our model also slightly over-predicts the employers’ rate across countries. Overall,
our parsimonious model makes good quantitative predictions of the labor force division over a
cross-section of countries with a wide range of development levels.
3.6 Conclusion
Our model and supporting evidence show that entrepreneurs without (with) employees
are negatively (positively) selected on ability, and entrepreneurs without employees (hence most
entrepreneurs) are negatively selected relative to wage workers. Moreover, economic development
increases (decreases) the labor force share of entrepreneurs with (without) employees, at the
aggregate level and across constant educational attainment groups (our proxy for fixed ability
levels). Improving technology pulls the more able agents from the traditional sector into the
modern sector and results in a higher employers’ rate despite increasing wages. Predictions
regarding the impact of development on labor force division made by a calibrated version of our
simple general equilibrium model fit the cross-country data quantitatively well.
This overwhelming evidence suggests that there are two distinct types of entrepreneurship.
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Necessity entrepreneurs lack the ability to build promising businesses and become successful
employers, whereas opportunity entrepreneurs combine workers with modern technology. Given
that own-account workers are mostly operating in the informal sector, our results are consistent
with the literature (e.g., ?, ?, 2014) that views business owners in the informal sector as “reluctant
entrepreneurs” with low productivity that cannot survive economic growth.
It is very unlikely that substantial employers can be fostered by encouraging necessity
micro-businesses operated by negatively selected agents. Thus it is not surprising that studies of
micro-credit programs find a pattern of modestly positive, but neither transformative nor persistent
effects of expanded access to micro-credit on the profits of small businesses. Policy makers
wanting to maximize impact of programs designed to help businesses limited by market frictions
such as finance constraints should consider focusing on employers.
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Lindsay Rickey. The dissertation author was the primary
investigator and author of the unpublished material.
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Figure 3.1: Probability of being own-account worker and Schooling
Table 3.1: Employment Categorization
Necessity Entrepreneu Wage/Salary workers Opportunity Entrepreneurship Undefined Labor Force
Own account, agriculture Management, Non-management Employer Unpaid family worker
Domestic worker, self-employed White collar (non-manual) Apprentice or trainee
Subsistence worker, own consumption Blue collar (manual) Works for others without wage
Own account, without temporary/unpaid help Employee, with a permanent job Other undefined labor force
Own account, with temporary/unpaid help Employee, occasional/temporary/contract
Member of cooperative Employee without legal contract
Sharecropper Wage/salary worker, private employer
Wage/salary worker, government
work for private household
Seasonal migrant
Other wage/salary workers
3.7 Appendices
3.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5
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Figure 3.2: Self-employment Rate by type
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Figure 3.4: Employers’ Rate
Proof. Substituting equation (3.6) into equation (3.8) yields
h∗ =
PT AT
AMg′(l)
. (3.22)
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Figure 3.5: Own-account self-employment rate by educational attainment
Substituting equations (3.22) into equation (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11), and combining them with
equation (3.4) yields
PT =
γ
1− γ [
AMg(l)
∫ h¯
PT AT
AMg′(l)
h f (h)dh
(1+ l)AT F( PT ATAMg′(l))
]1−σ. (3.23)
Note the left and right hand sides of equation (3.23) are monotonically increasing and decreasing
in PT , respectively. Let PT → hAMg
′(l)
AT
s.t. PT ATAMg′(l) → h, then the right hand side of equation (3.23)
goes to infinity, which is larger than the left hand side hAMg
′(l)
AT
. Let PT → h¯AMg
′(l)
AT
s.t. PT ATAMg′(l) → h¯,
then right hand side of equation (3.23) goes to 0 while the left hand side equals PT > 0. Therefore,
there exists a unique endogenous PT ∈ (hAMg
′(l)
AT
, h¯AMg
′(l)
AT
) such that equation (3.23) holds. Recall
l is also unique, so equation (3.22) defines a unique interior solution h∗ ∈ (h, h¯) that holds in
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general equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We will show that the price of unskilled products increases less than proportionally with
AM, i.e., 0 <
dPT /PT
dAM/AM
< 1. The result then follows from inspection of equation (3.22).
Consider equation (3.23). Suppose AM increases but PT remains unchanged or decreases,
we will have
∫ h¯
PT AT
AMg′(l)
h f (h)dh increases and F( PT ATAMg′(l)) decreases, thus the left hand side of
equation (3.23) smaller than the right hand side, which is a contradiction. Hence, we have
dPT
dAM
> 0. Now rewrite equation (3.23) as
(PT )
σ
1−σ
PT
AM
=
γ
1− γ
g(l)
∫ h¯
PT AT
AMg′(l)
h f (h)dh
(1+ l)AT F( PT ATAMg′(l))
. (3.24)
Recall dPTdAM > 0 as shown in Lemma 3. Now suppose PT increases such that
dPT /PT
dAM/AM
≥ 1, we will
have PTAM increases or remains unchanged. Then the left hand side of equation (3.24) goes up since
0 < σ< 1, and the right hand side decreases or stays unchanged. This is again a contradiction.
Therefore, we conclude 0 < dPT /PTdAM/AM < 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Because there is no market failure, our perfectly competitive model solves the social
planner’s problem:
max
h∗
y = (γyσT +(1− γ)yσM)
1
σ , (3.25)
where yT = AT F(h∗) and yM = AM g(l)1+l
∫ h¯
h∗ h f (h)dh. The first order condition has
dy
dh∗ = 0. So by
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the envelope theorem,
dy
dAM
=
∂y
∂AM
= (1− γ)yσ−1M (γyσT +(1− γ)yσM)
1
σ−1 g(l)
1+ l
∫ h¯
h∗
h f (h)dh (3.26)
> 0
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Sn = F(h∗) decreases with AM according to Lemma 2. Thus, dSodAM =− 11+l
dSn
dAM
> 0 and
dSw
dAM
=− l1+l dSndAM > 0. The result then follows by Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider equation (3.23). Suppose AT increases but PT remains unchanged or increases,
then
∫ h¯
PT AT
AMg′(l)
h f (h)dh decreases and F( PT ATAMg′(l)) increases, thus the left hand side of equation (3.23)
becomes larger than the right hand side, which is a contradiction. Hence, we have dPTdAT < 0. Now
suppose PT decreases such that AT PT gets smaller or remained unchanged. Rewrite equation
(3.23) as
(PT )
σ
1−σPT AT =
γ
1− γ
AMg(l)
∫ h¯
PT AT
AMg′(l)
h f (h)dh
(1+ l)AT F( PT ATAMg′(l))
. (3.27)
Then left hand side of equation (3.27) will be smaller than the right hand side. This is again
a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that AT PT increases with AT , so does h∗ and Sn =
F(h∗).
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Lemma 4. There exists a unique partition of efficiency units l such that the equilibrium condition
holds and that employers solve their profit maximization problems.
Proof. Substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.6) obtains H ≡ g(l)−g′(l)l−g′(l) = 0. Since
dH
dl = −g”(l)(l+ 1) > 0 by the concavity assumption, H is increasing monotonically in l. As
l→ 0, H→ liml→0 g′(l)l−g′(l)< 0; as l→ ∞, H→ liml→∞ l[g(l)l −g′(l)]−g′(l)→ ∞ because
g(l)
l - the average productivity of l exceeds g
′(l) - the marginal productivity when l approaches
infinity by concavity. Therefore there exists a unique l solves equation (3.5) and (3.7).
3.7.2 Tables
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Figure 3.6: The ability distribution of calibration input
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Figure 3.7: Data versus model predictions on share of the own-account
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Figure 3.8: Data versus model predictions on share of employers
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All industries
Self-employed Rate 40.3 18.1 10.6 83.1
Own-account Rate 36.2 19.7 6.2 82.9
Employers’ Rate 4.2 2.8 0.1 14.0
Primary school completion 60.0 25.3 7.1 99.2
Secondary school completion 25.6 20.0 1.3 92.5
University completion 6.8 5.9 0.0 31.1
GDPPC 7822.1 8495.2 442.2 41158.9
year 1991.3 13.2 1960 2010
Number of individual observations 287565.6 456685.4 4946 3507673
Country-year observations 162
Average years of schooling
All 6.4 2.3 1.2 11.5
Salaried 7.6 2.0 3.1 12.1
Self-employed 5.6 2.5 0.2 10.9
Own-account 5.4 2.4 0.2 10.4
Employers 7.9 2.4 0.7 12.5
GDP per capita 4678.7 3006.1 442.2 11939.8
year 1990.7 13.8 1960 2010
Number of individual observations 220627.4 332141.7 6807 1629695
Country-year observations 98
Panel B: Omit agriculture, fishing, and forestry
Self-employed Rate 28.4 11.5 11.3 62.5
Own-account Rate 23.9 12.1 5.0 61.2
Employers’ Rate 4.5 2.7 0.1 15.0
Primary school completion 71.8 20.0 15.0 99.3
Secondary school completion 33.6 19.7 2.9 92.4
University completion 9.2 6.5 0.1 31.8
GDP per capita 8078.6 8553.6 442.2 41158.9
Number of individual observations 201093.7 357384.0 2528 3373662
Country-year observations 156
Average years of schooling
All 7.8 1.9 3.1 11.9
Salaried 8.3 1.8 4.3 12.2
Self-employed 7.0 2.2 0.7 11.4
Own-account 6.7 2.2 0.7 11.1
Employers 8.9 2.2 1.4 12.7
Number of individual observations 149861.0 237657.1 3206 1174286
Country-year observations 98
Notes: Table 3.2 reports summary statistics within a country-year observation from IPUMS-I. Samples are
restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers, excluding people living within group quarters. All mean
values are weighted by personal weight in the census survey. GDP per capita used is from Penn World
Table 7.1, the PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of c, g, i, at 2005
constant prices.
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Table 3.3: Average Marginal Effects, Thailand 2000
(1) (2)
Schooling at d(y=Own-account)/dx d(y=Employer)/dx
5th percentile -0.0199*** 0.0024***
(0.0006) (0.0001)
mean -0.0175*** 0.0027***
(0.0005) (0.0002)
95th percentile -0.0123*** 0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Observations 50,146 50,146
*** represents statistical significance at 1%; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.3 reports the average marginal effects calculated from the multinomial probit model
(equation (3.13), (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) ) through the delta method. The dependent variable is one of the
labor choices, own-account self-employed workers, wage workers, or employers; and controls are age, age
squared, and a dummy for native-born. Samples are from IPUMS-I, restricted to prime age (25-55) male
workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
Table 3.4: AME at Mean Schooling on being Own-account
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N(/98)
Negative Average Marginal Effects (t < -1.96)
AME -0.02 0.013 -0.057 -0.001 91
GDPPC 4548.044 3037.813 442.201 11939.771 91
Insignificant Negative Average Marginal Effects
AME 0 0 0 0 2
GDPPC 4221.563 737.374 3700.161 4742.965 2
Insignificant Positive Average Marginal Effects
AME 0 0 0 0 2
GDPPC 7570.448 2961.004 5476.702 9664.194 2
Positive Average Marginal Effects (t > 1.96)
AME 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.005 3
GDPPC 7017.893 889.430 5995.739 7615.497 3
Notes: This table summarizes the AME of schooling on the probability of being own-account self-
employed workers at mean years of schooling within each country-year observation from 98 multinomial
probit regressions. The dependent variable is one of the labor choices, own-account self-employed workers,
wage workers, or employers; and controls are age, age squared, and a dummy for native-born. Samples are
from IPUMS-I, restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
173
Table 3.5: AME at Mean Schooling on being Employers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N(/98)
Negative Average Marginal Effects (t < -1.96)
AME -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 6
GDPPC 3556.493 2599.423 739.945 7074.860 6
Insignificant Negative Average Marginal Effects
AME 0 0 0 0 5
GDPPC 2507.923 2169.525 442.201 5995.739 5
Insignificant Positive Average Marginal Effects
AME 0 0 0 0.001 6
GDPPC 1433.758 1139.323 553.554 3577.978 6
Positive Average Marginal Effects (t > 1.96)
AME 0.003 0.002 0 0.01 81
GDPPC 5136.155 2971.12 471.689 11939.771 81
Notes: This table summarizes the AME of schooling on the probability of being employers at mean years
of schooling within each country-year observation from 98 multinomial probit regressions. The dependent
variable is one of the labor choices, own-account self-employed workers, wage workers, or employers;
and controls are age, age squared, and a dummy for native-born. Samples are from IPUMS-I, restricted to
prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
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Table 3.6: Average Marginal Effects on being wage workers versus employers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Statistically AMEopp =AMEwage
AMEopp 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.006 6
AMEwage 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.008 6
GDPPC 5381.098 3337.924 2141.621 9087.893 6
Statistically AMEopp >AMEwage
AMEopp 0.005 0.002 0 0.01 22
AMEwage -0.002 0.004 -0.013 0.004 22
GDPPC 6944.335 2040.807 3700.161 11379.896 22
Statistically AMEopp <AMEwage
AMEopp 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.007 70
AMEwage 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.058 70
GDPPC 3906.396 2888.611 442.201 11939.771 70
Notes: Statistically significance means that the hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significance level. The
dependent variable is one of the labor choices, own-account self-employed workers, wage workers, or
employers; and controls are age, age squared, and a dummy for native-born. Samples are from IPUMS-I,
restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
Table 3.7: Average Marginal Effects in the Private Sector
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Statistically AMEopp =AMEwage
AMEopp 0.004 0.003 0 0.006 4
AMEwage 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.006 4
GDPPC 4438.786 961.654 3101.991 5200.413 4
Statistically AMEopp >AMEwage
AMEopp 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.013 11
AMEwage -0.004 0.007 -0.016 0.006 11
GDPPC 7075.147 1752.148 3844.639 9087.893 11
Statistically AMEopp <AMEwage
AMEopp 0.003 0.002 0 0.007 16
AMEwage 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.031 16
GDPPC 5340.447 2982.444 588.604 10849.332 16
Notes: Statistically significance means that the hypothesis is not rejected at 5% significance level. The
dependent variable is one of the labor choices, own-account self-employed workers, wage workers, or
employers; and controls are age, age squared, and a dummy for native-born. Samples are from IPUMS-I,
restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
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Table 3.8: Prime Male Necessity and Opportunity Self-Employment Rates Across Countries
All Industries Excluding Agriculture, fishing, and forestry
Rates by Employment: Self-Employed Own-account Employer Self-Employed Own-account Employer Self-Employed Own-account Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln (GDP per capita) -12.85*** -14.47*** 1.619*** -6.596*** -8.119*** 1.524*** -6.585*** -7.890*** 1.305***
(1.398) (1.460) (0.226) (1.033) (0.963) (0.212) (2.277) (2.049) (0.462)
schooling -1.088 -1.204 0.116
(0.965) (0.868) (0.196)
age 1.367 0.771 0.597
(2.647) (2.382) (0.538)
nativity 22.18 19.56 2.618
(38.45) (34.59) (7.808)
Constant 148.0*** 157.2*** -9.291*** 84.44*** 92.85*** -8.412*** 20.02 52.41 -32.39
(11.69) (12.20) (1.893) (8.662) (8.076) (1.778) (95.57) (86.00) (19.41)
Observations 56 56 56 55 55 55 33 33 33
R-squared 0.610 0.645 0.486 0.435 0.573 0.493 0.390 0.538 0.457
***, * represents statistical significance at 1% and 10% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Taking all available census samples from IPUMS-I, the dependent variables self-employment rate,
own-account self-employment rate, and employers rate are weighted by “person weight” after restricting
the samples to prime age (25-55) males. Regressions (7) to (9) include observations with controls for
average years of schooling, average age, and average native-born rate.
Table 3.9: Own-account self-employment rate by educational attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
own-account rate for <Primary Primary Lower Secondary Secondary University
ln (GDP per capita) -12.06*** -6.861*** -5.370*** -2.147 1.721
(2.430) (2.350) (1.664) (1.429) (1.154)
age 30.72 163.4*** -53.47 73.15** -8.263
(63.98) (45.42) (40.54) (27.53) (10.57)
age2 -0.395 -2.224*** 0.799 -0.992** 0.146
(0.798) (0.613) (0.582) (0.385) (0.147)
nativity 9.402 25.32 37.58 29.06 13.86
(34.73) (56.38) (39.89) (19.59) (8.713)
Constant -475.0 -2,939*** 919.4 -1,339** 90.92
(1,274) (840.2) (712.6) (488.7) (186.2)
Observations 33 33 31 33 33
R-squared 0.576 0.449 0.383 0.348 0.455
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.9 reports the estimation of equation (3.18) when restricting the sample to 5 fixed educational
attainment groups: less than primary school completed, primary school completed but not lower secondary
school, lower secondary completed but not upper secondary school, secondary school completed but not
university and university completed. The dependent variable is the weighted own-account self-employment
rate after taking the average of the multiple years’ observations from one country. Samples are from
IPUMS-I, restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
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Table 3.10: Employers’ rate by educational attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
own-account rate for <Primary Primary Lower Secondary Secondary University
ln (GDP per capita) 1.217*** 1.247*** 1.690*** 2.533*** 3.461***
(0.346) (0.288) (0.356) (0.442) (0.580)
age 1.480 1.236 -27.46** -7.426 -7.623
(9.325) (11.54) (11.65) (8.775) (4.981)
age2 -0.0207 -0.0139 0.400** 0.110 0.112
(0.117) (0.159) (0.167) (0.126) (0.0696)
nativity -1.010 -2.813 1.066 -1.288 4.913
(5.676) (10.23) (7.433) (5.607) (4.897)
Constant -32.14 -30.63 459.3** 110.5 102.3
(183.0) (213.5) (204.2) (153.3) (88.19)
Observations 33 33 31 33 33
R-squared 0.302 0.337 0.591 0.504 0.627
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.10 reports the estimation of equation (3.19) when restricting the sample to 5 fixed
educational attainment groups: less than primary school completed, primary school completed but not
lower secondary school, lower secondary completed but not upper secondary school, secondary school
completed but not university and university completed. The dependent variable is the weighted employers’
rate after taking the average of the multiple years’ observations from one country. Samples are from
IPUMS-I, restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers not in agriculture, fishing or forestry.
Table 3.11: Own-account self-employment rate by industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Own-account Rate in Manufacture Sales Service Construction Manufacture Sales Service Construction
ln (GDP per capita) -18.70*** -17.40*** -1.096 -7.381*** -18.92*** -20.14*** -0.584 -7.874**
(3.042) (2.189) (2.729) (2.387) (2.860) (3.303) (2.102) (3.221)
age 186.1 133.0 -304.7 -1.465
(149.4) (83.23) (184.5) (137.5)
age2 -2.509 -1.781 4.084 0.0257
(2.035) (1.131) (2.446) (1.821)
nativity -42.79 19.39 87.20 -63.05
(43.00) (32.34) (53.84) (52.56)
Constant 178.3*** 192.1*** 27.62 88.21*** -3,228 -2,287 5,620 172.0
(25.72) (17.88) (22.87) (19.89) (2,732) (1,515) (3,437) (2,554)
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
R-squared 0.630 0.612 0.009 0.230 0.658 0.648 0.161 0.263
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.11 reports the estimation of equation (3.18) when restricting the sample to 4 specific
industries. The dependent variable is the own-account self-employment rate weighted by “person weight”
after taking the average of the multiple years’ observations from one country. Samples are from IPUMS-I,
restricted to prime age (25-55) male workers.
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Table 3.12: Employers’ rate by industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Employers’ Rate in Manufacture Sales Service Construction Manufacture Sales Service Construction
ln (GDP per capita) 1.578*** 3.982*** 1.705*** 0.933*** 1.582*** 3.864*** 1.783*** 1.488***
(0.342) (0.610) (0.257) (0.300) (0.344) (0.517) (0.329) (0.318)
age -20.88 -92.22*** -62.53*** -33.78
(26.76) (18.21) (12.35) (29.54)
age2 0.286 1.273*** 0.841*** 0.442
(0.365) (0.252) (0.164) (0.389)
nativity 8.561 -3.626 10.71* 5.603
(6.083) (5.778) (5.614) (8.959)
Constant -8.643*** -25.84*** -10.33*** -4.216 364.5 1,647*** 1,141*** 630.2
(2.767) (4.545) (1.950) (2.599) (491.5) (330.2) (228.3) (553.4)
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
R-squared 0.289 0.529 0.487 0.124 0.314 0.701 0.601 0.255
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.12 reports the estimation of equation (3.19) when restricting the sample to 4 specific
industries. The dependent variable is the employers’ rate weighted by “person weight” after taking the
average of the multiple years’ observations from one country. Samples are from IPUMS-I, restricted to
prime age (25-55) male workers.
Table 3.13: Own-account self-employment rate by educational attainment with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
own-account rate for All <Primary Primary Lower Secondary Secondary University
ln (GDP per capita) -7.194*** 1.819 -2.581 1.981 1.981 -2.286
(2.174) (3.039) (2.760) (2.559) (1.596) (1.413)
age -124.8 -74.96*** -8.272 -6.950 -11.20 -20.74
(77.87) (27.08) (21.43) (30.63) (15.42) (14.44)
age2 1.682 0.941*** 0.138 0.116 0.191 0.297
(1.049) (0.339) (0.292) (0.430) (0.216) (0.193)
schooling 1.606*** 0.100 1.062 0.0415 -0.0368 0.237
(0.575) (0.226) (1.963) (0.270) (0.114) (0.178)
nativity 54.76 41.84 125.2** 135.3*** 57.85*** -5.339
(34.53) (37.33) (47.90) (39.24) (15.97) (8.915)
Constant 2,332 1,466*** 35.90 -24.77 101.0 393.0
(1,452) (540.9) (411.8) (551.5) (276.9) (270.3)
Observations 91 91 91 86 91 91
R-squared 0.318 0.145 0.210 0.272 0.527 0.253
Number of cntry 28 28 28 26 28 28
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.13 reports the estimation of equation (3.20) with and without restricting the sample to 5
fixed educational attainment groups: less than primary school completed, primary school completed but
not lower secondary school, lower secondary completed but not upper secondary school, secondary school
completed but not university, and university completed.
178
Table 3.14: Employers’ rate by educational attainment with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employers rate for All <Primary Primary Lower Secondary Secondary University
ln (GDP per capita) 0.849 0.560 0.729 -0.158 -0.357 -0.610
(0.822) (0.730) (0.755) (0.801) (0.756) (1.085)
age 92.84*** -1.401 3.360 18.61* 16.34** 25.96**
(29.44) (6.505) (5.862) (9.586) (7.303) (11.09)
age2 -1.247*** 0.0203 -0.0470 -0.259* -0.229** -0.343**
(0.396) (0.0814) (0.0799) (0.135) (0.102) (0.149)
schooling 0.243 0.0539 0.766 0.117 0.0286 0.143
(0.217) (0.0543) (0.537) (0.0844) (0.0540) (0.136)
nativity -7.880 3.308 -31.53** -20.12 7.282 10.24
(13.06) (8.967) (13.10) (12.28) (7.563) (6.850)
Constant -1,725*** 18.61 -37.10 -309.9* -290.9** -489.4**
(549.0) (129.9) (112.6) (172.6) (131.2) (207.7)
Observations 91 91 91 86 91 91
R-squared 0.195 0.081 0.122 0.160 0.088 0.132
Number of cntry 28 28 28 26 28 28
***, ** represents statistical significance at 1% and 5% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Table 3.14 reports the estimation of equation (3.21) with and without restricting the sample to 5
fixed educational attainment groups: less than primary school completed, primary school completed but
not lower secondary school, lower secondary completed but not upper secondary school, secondary school
completed but not university, and university completed.
Table 3.15: Calibration
Target Moments (CAN in 2001) Data Model Parameter
Ratio of the average wage
1.3 1.3
Ratio of the log(ability) distribution mean
for high- to low-education for high- to low-education = 4.2
Variance of log(wage) 0.8 0.8 Variance of log(ability) distribution= 1.1
Own-account Rate 8 8 Sector share γ= 0.52
Employers’ Rate 5 8
Employers’ share in formal production
α= 0.91
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Table 3.16: Prime Male Necessity and Opportunity Self-Employment Rates Across Country-
years
All Industries Excluding Agriculture, fishing, and forestry
Rates by Employment: Self-Employed Own-account Employer Self-Employed Own-account Employer Self-Employed Own-account Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln (GDP per capita) -13.09*** -14.75*** 1.656*** -6.782*** -8.271*** 1.489*** -6.653*** -7.922*** 1.269***
(0.823) (0.852) (0.159) (0.683) (0.641) (0.164) (1.257) (1.164) (0.332)
schooling 0.0769 0.0575 0.0195
(0.512) (0.474) (0.135)
age 1.991 1.458 0.533
(1.255) (1.162) (0.331)
nativity 50.16** 47.01** 3.147
(23.57) (21.82) (6.214)
Constant 150.6*** 160.4*** -9.793*** 85.96*** 94.11*** -8.156*** -38.39 -8.947 -29.44**
(6.996) (7.239) (1.347) (5.836) (5.483) (1.403) (49.36) (45.70) (13.01)
Observations 162 162 162 156 156 156 98 98 98
R-squared 0.612 0.652 0.405 0.391 0.519 0.348 0.284 0.399 0.264
***, * represents statistical significance at 1% and 10% respectively; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Notes: Taking all available census samples from IPUMS-I, the dependent variables self-employment rate,
own-account self-employment rate, and employers rate are weighted by “person weight” after restricting
the samples to prime age (25-55) males. Regressions (7) to (9) include observations with controls for
average years of schooling, average age, and average native-born rate.
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